





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THE
HISTORY
OF THE
REIGN
OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

By ROBERT WATSON, LL. D.

*PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AND RHETORIC
IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREW'S.*


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HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.
BOOK XI.

WHILE the transactions that have been related passed in Zealand, the same spirit of revolt, by which the people of that province were actuated, made rapid progress in some of the other provinces. The inhabitants of Enchuyfen were the first in North Holland who had the courage to plant the standard of liberty upon their walls; and those of Medenblick, Edam, Purmerend, and other towns, quickly followed the example. In some of these places, part of the people were averse to this revolution; but these were few, compared with their opponents, and were obliged either to yield to the majority, or to secure themselves by flight from their resentment.

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The revolt
of Holland.

The same measures were pursued, at the same time, in the southern parts of the province. That

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flame which had been kindled some time before, burst out at once in a thousand different places. And in a few months, Leyden, Gouda, Dort, Haerlem, and all the other towns in Holland, Amsterdam excepted, had openly declared against the Spaniards, and avowed their resolution to acknowledge no other authority in future, but that of the prince of Orange, and the States. The same resolution was formed in several of the cities of Overysfel, Friesland, and Utrecht.

This revolution, so favorable to William's views, was not a little promoted by intrigues, which, although he himself was absent, were carried on in his name, and by his authority. In letters to the principal inhabitants he had allured them to his interest, by flattering them with the hopes of having all their privileges secured; of enjoying full freedom to exercise their religion, whether protestant or catholic; and of being for ever delivered from that oppressive load of taxes with which they had been overwhelmed. In order to enforce these exhortations, he sent his agents throughout the provinces; and most of these were persons either of great address, or of great authority and influence among the people ^x.

^x In Holland, the revolution was chiefly owing to the activity of Sonoy, whom the prince had sent thither as governor-substitute, till he himself should arrive: and in Guelderland, Utrecht, and Friesland, to the count of Bag, a nobleman of interest in those parts, who was married to William's sister, and acted in every thing by his direction.

William's military preparations were at this time far advanced, and he hoped soon to begin his march, with the probability of a more prosperous issue than had attended his former expedition. He had already collected a formidable army of well-disciplined forces. Considerable sums had been transmitted to him by the friends of his cause; and the strongest assurances had been given him, that some of the principal cities in the southern provinces would open their gates to receive him. But no circumstance contributed more to inspire him with a confidence of success, than the new measures which, a little before the present period, had been embraced by the court of France.

In the bloody contest, which had subsisted for several years between the catholics and protestants in that kingdom, the former had generally been victorious. But the latter, roused by their leaders, aided by foreign powers, animated by zeal for their religion, and inflamed with resentment on account of the cruel persecutions which had been exercised against them, continued to make such vigorous efforts, as created in their enemies the most alarming apprehensions with regard to the issue of the war. The court had, at different times, offered them advantageous terms of accommodation; and peace had oftener than once been established between the contending parties. But their pretensions, their interests, and their religious principles, were incompatible; and they remained quiet only till they were in a condition to renew

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His military
preparations.

The affairs
of France.

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hostilities. The court never had more reason to entertain hopes of being able to extirpate their opponents, than towards the end of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-nine. Their brave and active leader, the prince of Condé, had been killed in the battle of Jarnac; they had afterwards received a dreadful overthrow in the battle of Moncontour; and the admiral Coligni, with the young princes of Bourbon, had been obliged to retire, with the feeble remains of their shattered army, to the mountains of Gascony and Languedoc. There, however, they exerted themselves strenuously in making preparations for trying once more the fortune of war; and in a few months, they drew together a force sufficient to enable them to leave their retreat, and to enter the lists against the royal army.

Queen
mother's plot
against the
protestants.

When intelligence of this was brought to the queen mother, who exercised at that time an unlimited authority in the government, she was equally exasperated and alarmed; and she resolved to employ other means than open force, to be avenged upon her enemies. She communicated her plan only to the king, the duke of Anjou, the cardinal of Lorraine, the duke of Guise, and Alberto Gondi, count of Retz; who all engaged to maintain the most inviolable secrecy. Time only brought to light their dark design. The protestants, they now believed, were not to be overcome by the force of arms; and it was resolved to have recourse to fraud and circumvention.

In pursuance of this plan, a new treaty with

the princes of Navarre and the admiral was set on foot, and soon afterwards concluded at St. Germain. By this treaty, the protestants received a free pardon of all their past offences, with liberty to make public profession of the reformed religion; and the princes and admiral were allowed, for their security, to retain possession of Rochelle, Cognac, La Charité, or Montauban, on condition, that if the articles of the peace were observed, these places should be delivered to the king within the space of two years from the date of the present pacification.

The protestant leaders entertained the same distrust of the sincerity of the king and queen mother in this, as in all their former negotiations. They were still afraid of putting themselves in their power, and remained at a distance from court, in the places of strength which had been assigned them. In order to remove their suspicions, every species of artifice was employed. All the articles of the peace were punctually fulfilled. Strict orders were issued to allow the protestants in all places to celebrate openly their religious assemblies; and in all the disputes which happened between the catholics and them, the latter were treated with indulgence, while the former had, on many occasions, reason to complain of injustice or severity. Charles embraced every opportunity to express the pleasure which he now enjoyed, in having restored tranquillity to his kingdom; and even when none but zealous catholics were present, he often declared how unalterably fixed his purpose was, to perform,

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with strict fidelity, his engagements with the protestants. He had sufficiently experienced the folly of attempting to subdue men's consciences by force; and no consideration would make him return to his former unhappy measures; which he had found to be no less ineffectual for accomplishing the end intended, than they were destructive of his own repose, and pernicious to his subjects. All his counsellors, except those who were partners in the bloody secret, believed him to be sincere; and, by the accounts which they gave of his discourse, added to the displeasure which they expressed at his change of conduct, they contributed to complete the delusion of the protestants. The admiral, however, still retained his wonted diffidence; and when urged by the king to come to court, and receive in person every proof that could be given him of sincere attachment, he declared, that it was impossible for him to think himself secure, where his mortal enemies of the family of Guise were possessed of so much power.

To have gratified the admiral by so great a concession as the immediate removal of the Guises, Charles knew would have had a suspicious aspect; and therefore he went no further at this time, than to assure him that his fears were groundless, and that his enemies were not masters as formerly. But soon after the duke of Guise and his brother left the court, seemingly much disgusted with the measures which were there pursued. At the same time, other means of delusion were employed, more likely to produce the desired effect.

Charles offered his sister in marriage to the King of Navarre; and an ambaffador was fent to England, to negociate a match between the duke of Anjou and queen Elizabeth. But of all the instruments of deceit which he employed, there was none more efficacious, than the declaration which he made of his refolution to enter into war with the king of Spain. Philip had refused, he faid, to grant him reparation for certain injuries which his fubjects had received from the Spaniards in America; and he was determined to take vengeance on that prince, by invading his dominions in the Netherlands. He offered the command of the army, which he talked of fending thither, to the admiral, and affured him that he would be entirely governed by his counfels, and thofe of the prince of Orange and count Lewis, in carrying on the war.

No propofal could be better calculated than this to blind the admiral's penetration. Confcious of fuperior military talents, he was naturally fond of war; fincere in his profeflion of the reformed religion, he was zealous to propagate and defend it; and he was ftrongly attached by fymphony of manners, as well as religious principles, to the princes of Naffau. Count Lewis was with him at Rochelle, when the propofal was delivered, and he contributed not a little to banifh from his mind the remains of thofe fufpicions, which he ftill retained of the king's fincerity. Soon afterwards they both fet out for Paris, where they were received and treated with fo much efteem and confidence,

BOOK as gave the admiral a full conviction that the sentiments both of the king and the queen mother were in reality what they seemed.

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Charles thought it necessary for his purpose to wear the mask for some time longer; and as he found that nothing had served so effectually to lull the admiral's suspicions as this last device, he affected to be extremely solicitous about making preparations for the war; and in the mean time desired count Lewis to repair to the frontiers of the Netherlands; to communicate his design to the malecontents, and to hold them in readiness for the admiral's arrival with the troops. There was nothing farther from his intention than to begin hostilities. But no sooner were the Huguenots informed of the design on which count Lewis had set out, than great numbers of them, prompted by their religious zeal, and by the restless military spirit of the age, flocked after him, and offered to assist him in any enterprise he should undertake.

Lewis was himself of too active a temper to suffer them to remain long without employment. It was of the utmost consequence, he knew, towards the success of that expedition on which his brother was about to enter, as well as of the French invasion of the Netherlands, to acquire possession early of some fortified town in the frontier provinces. With this view he had maintained a secret correspondence with some of the inhabitants of Mons; and he made himself master of that important city by the following stratagem.

Having left the confines of France, he arrived

in the evening with five hundred horse and a thousand musqueteers at a wood in the neighbourhood of Mons, whence he sent forward ten or twelve of his soldiers, whom he selected on account of their superior address and resolution. They entered Mons in the evening, and lodged together in the same inn. They gave out that they were dealers in wine; informed their host, that their servants were bringing a quantity of that liquor, and inquired at what hour the gate of the city, by which it was to be brought in, would be opened. They were told, that, for a small reward, the keeper would open it at any time. And early next morning, having bribed the keeper to open it, they seized upon the keys, and dispersed the guards. Count Lewis, who was at hand with a hundred horse, immediately rushed in, and having taken possession of the gate, with a part of his troops, he traversed the principal streets of the city with the rest, and proclaimed to the inhabitants, that he was not come as an enemy, but as a friend; and that the prince of Orange was approaching with a powerful army, to assert their liberty, and to deliver them from all those oppressive taxes which had been imposed upon them by the duke of Alva.

All the citizens still remained within their houses, except a few who were privy to his design; but he began to grow uneasy when he reflected on the small number of men that were with him, and to wonder that the rest of his troops were not come forward. It was to no purpose, he knew, to

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attempt keeping possession of so great a town with so small a force. He rode out therefore as fast as he could towards the place where he had left his troops, who had lost their way, and were wandering in the wood. He conducted them immediately to the city; not without anxiety, lest he should find the gate shut against him on his return. But such was the consternation of the citizens, and their ignorance of what had passed, that none of them had ventured to stir without their houses. The gate was still open, and every thing in the town as quiet and motionless as when he left it. He then placed his guards at the several gates, and on the ramparts; and calling the magistrates together, explained to them his own, and his brother's designs; giving them the strongest assurances that no violence should be committed by his soldiers. After which he commanded such of the citizens as he could not trust, to deliver up their arms; and ordered all of them to proceed as formerly in the pursuit of their customary occupations. His troops did not amount to more than fifteen hundred men; but he soon acquired a much greater force by the accession of many protestants, who hastened to his assistance from Picardy and Champaign².

The loss of Mons affected the duke of Alva in the most sensible manner; and it gave him the greater uneasiness and concern, as it was altogether

² Bentivoglio, p. 95. Meursii Auriacus, p. 79. Meteren, p. 95.

unexpected. Being no stranger to count Lewis's enterprising genius, he had kept an anxious eye upon all his motions, during his abode in France; especially after the peace of St. Germain's, and the kind reception he had met with from the king. The latest account which he had received of him from his spies at Paris was, that he was playing at tennis; by which piece of intelligence, they meant to insinuate that he was more attentive to amusement, than to any serious pursuit. When the duke therefore was informed of his success at Mons, he discovered the utmost impatience and chagrin. In the rage which it excited in him, throwing down his hat, and trampling upon it, "I have been deceived," he cried, "by a Tuscan woman (meaning Catherine of Medicis), but ere long, instead of Tuscan lilies, she shall feel the smart of Spanish thorns."

His vexation was much increased by his knowledge of the great importance of the place which he had lost. He considered that Mons was not only the capital of the province of Hainault, but one of the largest and most populous cities in the Low Countries; that, being situated in a marshy soil, it might easily be rendered impregnable; that although it was not in the line of the barrier towns, yet it was removed at so small a distance from the frontier, that the possession of it must greatly facilitate the entrance of foreign troops into the provinces; and that either the French king, whose conduct had for some time past had so hostile an

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appearance, or the prince of Orange, could easily furnish it with supplies.

These considerations made him resolve to attempt the recovery of it without delay, but while he was making the preparations necessary for this purpose, he received intelligence of the revolution in Holland; and at the same time was informed, that the prince of Orange, having already collected a numerous army, was about to begin his march. Alva, far from shrinking at the view of so many impending dangers, exerted himself with great activity and vigor to repel them. He carried on his levies with the utmost diligence, and in a very short time found himself possessed of between five and six thousand German horse and eighteen thousand foot of the same nation; besides fifty companies of Spaniards, and one hundred and fifty of Walloons, and other natives of the Netherlands. He would gladly have sent a part of these forces to recover the revolted cities in the maritime provinces, and the rest to the siege of Mons; but when he reflected on the difficulty which he must encounter in either of these two enterprises, he apprehended that his army, numerous as it was, could not with safety be divided. He resolved therefore to employ it, whole and entire, against his enemies on one hand of him, before he should turn it to the other.

Still, however, he remained in great perplexity, finding it difficult to determine whether it was most expedient to begin with the siege of Mons, or the recovery of the maritime provinces. And to assist him in deciding this important question, he

called a council of his principal officers; when the marquis of Vitelli, one of the first in rank, as well as in military merit, advised him earnestly to begin with the latter, and supported his opinion by observing, "That although the interior provinces were liable to be invaded from the side of France or Germany, yet it would not be difficult to recover whatever cities should be lost in those provinces, as the inhabitants were in general more loyal than those of Holland and Zealand, and much less infected with the spirit of innovation in religion. That the Huguenots under count Lewis were destitute of means to support themselves, and must soon be dispersed; for he could not be persuaded that the French king, who had hitherto shown so much zeal for the true religion, would ever debase himself so far, as to favor the attempts of his rebellious subjects to subvert it. The German forces under the prince of Orange, undisciplined and tumultuary, were actuated in their present warfare, by no other motives but those of pay and plunder. And if they were disappointed in their expectation of these, there was little ground to doubt that they would chuse rather to return home, after taking vengeance on their leaders, than expose themselves to the fatigue and danger of besieging towns and fortresses. We may therefore, without anxiety," continued he, "put off the siege of Mons, and the defence of the inland frontier, till a more convenient season shall arrive. But the state of the maritime provinces admits not of the least delay. The people there are universally infected

B O O K with heresy. They have conceived a degree of
XI. phrenzy, and indulged themselves in the most
1572. extravagant excesses against the church and the
 king. Their situation, strong by nature, will soon
 be rendered impregnable. Every passage of a river
 and canal will require an army, to force it, and
 every siege, a campaign, to finish it. By the
 sea, and by the rivers, they can be always richly
 furnished with provisions; they can every hour re-
 ceive succour from France, Germany, or England;
 and will be able, by their naval force, to prevent
 the king's army from receiving supplies from Spain.
 It is there too, the prince of Orange, for many
 years, was governor. There he possesses several
 large estates; and he has formed there numerous
 and close connexions with persons of the greatest
 influence in the country. As it was in these pro-
 vinces he first erected the standard of rebellion, it
 is in them he intends to fix the seat of that usurp-
 ed dominion which he is so ambitious to maintain.
 Let us attack our enemy first in his strong hold;
 and when we have driven him from thence, we
 shall find it much easier to prevent him from estab-
 lishing himself in any other quarter."

Such were the reasons which Vitelli gave for
 advising the duke of Alva to postpone the siege of
 Mons; and, if his advice had been followed, it is
 probable that the republic of the United Provinces
 would never have been formed. The people had
 not yet had time to put the cities into a proper
 state of defence; and they could not have long
 resisted so great a force as the duke of Alva might

have employed to subdue them. Amsterdam and Middleburgh were still unshaken in their allegiance. With the ships belonging to these two wealthy cities, and those which he would have received from Spain, a fleet might have been equipped superior to that of the protestants; who must have been soon reduced to the necessity of submitting to whatever terms Philip might have thought fit to impose.

No such pernicious consequences as those which were foretold by Vitelli, could have followed from allowing the enemy to remain for some time in possession of Mons; nor even from the conquest which the prince of Orange might have made of other places. In an open country, such as the interior provinces, the fate of towns must depend entirely on the number and discipline of the armies employed to attack or defend them; and in both these respects, the duke of Alva had reason to believe that he would be at all times able to maintain his superiority; especially if, by first reducing the maritime provinces, he could keep open his communication by sea with Spain.

But it is infinitely easier for men to judge concerning matters of such nice deliberation, after the event has happened, than when they are about to enter upon action. It ought to be considered, that Alva had not yet experienced the difficulties attending the siege of towns, situated in a country so much intersected by the sea, by rivers, and canals, as the maritime provinces; and could not foresee those amazing exertions which the people

B O O K made, first in their preparations for war, and after.
XI. wards in the defence of their cities when attacked.
1572. He had likewise reason to entertain suspicions of the hostile intentions of the French king. He dreaded the havock which would be made by the army of the prince of Orange, in the richer and more fertile provinces; and thought it would bring an indelible stain upon his honor, if he did not endeavour to prevent it. Besides these motives, it is not improbable, considering the natural violence of his temper, that he was in some degree influenced, in the resolution which he formed, by his personal jealousy of the prince of Orange, and his desire of disappointing a second time the attempts of one who had formerly rivalled him in the favor of his prince.

The siege of
Mons.

Whatever were his motives, he resolved to begin his operations with the siege of Mons; and to delay the reduction of Holland till he should disengage himself from his enemies on the southern frontier. In order to increase the number of his forces, he commanded the garrisons of Rotterdam and Delftshaven, the only towns in Holland in which he had any garrisons left, to join him; and immediately sent off his son Frederic de Toledo, accompanied by Noircharmes and Vitelli, with a part of the troops, to form the blockade of Mons.

The inhabitants of that city, though suspicious at first of count Lewis's intention, were now well satisfied with his government, and were solicitous to provide for their defence against the Spaniards. They assisted him with great alacrity in completing
 their

their fortifications. They were active in laying in military stores and provisions; and having repeatedly sallied out for this purpose, after Toledo's arrival in their neighbourhood, they had several rencounters with his troops.

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Lewis had, some time before, sent the Sieur de Jenlis to Paris, to inform the king of his success, and to solicit the speedy march of the troops which he had promised to send to his assistance. Charles received Jenlis in the most gracious manner, affected to be extremely happy with the accounts which he had brought him, and gave him authority to levy forces; hoping that, before they could take the field, he would be able to put an end to the scene of dissimulation which he had so long been acting. But the admiral, who was allowed to exercise an unlimited power in the administration, pushed forward the levies with greater vigor than the king intended; and, in a few weeks, Jenlis was ready to set out with between four and five thousand foot and four hundred horse. The admiral and count Lewis concurred in advising him to direct his march by the way of Cambray, that he might avoid being intercepted by the enemy, and join the army of the prince of Orange. But Jenlis refused to comply with this wholesome counsel. He vainly hoped to be able, with his own forces alone, to oblige the Spaniards to quit the siege; and he wished to secure this honor to himself, rather than leave it to be reaped by the prince of Orange. Notice was sent privately to Toledo, from the court of France, of the route

BOOK which he was to take, and of the time of his
 XI. departure. Toledo immediately drew off his forces
 1572. from the blockade, and advanced to meet him on
 the frontier; being desirous to engage at a distance
 from the town, lest count Lewis should fall
 out, and attack the Spaniards in the rear, when
 they were engaged in battle with Jenlis. Toledo
 had reached a village called St. Ghislain, at the
 distance of a few miles from Mons, when he was
 informed that the enemy had entered a neighbour-
 ing wood, and that upon their coming out from
 it he might attack them with great advantage. He
 ordered his cavalry to march first, and followed
 as fast as he was able with the infantry. The
 cavalry had almost reached the borders of the
 wood, when they perceived a hundred of the
 enemy's horse that had been sent before to recon-
 noitre. These the Spaniards instantly attacked, and
 drove back into the wood, pursuing them closely
 till they reached the main army, which was
 thrown into confusion by the precipitate flight of
 the fugitives. In a very little time the whole
 Spanish army arrived, and began the attack, be-
 fore Jenlis had time to draw up his men in order
 of battle. The French made resistance, however,
 for two hours with great bravery; but at last they
 gave way, and endeavoured to save themselves
 by flight. Upwards of twelve hundred fell on the
 field, and many were killed in the pursuit, partly
 by the Spaniards, and partly by the country people,
 who took cruel vengeance for the injuries which
 they had received from them in their march. Jenlis

himself was taken prisoner, and conducted to the citadel of Antwerp; where, having died suddenly, his death was ascribed to poison. The loss sustained by the Spanish army was inconsiderable.

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Toledo returned to Mons in a few days after this distinguished victory; and soon after the duke of Alva arrived. The cautious general having drawn a double trench and rampart round his army, by which it was rendered secure on one side against the sallies of the besieged, and on the other, against any sudden attack that might be made upon it by the prince of Orange, he immediately erected several batteries, and began his fire in different quarters with great fury. The besieged discovered no less vigor in their defence; which was conducted with great prudence, as well as the most indefatigable activity, by count Lewis, seconded in all his operations by the celebrated La Noue, who had gained distinguished renown in the civil wars of France.

Alva's arrival
before Mons.

But although the besieged displayed the utmost skill and intrepidity, they had no hopes of being able to raise the siege, without the assistance of the prince of Orange. William had already penetrated into the Low Countries, and advanced as far as Ruremond. There he stopped, and demanded a supply of provisions for his troops. The government of the town was in the hands of zealous catholics, who not only rejected his request, but accompanied their refusal with a degree of haughtiness and insolence, by which the prince and his army were highly exasperated. There were many

Arrival of
the prince of
Orange in the
Netherlands.

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of the citizens, however, with whom he had formerly held intelligence. Having at this time renewed his correspondence with them, he made a brisk attack upon one of the gates. The catholics sustained it with spirit; but while they were thus employed, the protestant inhabitants snatched the opportunity, and introduced the assailants by another gate into the city. It was not then in the power of the prince of Orange to restrain the fury of his soldiers. They plundered many of the citizens, violated the churches, and put to death, with great barbarity, several priests, and other religionists. By some popish historians, William himself has been blamed on account of these enormities. But these writers seem neither to have known that he published an edict to prevent them, nor to have considered, that as he could not but perceive that violent measures were calculated to hurt his cause, by alienating the affections of the people in other cities, so his conduct, on innumerable other occasions, furnishes the strongest proof of his utter aversion to all cruelty and outrage.

William's acquisition of Ruremond was of great importance, as it put him in possession of a commodious passage over the Maese; he therefore left a garrison to defend it, and hastened forwards to Hainault. The citizens of Mechlin having been gained over to his interest by the Sieur de Dorp, opened their gates to receive him. There he likewise left a garrison. The citizens of Louvain refused to admit him within their walls; but, on his preparing

to employ force, they consented to grant him a contribution; of which he accepted, in order to save the time which the siege would have cost him. Nivelles, Diest, Sichein, Tillemont, and several other towns surrendered to him; some through fear and others through the affection which they bore to his cause or person. Dendremond and Oudenarde were taken by surprise, and great irregularities were committed by the soldiers in both these places, especially in the latter, where notwithstanding their leader's prohibition, they once more indulged that ungovernable fury with which their bigotry inspired them against the ecclesiastics of the Romish communion.

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William made his stay at each of these places as short as possible. He did not, however, arrive in Hainault till the beginning of September, when his army amounted to more than twenty thousand men.

So great an army could not be supported long without more ample funds than he possessed. The States of Holland had sent him a considerable sum. The exiles had transmitted to him a part of the money that rose from their captures. His other friends had raised contributions proportioned to their abilities. But so great had been the expense of levying, equipping, and maintaining his troops, and such immense sums had been laid out in purchasing artillery and military stores, that he had occasion still for all the supplies which had been promised him by the court of France.

But his hopes of relief from that quarter were now utterly extinguished. The plan of treachery

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above mentioned, which had been carried on for two years, with a degree of perseverance as well as of dissimulation that has not its parallel in history, was at this time brought to a conclusion. The artifices employed to delude the protestant leaders had at length succeeded, and they were almost all caught in the net which had been prepared for their destruction.

The admiral had remained at court for several months, during which time Charles gave him every day fresh marks of affection and esteem. That deceitful monarch had shown likewise a particular attachment to the admiral's friends, and was perpetually surrounded with them at council, in his own apartments, and when he went abroad. With his permission, the admiral had left Paris, and gone to Chatillon, where he staid for some time to settle his private affairs. This indulgence was calculated to create in him the most assured confidence; since it could hardly be supposed, that if the king had intended him any harm, by enticing him to court, he would have allowed him to depart from it. To such a height was the admiral's security now risen, that when Charles expressed his desire of having all grounds of enmity between him and the Guises removed, he readily consented that they should come to Paris, and agreed to refer the several points of difference between himself and them to the king's decision. In a few days after, the duke of Guise arrived, attended by a numerous train of dependants; and a formal reconciliation was made in presence of the king. But it

soon appeared how little sincerity there was on one side, in the professions which were uttered on that occasion.

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As a prelude to the final catastrophe, the queen of Navarre, a princess who by her spirit and magnanimity had long been formidable to the catholics, died, after a short illness, which was generally ascribed to poison. And an attempt was made, by a partisan of Guise, to assassinate the admiral. By this last event the protestants were greatly alarmed; but the king and queen mother, by redoubling their dissimulation, and assuming, with consummate artifice, the appearance of deep concern for what had happened, prevented the admiral from suspecting *them* to have been privy to it, and diverted him and the other protestant leaders from forming any vigorous resolution of providing for their safety. They were all found therefore defenceless and unprepared.

In that horrid scene which passed on the night of the twenty-fourth of August, the duke of Guise was the principal actor. But his savage spirit quickly diffused itself into every breast; and no catholic declined to assist him in the execution of his bloody purpose. The admiral, to whom, not many days before, he had pledged his friendship, was among the first who fell a sacrifice to his fury. This great man died with a fortitude and tranquillity suitable to his character. "Young man," said he to La Besme, (who was sent into his apartment by the duke of Guise, while Guise himself remained without till the deed was perpetrated) "you ought to

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reverence grey hairs; but proceed to the execution of your design; you can shorten my life but a very little." While he was saying this, the assassin plunged his sword into his breast. At the same time all his domestics and friends were murdered; among whom was the brave Guerchy, his lieutenant, and his son-in-law, the amiable Taligny, who had won even the savage heart of Charles, and whose engaging aspect suspended for some time the lifted hands of his murderers. But it does not belong to this history to enter more particularly into the detail of this transaction. Upwards of ten thousand protestants were massacred in Paris alone; and in the other cities of the kingdom, between fifty and sixty thousand.

Of this horrid massacre the first idea is said to have been suggested to the queen mother by Philip, through the duke of Alva, at conferences held at Bayonne in one thousand five-hundred and fifty-nine; and it is certain, that intelligence of it was received at Madrid with the utmost joy. Philip offered public thanksgiving to heaven for the destruction of his enemies; and wrote to Charles a congratulatory letter on the subject. On the other hand, it filled the protestants in the Low-Countries with horror and consternation. Their hopes of obtaining deliverance from the Spanish yoke, through the powerful aid of France, had been raised to the greatest height, and their dejection now was in proportion to their former expectations.

Nothing could be more galling to the prince of Orange than the news of this disaster. Besides the

cruel disappointment of finding a powerful monarch his mortal enemy, whom he had so much reason to believe to be his friend, he knew not what dangerous effect this unexpected revolution might produce upon his troops, especially as some of them were subjects of France, and had entered into his service, under a belief that their king was to support them in their present enterprize.

Perceiving therefore the necessity of pushing forward his operations with the utmost vigor, and being persuaded, that, without some signal instance of success, he could not long support his army, he advanced without delay towards Mons; being resolved to try every expedient, not only to raise the siege, but if possible to bring on a general engagement.

Operations of
the prince of
Orange.

The duke easily penetrated into his design, and omitted nothing in his power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. After the arrival of several German auxiliaries in his camp, his army was superior in number, as it had always been in discipline, to that of the prince; and he could not have much reason to dread the event of a battle, in case he should find it unavoidable. But knowing that the fate of battles is decided sometimes by accidents, against which no human prudence can provide; and considering, that the prince's army, through the scantiness of his funds, would probably soon fall to pieces of itself, he resumed the principles on which he had acted in the time of William's former expedition, and resolved to avoid exposing his troops to any unnecessary risk; hoping, that, by tiring out the enemy, he should be able to triumph

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over them without fighting. With this view, while he invested the town on every side, and prevented any supplies from being thrown into it, he intrenched his camp so strongly, as to render it entirely impracticable for the prince of Orange to force his lines. He fortified the several passes by which the town might be approached in the strongest manner; watched over every operation himself, with indefatigable attention; and forbade his men to engage in the slightest skirmish with the enemy, whatever provocation they might receive.

After having taken these precautions, he sent out five hundred horse to reconnoitre. They were met by nearly the same number of German horse, commanded by count Henry, William's youngest brother, who being ambitious to distinguish himself in this his first campaign, attacked the Spaniards with uncommon fury, and after killing many of them, broke their ranks, and drove them back in great confusion. The prince himself followed soon afterwards with all his army, and drew it up in battle array before the duke of Alva's camp.

But Alva, more determined than ever since the repulse of the cavalry to adhere to his plan, kept all his men within their intrenchments. The prince of Orange omitted nothing in his power to induce him to change his purpose. He shifted his ground, intercepted the convoys of provisions, attacked the foragers, and sent out parties on every side, with a view to entice the enemy to quit their lines.

There were persons in the Spanish camp who condemned their general's conduct on this occasion,

and exhorted him to put to proof that courage of which the enemy were so extremely ostentatious. Among these was the archbishop of Cologne³, whose ardent spirit breathed nothing but war and battle, and who could not relish those cautious maxims by which the duke of Alva had resolved to regulate his conduct. Alva remained equally firm against the importunities of his friends, and the arts that were practised by the enemy. It was a maxim often in his mouth, that as all human events are precarious, the most precarious of all is a battle: to which he added, that it ought not to be the aim of a general to fight, but to overcome; and that there were other means by which this aim might be accomplished more effectually than by fighting.

But although his conduct was not approved by the archbishop of Cologne, he had the satisfaction to know that it gave the deepest uneasiness to the prince of Orange; who perceived, that if an opportunity did not offer soon of striking some important blow, by which he might raise the siege, it would not be possible for him to keep his army together. His finances did not enable him to bring provisions from a distance, and all the country round had been plundered by the Spaniards. Being driven therefore to despair, he made a bold effort to break through the enemy's intrenchments; but this adventurous attempt, which nothing could

³ The count of Isenburg.

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justify but the urgent motive that incited him, was attended with such an issue as he had reason to expect. His men were bravely repulsed, and a considerable loss sustained.

He now relinquished all hopes of either raising the siege, or forcing an engagement; and he resolved to leave Hainault, after attempting to introduce such supplies into the town as might enable the garrison to hold out till winter, when the duke of Alva would be obliged to retire. For this purpose, he made choice of two thousand horse and one thousand foot, the flower of his army. There was only a single pass by which they could have access to the town, and at that place Alva had built a strong fort, of which he committed the defence to a select body of Spanish troops, under the command of Sancho d'Avila and Julio Romero. Notwithstanding this precaution, which left hardly a possibility of success, the troops destined for the relief of Mons advanced towards the pass with the utmost intrepidity. Romero and D'Avila received them with equal intrepidity; and were seconded by the guns of the fort. The combat was hot and furious. There was a brisk cannonading during the time of it from the two armies, and from the town; but the fire from the fort did the greatest execution; and the Germans, after several hundreds of their number had fallen, were at last obliged to abandon their attempt.

The prince is
obliged to
leave Hai-
nault.

The prince of Orange, now convinced of the impossibility of relieving the besieged in opposition to so powerful an army, immediately decamped.

The duke of Alva followed him next day with most of his forces, and in every movement discovered the most consummate skill; so that he at once prevented the prince from returning towards Mons, and avoided being reduced himself to the necessity of fighting. It was not long before he learned that there was not the same good order in the prince's army, which had hitherto been observed in it. William's authority over his troops had suffered greatly by the failure of his late attempts; and he was unable any longer to maintain that perfect discipline, without which no army, however numerous, can be formidable.

Alva readily embraced the opportunity which this circumstance afforded him. Having taken a view in person of the enemy's quarters, he resolved to attack them in the night. He committed the charge of this enterprise to Julio Romero, and gave him two thousand chosen infantry, who were ordered to be ready to march in the middle of the night, each with a shirt over his armour, to enable them to distinguish one another. They fell with great fury on the Germans, who were stationed to guard the camp; and as most of them were fast asleep, they made dreadful havock among them, till the alarm was communicated to the rest, who were soon roused by the groans and shrieks of the wounded. At first, believing that the whole Spanish army had attacked them, they fled precipitately. The assailants had in the beginning set fire to the tents, and many of the Germans perished in the flames. But this circumstance, by

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which the horror of the scene was augmented, saved the German army from destruction. It discovered the number of the Spaniards, and made it easier for the prince of Orange to draw up his men, and to know in what quarter he might find the enemy. But the assailants, perceiving that the whole camp was up in arms, made their retreat in time, and eluded the vengeance which they saw approaching. By the favor of the night they escaped with little loss, after having put to the sword near five hundred of the Germans.

The consequences of this disaster were more pernicious to the prince of Orange than the disaster itself. It filled his troops with consternation, and gave them a formidable idea of the Spaniards, whom, on account of their having so often declined fighting, they had been accustomed to despise. Without waiting for orders, they hastily decamped with one consent, and left a part of their baggage a prey to the enemy. They had not candor to acknowledge that the misfortune which had befallen them on the preceding night was owing to their negligence in obeying orders. They were disposed to throw the blame of it upon their general, and began to complain, that instead of enriching them with spoil, he had brought them into the Low Countries, only to expose them to perpetual hardships and distress. He found means, however, at this time, to quiet their minds, and in some measure to rectify their opinion of his conduct.

The duke of Alva was on this occasion urged

by his officers to pursue the prince till he should drive him entirely out of the Netherlands; but he repeated the old maxim, That it is wiser to make a bridge for a flying enemy, than to reduce them to despair; and returned to the siege.

The prince of Orange led his troops to Mechlin; and having remained there for some days to recruit them after their fatigue, he continued his march northwards, till he had brought them as far as Orsoy in the dutchy of Cleves. At that place their ill-humor broke out afresh with greater violence than ever, and they began to hold private meetings, in which they deliberated, whether, in order to procure payment of their arrears, they should not deliver him up to the duke of Alva. The principal officers received this ungenerous proposal with horror and indignation. They were convinced that the prince had done every thing that could have been done by a general of the most consummate abilities. They knew that he had begun his enterprise with the highest probability of success, and that his failure in it had been almost entirely owing to the treacherous dealings of the French king; by trusting to whom, he had engaged in a very different plan of operations from that which he would otherwise have adopted. By these considerations the officers were entirely satisfied; and through their influence, the common soldiers were persuaded to relinquish their perfidious design. The army was immediately disbanded; and William set out for Holland, where the people longed for his arrival.

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He disbanded
his army.

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The surren-
den of Mons.

His retreat from Mons gave his brother, count Lewis, who was naturally of a sanguine temper, the deepest affliction. And this, joined to the extreme fatigue which he had undergone for several months before, threw him into a violent distemper, which prevented him for some time from attending to the siege. But during his confinement La Noue conducted the defence with so much skill and intrepidity, that Alva, despairing of being able before winter to take the town by force, was willing to agree to such terms of capitulation, as count Lewis thought it not dishonorable to accept. These were, that the French, count Lewis, the Flemish nobility, and all who were not inhabitants of the place, should leave it with their arms and baggage; and that such of the inhabitants as had borne arms might leave it with their effects, but not their arms. That such of them as were catholics might remain in the town unmolested; but that all the protestants should not only depart from the town, but from the Netherlands; and that all persons, whether citizens or foreigners, should take an oath, that they would not carry arms for the space of a year, either against the king of France or the king of Spain, from which oath count Lewis alone was exempted. This capitulation was signed by the dukes of Alva and Medina-Cœli, by Frederic de Toledo, and the baron de Noircharmes; and all the conditions of it were punctually fulfilled.

Enormities
of the Spa-
niards at
Mechlin.

In this manner was Mons recovered from the protestants, after it had been more than three months in their possession. The duke of Alva felt

no

no anxiety with regard to the recovery of the cities which had received the prince of Orange. They were neither strongly fortified nor sufficiently provided with garrisons to defend them. The first against which he turned his arms was Mechlin; and he ordered his son to lead thither the Spanish troops, who having received no pay for some time, advanced like so many famished wolves, with a resolution to satiate their rapacity by plundering the inhabitants.

On their arrival, the garrison which had been left in the town by the prince of Orange seemed determined to make resistance; but finding the citizens averse from co-operating with them, and despairing of being able, without their assistance, to hold out long, they deserted the place in the night; and next morning all the priests and ecclesiastics went in solemn procession to Toledo's tent, to deprecate his vengeance. When they were pleading the cause of the unhappy anxious inhabitants, and representing that only a small number of them had been guilty, while by far the greatest part had preserved their allegiance; the soldiers, apprehensive that Toledo might listen to this apology, and disappoint them of their prey, rushed forward to the city, and broke into it, some by the gates, and others, by the help of scaling ladders, over the walls. Then spreading themselves like a deluge, they gave a loose to every species of violence; butchering some, and plundering all without mercy. There was no distinction made of age, sex, or condition. Virgins and matrons

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Justified
by the duke
of Alva.

were violated before the eyes of their parents and husbands. The churches and convents were pillaged as well as private houses; and the nuns were not exempted from that brutal lust and fury, which the Spaniards indulged without control.

The duke of Alva was sensible how great an odium must attend such a barbarous treatment of a city, which had hitherto been distinguished for its fidelity; yet he chose to justify what had been done, and in a few days afterwards published a manifesto, in which he declared, that the citizens had suffered no more than their rebellion had deserved; that justice was not yet entirely satisfied; that their crime merited a still severer punishment, than barely to be deprived of their effects; and that other cities which had already imitated, or should afterwards imitate, their example, might expect, sooner or later, to meet with the same fate. Of the sacrilege that had been committed on the churches and convents, and the shocking treatment of the weaker sex, no mention was made in the manifesto, and no excuse was ever offered for passing over these enormities with impunity. Great arrears, said the apologists of Alva, were at that time due to the soldiers; and, as he could not satisfy them, he either thought it reasonable to allow them to take a compensation for their pay; or, being well acquainted with their ferocious tempers, he was afraid to exercise his authority. The Spanish soldiers themselves, though little scrupulous with respect to crimes contrary to the laws of nature, justice and humanity, were afterwards, agreeably

to the character of their nation, touched with remorse on account of their violation of the churches; and in order to atone for their guilt, they hearkened to the dictates of superstition, and laid out a portion of their plunder in building a house for the jesuits in Antwerp *.

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Alva having gone to Maelricht, where he dismissed his German horse, went from thence to Brussels, while the Spaniards were permitted to remain at Mechlin for several days, which they employed in collecting their plunder, and sending it off in boats to Antwerp, to be exposed to sale. Toledo then led them against the other cities which had received German garrisons. These garrisons fled on his approach; and the people agreed to pay exorbitant contributions to save their cities from being sacked: nor did he meet with any opposition in his progress, till he came to Zutphen, which was at that time a place of considerable strength. It was defended with a wall flanked with bastions, and surrounded with a deep ditch. The Issel washes the fortifications on one side, the Berkel on another; and the ground on the other two sides is so extremely wet and marshy as to render the place, for the greatest part of the year almost inaccessible. But unfortunately for the protestants in garrison, they could not avail themselves of these advantages at this juncture; the frost having set in with uncommon severity several days before the arrival of Toledo. He found no difficulty therefore in

Cruelty of
the Spani-
ards at Zut-
phen.

* Meteren, p. 107. Campana, p. 97. Bentivoglio, p. 114.

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approaching the place with his batteries, and he soon made a breach in the wall. He was preparing for an assault, when he received intelligence, that the garrison, and all such as had rendered themselves obnoxious, had gone out of the town by the opposite gate; and that the citizens who remained were now, when left at liberty to act agreeably to their inclination, willing immediately to surrender at discretion. But Toledo having, by the small resistance which the garrison had made, got a pretext for plundering this unhappy people, refused to listen to any terms of accommodation, and ordered his troops to advance. They entered the town without opposition, and repeated there the same shocking barbarities which they had exercised in Mechlin, with this difference, that as there was much less booty in Zutphen, to satisfy their rapacity, they indulged their cruelty so much the more. They put to the sword all the citizens who fell in their way, men and women without distinction, and when they were tired with slaughtering, they cast great numbers into the Issel, and indulged themselves in the horrid joy of beholding the unhappy sufferers perish in the stream. By the sword and water, above five hundred perished; and the rest were obliged to redeem their lives by the most oppressive contributions, which were so cruelly exacted, that the living had reason to envy the fate of those whom death had delivered from such intolerable misery^s.

^s Meteren, p. 110. Bentivoglio, p. 115. Meursii Auriacus, p. 98.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XII.

WHILE the Spanish army was employed in the siege of Mons, and in subduing the other revolted towns in the southern provinces, the people of Holland and Zealand improved the leisure which was afforded them, by taking every precaution in their power to secure themselves from being again reduced under the Spanish yoke. They increased the number of their ships of war, completed their fortifications, and levied so great a number of forces, as, with the great advantages of their situation, they hoped would be sufficient for their defence.

Before the duke of Alva set out for Mons, he had, agreeably to orders transmitted to him from Spain, read, in presence of the States of Brabant, Artois, Hainault, and Flanders, a declaration, that he would pass from the taxes of the tenth and

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Transacti-
ons in Hol-
land and
Zealand.

Philip passes
from the
taxes of the
10th and
20th penny,
in June.

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twentieth pennies, on condition that the States would devise some other means by which the money necessary for the king's service might be raised. Intimation was made of this concession to the States of Holland, by the count of Boffut; who, in the name of the governor, commanded them to assemble at the Hague, to consider of what other taxes they would substitute in the room of those which had been formerly imposed.

His concession disregarded by the States.

This concession, which, if it had been made sooner, might have prevented the revolt of the maritime provinces, was not attended with the desired effect. It excited in the minds of the people the highest degree of joy and exultation; but they did not think themselves indebted for it, either to the king or the duke of Alva. They ascribed it wholly to the dread that was entertained of the prince of Orange, to whom alone they thought themselves bound for this first instance of attention that had been shown to their inclination or interest since Philip's accession to the throne. They could not doubt, that if his apprehensions of the German army were removed, Alva would be again permitted to resume the pursuit of that plan of tyranny which he had been obliged to suspend. They were well acquainted with the vindictive spirit which animated Philip's counsels. They knew that, for much slighter offences than those of which they had been guilty, many thousands of their countrymen had suffered the most cruel death; and they believed, that whatever assurances might be given them of pardon, the memory of their guilt would

never be extinguished but in their blood. By the unrelenting cruelty which had been exercised against the protestants, added to the contempt which had been shown to their fundamental rights and laws, the people were entirely alienated from Philip's person and government. They were convinced that he had resolved to treat them henceforth, not as subjects but as slaves; and they had long repined and murmured at their fate.

From the time of Alva's arrival in the Netherlands, all the protestants who had escaped from the cruelty of the inquisitors, had carefully concealed their sentiments, and conformed to the established worship; but having of late received a great increase of number, by the return of many of the exiles, they had thrown off the mask; and it now appeared, that by far the greatest part of the inhabitants, and even of the deputies of the States, were strongly attached to the reformed religion. Their religious zeal co-operated with their abhorrence of the Spanish tyranny; and both together inspired them with a fixed unalterable purpose to defend their liberty to the last.

Prompted by these motives, the States paid no regard to the order for assembling at the Hague, transmitted to them by Bossut; and that they might the more strongly express their contempt of the governor's authority, they appointed an assembly to be held at Dort. Of this assembly they gave early notice to the prince of Orange, and entreated him to send one of his most faithful friends, properly instructed, to assist them in their

They meet
at Dort,

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and enter
into engage-
ments with
the prince
of Orange.

deliberations. The person whom the prince made choice of for this purpose, was the *Sieur de St. Aldegonde*, the author of the compromise, who had long been well acquainted with William's most secret views and sentiments.

St. Aldegonde readily undertook the task imposed upon him; and at the first meeting of the States, gave them thanks in the name of the prince, for the intimation which they had sent him, of their resolution to vindicate their liberty under his direction. "The prince was conscious, he said, of being seriously interested in the welfare of all the provinces, and of none more than those of Holland and Zealand, which for several years had been the objects of his particular attention. From time to time he had heard with indignation and grief, of the distress and misery to which they had been reduced through the Spanish tyranny; and there was nothing which he desired more ardently, than to be instrumental in recovering for them those invaluable rights, which for ages past had proved the source of their prosperity. In order to accomplish this end, he had spared neither expense nor labor. He had failed in his former attempt for their deliverance, not (he hoped, they would believe) through any negligence or misconduct, but through the superior power and more copious resources of the enemy. In his present armament, he had already expended all that remained of his once ample fortune; and as in levying his army, he had trusted in a great measure to

the assistance which they had promised him; now was the time to fulfil that promise, and to enable him to begin his military operations without delay."

The States who knew the truth of what St. Aldegonde had represented, and were sensible how much the success of William's enterprise depended on his receiving an immediate supply, sent him without delay a hundred thousand florins, which they borrowed from the more wealthy citizens; and promised to send him more as soon as it could be raised, either from the ordinary taxes, or from the revenues of the monasteries, which were at that time converted into a fund for carrying on the war. After this transaction, a solemn declaration in writing was delivered to St. Aldegonde, in which they engaged to acknowledge the prince of Orange as the only lawful governor or stadtholder of the province; appointed him commander in chief of all their forces by sea and land; and engaged, that without his consent, they should not listen to any terms of peace which might be offered: St. Aldegonde on the other hand, engaging in the name of the prince, that he would not lay down his arms, nor enter into any accommodation or treaty, without the knowledge and approbation of the States¹.

The States exerted themselves strenuously to perform their promises of supplies. They sent him two hundred thousand florins, which he received at

Their distress.

¹ Meursii Auriacus, p. 84.

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Amsterdam
adheres to
the Spa-
niards.

Ruremonde, in his way to Mons, and gave him security for three hundred thousand. When the news was brought them of his retreat, and the necessity under which he found himself of disbanding his army, they were exceedingly dejected; and were filled with the most disquieting apprehensions, when they considered that the duke of Alva, having no enemy in the field to oppose his progress, was now at liberty to employ all his forces united, in taking vengeance on them, for their contempt of his authority.

Their distress was much increased by the inflexible obstinacy of the city of Amsterdam, in adhering to the Spanish interest; which did not proceed so much from the general inclination of the citizens, as from the care which the duke of Alva had taken to preserve the government of that city in the hands of the most rigid catholics. By an order of the States, Lumey count de la Marck had besieged it with a considerable body of troops, but after making some progress in his operations, he despaired of success, and suddenly raised the siege. He ascribed the miscarriage of his attempt to the negligence of the States, in supplying him with provisions. The States on the other hand, threw the blame entirely upon the count. They had been for some time past extremely dissatisfied with his conduct, on account of the cruelties which he had allowed his troops to exercise against the catholics; and they believed that they should never be able to persuade the people of Amsterdam to unite with the other cities in the province, while

their army was under the command of a person who had rendered himself so extremely obnoxious².

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Loud complaints of the outrages of the soldiers were heard in every quarter, and many of the people began to lament the revolution to which they had given their consent. The States dreaded the consequences of so much ill-humor. But they were not possessed of power sufficient to remedy the abuses complained of; and la Marck, who was naturally violent and ferocious, paid no regard to their commands. In this distress they had no resource, but in the prudence and authority of the prince of Orange; who, they hoped, would, notwithstanding his late misfortunes, be able to repress the insolence of the soldiers and their general. They sent him notice of the critical situation to which they were reduced; and they entreated him to come, as soon as possible, to take the government of the province, and the command of the forces, into his own hand.

Outrages
committed
by their
troops.

William could not, either with safety or honor, have left his army sooner than he did. From Orsey, where it was disbanded, he went, attended only by his own domestics, and a company of horse, to Campen in Overissel, and from thence he passed over the Zuider Sea to Enchuyfen; where he was joyfully received, and all his directions for the greater security of the place, were carried immediately into execution. After staying there for

Arrival of
the prince
of Orange in
Holland.

² Meursii Auriacus, p. 95.

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His magna-
nimity.

some days, and visiting the other towns in the province, he set out for Haerlem; having appointed a convention of the States to be held in that city, to consider of the present situation of their affairs.

His arrival excited in persons of all ranks the most unfeigned joy; but this joy, he perceived, was greatly allayed by their apprehensions of being unable to resist an enemy, before whom he himself, at the head of a powerful army, had been obliged to retire. The first object of his attention was to raise their drooping spirits, by making them sensible of the advantages which they possessed in the nature and situation of their country; which, while they retained their superiority at sea, and acted in concert, would render abortive all the attempts of the Spaniards to reduce them. The magnanimity which he displayed diffused itself into every breast; and the deputies unanimously declared, that they would be entirely governed by his counsel in all their conduct, and would lay down their lives sooner than abandon that invaluable liberty, without which they thought life itself was not desirable.

His mode-
ration, and
salutary re-
gulations.

In the present temper of their minds, William might have ruled the people of the maritime provinces with an absolute sway; but he knew there was a much safer, as well as a more effectual, method of exercising power, and wisely resolved to consult the States in every matter of importance, and to take upon himself only the execution of their commands. For this purpose he frequently

convened them; and in order to give greater weight to their decisions, he persuaded them to admit into their number the deputies of twelve other cities, besides those of whom their assembly had been hitherto composed: a measure which was no less gracious and popular, than it was wise and prudent. It flattered the vanity of those towns on which the new privilege was bestowed; engaged them to contribute with greater alacrity their share of the public expenses; and drew the several districts of the province into a state of more intimate union with one another.

With the States, thus increased in number, the prince applied himself to rectify the disorders which had prevailed, and to put the province into a posture of defence against the Spaniards. It had been deserted during the late commotions by many of the principal inhabitants, by several members of the courts of justice, and by the officers of the revenue, and others who held public employments; which they had been induced to abandon, either by their attachment to popery, or their diffidence in the duration and stability of the present government. The numerous vacancies which were thus occasioned, were supplied with protestants; and no catholic was admitted into any office, or allowed to take any concern in the administration of public affairs.

The exercise of the Romish religion was prohibited in the churches; and the only worship permitted to be exercised publicly, was the protestant, as taught by Calvin, and practised in Geneva, and

Establishment of the reformed religion.

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the Palatinate. Thus far the prince of Orange complied with the inclination of the people, by a great majority of whom the principles of the reformers had been embraced. But all persecution on account of religion, he discouraged to the utmost of his power. His reasonings for toleration were more successful now in favor of the papists, than they had been formerly with the dutchefs of Parma, in behalf of the reformers. The States, by his persuasion, resolved that no person whatever should be molested on account of his religion, provided that he lived quietly, kept no correspondence with the Spaniards, and gave no disturbance to the established mode of worship³.

William found greater difficulty in restraining the licentiousness of the army, than in settling either the courts of justice or the church. When we reflect on those horrid scenes which were exhibited in the Netherlands by the duke of Alva and his associates, it will not appear surprising, that the protestants should have conceived the most violent animosity against their bloody persecutors. They had seen their dearest relations and friends, besides many persons whom they revered on account of the innocence and sanctity of their lives, treated like the most flagitious malefactors: and many of themselves had, in order to avoid the same fate, been obliged to abandon their habitations, and to wander from place to place, forlorn and indigent. In the bitterness of their distress, they had forgotten

³ Grotius, p. 41.

the spirit of that religion for which they suffered; and on many occasions, wreaked their vengeance against their enemies with a brutal fury. To the Spaniards who were taken prisoners at sea, the protestants on board the fleet gave no quarter; while the ecclesiastics, and many others whose only crime was their adherence to the religion of their ancestors, were treated by the protestant soldiers with equal inhumanity.

The count of la Marck, commander in chief of the forces, was so far from opposing these enormities, that he encouraged his soldiers in committing them. This nobleman's principal virtue was intrepidity, and under the cloak of zeal for liberty, and the reformed religion, he seems to have intended nothing so much as the gratification of his avarice or revenge. The prince of Orange, who from his natural humanity, and a prudent regard to future consequences, was utterly averse to every species of violence, attempted to make him sensible of the folly and iniquity of his conduct. But finding that he was not likely to succeed, and that the soldiers still indulged themselves without control in their wonted excesses, he referred the matter to the cognizance of the States, and desired them to consider coolly what was proper to be done. The States, who were highly incensed against the count, for his contempt of their authority, deprived him of his command, and ordered him to be apprehended. William, unwilling to forget the services which the count had performed in the beginning of the revolt, soon after

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Lumey de
la Marck.

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interposed in his behalf, and prevailed upon the States to release him. But la Marck could not digest the affront which had been offered him. He complained loudly of the States, for their ingratitude; boasted of his authority in the fleet and army; and attempted to excite a spirit of sedition among the people. The States were meditating to seize him a second time, in order to bring him to his trial. But the prince of Orange, prompted by tenderness for his relations, and a sense of his former services, dissuaded them from executing their design, and advised them to suffer him to leave the province. The States listened, though with some reluctance to this advice, and the count having left the Netherlands, died soon afterwards in the city of Liege.

The command of the forces was conferred on the count of Battenburgh; and by that Nobleman they were brought under proper discipline; and all such of the catholics as chose to remain in the country, delivered from those alarms and apprehensions with which they had been hitherto disquieted. One cause of the great irregularities which had been committed by the troops, was the want of proper funds for their subsistence. The States now supplied this defect, as well as the present circumstances of the province would allow. To the payment of the army, and other public purposes, they appropriated the demesnes which the king had employed as count of Holland, the revenues of the Romish priests and monasteries, and the estates of all such catholics as had gone over to
the

the enemy, besides a certain proportion of the captures made at sea *.

While the prince of Orange and the States were thus employed in providing for the security of Holland, Frederic de Toledo had made rapid progress in reducing the towns which had revolted in the other provinces; nor did he find much difficulty in subduing them; for so great was the terror which they had conceived from his late success, that of all the towns which had declared for the prince of Orange in Groningen, Overissel, Utrecht, and Friesland, there was none that did not send ambassadors to Toledo, to deprecate his vengeance, and to make profession of unreserved submission to his will. He placed garrisons in the most considerable towns, and inflicted no other punishment upon the people but pecuniary fines. Had he maintained the same moderation in his conduct afterwards, he would not perhaps have encountered much greater difficulty in the recovery of some of the towns of Holland and Zealand, than he had met with in recovering those of the interior provinces; but from natural temper, he rejoiced infinitely more in rigor and severity, than in lenity and moderation; of the truth of which he gave a signal proof in his barbarous treatment of the inhabitants of Naerden.

This town was then neither large nor strongly fortified, yet the citizens, prompted by some foreign protestants who resided in it, were bold enough to refuse admittance to a company of

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Progress of
the Spanish
arms.

Massacre of
the people
of Naerden

* Grotius, p. 40. Meursii Auriacus, p. 97.

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horse, sent by Toledo before his main army, to require their submission; but, having quickly repented of their rashness, they dispatched a deputation of the most respectable inhabitants, among whom was Lambertus Hortensius, a man eminent for his learning, to Amersfort, where Toledo had arrived in his way to Naerden. He declined hearing the ambassadors himself, and desired them to apply to Julio Romero, who had power, he said, to grant them such terms of reconciliation as *he* should judge to be reasonable. By Romero, it was agreed, that the lives and fortunes of the citizens should be spared on the following conditions: That the town should be immediately delivered into the hands of Toledo; that all the inhabitants should renew their oath of allegiance to the king; and that one hundred Spanish soldiers should be permitted to seize as much booty as they could carry at one time out of the city. In ratification of this agreement, Romero, having given his right hand three several times to Hortensius, entered the town, attended by so small a number of Spaniards as banished from the minds of the citizens all apprehensions of fraud or violence; and when he summoned them to meet in one of the churches to take the oath of allegiance, they ran thither unarmed, and presented themselves a defenceless prey to their bloody murderers. Whether Romero acted in concert with Toledo does not appear from the cotemporary historians. This only is certain, that while the former was employed in administering the oath; the latter, who had

brought forward his troops to the gates of the town, led them directly to the church in which the citizens were assembled, and ordering the doors which till then had been kept shut to be thrown open, he rushed into it at the head of his troops, and immediately killed with his own hand the principal magistrate. The Spaniards were not backward to imitate the example of their general. They fell with savage fury on the astonished, defenceless citizens, and after butchering all that were in the church, spread themselves over the city, and put every person whom they met to the sword. They made no distinction between the innocent and the guilty; the catholics as well as protestants; those who had preserved their allegiance, as well as those who had thrown it off, were all involved in one promiscuous ruin. Then entering into the houses, where they found the wives and daughters of the slain overwhelmed with anguish, instead of being softened by the sight of so much unmerited distress in that tender sex, their savage hearts only prompted them to indulge their avarice, their cruelty, and their lust. Even virgins under age they violated, and others they tortured in the most inhuman manner, either from a wanton pleasure which they took in cruel deeds, or to extort from the unhappy sufferers a discovery of the treasure which had belonged to their murdered husbands or parents. They strangled some, embued their hands in the blood of others, turned all the rest out of the city into the open fields, and then throwing fire into the houses, reduced the town to ashes.

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The accounts transmitted to us by the protestant writers of the horrid cruelty which the Spaniards exercised on this occasion, would be incredible, if they were not confirmed by the catholic historians. There was an hospital in the town for old men, and at that time there were several in it above eighty years of age; even these were butchered; nor did persons confined to the bed of sickness and distress escape their fury. The life of Lambertus Hortensius was saved by the interposition of the count de Bossut; but the Spaniards made him suffer what was worse than death; by murdering the son, and tearing his heart out of his body before the father's eyes. There is another instance of their cruelty recorded, which is, if possible, still more inhuman. After having tortured in the most shocking manner one of the citizens, to make him discover where he had concealed his wealth, they dishonored his wife in his presence, and upon his reproaching them with their barbarity, they put him to death; then, having tied the woman's hands behind her, they bound her by the feet to a beam of the house, with her head downward, and left her to die in that posture, with her little son, whom they likewise bound and placed beside her, to aggravate the misery of that dreadful death to which their cruelty had doomed her^s.

From this horrid massacre, Toledo led his army to Amsterdam, where he remained for some time

^s Meursii Auriacus, p. 98. Thuanus, lib. liv. Benvoglio, p. 115.

in expectation that, from the dread of his vengeance, the other towns of the province would be induced to make a tender of their submission; but the cruelty and treachery which he had exercised at Naerden, were not more contrary to the laws of religion and humanity, than inconsistent with the maxims of sound policy, and were calculated not so much to excite terror as revenge and indignation. From the fate of Naerden the people were convinced, that there was at least as much to be dreaded from submission as from resistance, and they thought it no less absurd than dangerous, to enter into terms of agreement with men who had shown themselves so cruelly perfidious.

Of this they soon gave a conspicuous proof in their vigorous and obstinate defence of Haerlem. To gain over the inhabitants of that city, Toledo had employed the mediation of the catholics of Amsterdam, and some of the magistrates of Haerlem had sent privately three of their number to Frederic to treat with him of a surrender. This was no sooner known, than Riperda, a Friesland gentleman, to whom the prince of Orange had committed the government of the town, called together the principal inhabitants, and informed them of what had passed. "By a solemn oath," said he, "the magistrates were lately bound not to listen, without your permission, to any proposals, or to engage in any design or enterprise, by which the general interest of the city might be affected; yet, not only without your permission, but even without your knowledge, they have sent

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an embassy to treat with Toledo about delivering the city to the Spaniards. We are unable, they pretend, to withstand so great a force as will be brought against us, and must be involved in all the miseries of a cruel siege, unless we avert them by a timely application for peace and pardon. But have the Spaniards treated with greater lenity those who have trusted to their faith, than those who have opposed them? Have the people of Mechlin and Zutphen been dealt with more mercifully than those of Mons? Does not the melancholy fate of Naerden sufficiently instruct you how little regard is due to the promises of those men, who have now shown themselves no less devoid of faith than we have ever found them of humanity? Are not the streets of that unhappy city still reeking with the blood of those who confided in the faith and mercy of the Spaniards? By standing on our defence we may elude their fury; but if we receive them into the city, we rush headlong upon destruction. They will either butcher us like sheep, after they have stripped us of our arms, or reduce us to a state of ignominious slavery and bondage. Do not flatter yourselves with the hopes that they are willing to be reconciled to you. They intend only to take advantage of your simplicity, and to get you into their power, without exposing themselves to danger. Have you not already sworn to act the part to which I now exhort you, to defend your walls against the Spaniards, and to preserve your allegiance to the prince of Orange, whom you have

acknowledged as the only lawful governor of the province? And in order to save ourselves from the hardships of a siege, shall we imitate that vile example of treachery, which in our enemies appears so odious? Let us derive courage, my friends, from the justness of our cause; and rather than submit to such an enemy, let us resolve to die, fighting gloriously in defence of our religion, our liberty, and laws."

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This speech was received with shouts of high applause by all the audience. They cried out with one voice, "No peace with the Spaniards; we will shed the last drop of our blood rather than open our gates to so perfidious an enemy." Riperda then sent information to the prince of Orange, who was at this time in Delft, of the resolution which they had formed. And in return, William encouraged the citizens to persevere, by assuring them that the other cities in the province would exert themselves with vigor in their behalf. Immediately after which he reinforced the garrison with four companies of Germans; and sent St. Aldegonde with a commission to put the administration of the town in the hands of such as were sincerely attached to the reformed religion. Of the three ambassadors who had treated with the Spaniards, one remained with Toledo, and the other two were, upon their return to Haerlem, put under arrest, and sent to Delft, where, after being tried, they were condemned as traitors. One of them died in prison, and the other was executed publicly: an instance of severity, with which the prince

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of Orange was not displeased, as it tended to deter the catholics in the other cities, from holding correspondence with the enemy.

The news of these unexpected events excited, in the fiery tempers of Toledo, and his father, the highest degree of wrath and indignation. They immediately gave orders for the march of the troops to Haerlem, and exerted themselves strenuously in making preparations for carrying on the siege with dispatch and vigor.

Description
of Haerlem.

Haerlem was, at the time of this memorable siege, the most considerable town in Holland, next to Amsterdam. It was surrounded with a deep ditch and a strong wall, but was of so great extent, that it required a numerous garrison to defend it. It stands beautifully in the midst of an extensive plain, having a wood on one side, and a branch of the river Sparen on the other; and the other branch of that river passes through the town, and then falls into the lake, or as it is sometimes called, the sea of Haerlem. Amsterdam and Leyden are nearly at the distance of between three and four leagues from it, the former lying towards the east, and the latter towards the south. From Amsterdam and Utrecht, Toledo proposed to furnish his army with provisions; and the people of Haerlem expected to derive the same advantage from the neighbourhood of Leyden; where, in order to assist them more effectually, the prince of Orange now fixed his residence.

The nearest way by which the Spanish army could approach to Haerlem, was by the fort of

Sparendam, the rampart of which stood on the dike along which the troops must pass. In this fort Riperda had placed a garrison of three hundred men, and had begun to employ the country people in breaking down the dike, in order to lay the country under water. But the frost having set in with uncommon severity, rendered all their labor fruitless, and gave the Spaniards easy access to the fort. The garrison made a vigorous resistance for some time; but being attacked on every side, and overpowered by superior numbers, they were at length compelled to retire to Haerlem.

Toledo followed soon after with his army, which consisted of between twelve and thirteen thousand men; six thousand of whom were natives of Spain, and the rest Walloons and Germans. He had just begun to assign them their several stations, when he received intelligence that a body of troops, amounting to near three thousand men, with cannon and provisions, were upon their march from Leyden, with an intention to enter Haerlem, before the blockade was formed. He set out immediately to intercept them, and had the good fortune, during a fall of snow, to come upon them unawares, near the village of Berkenrode. His troops being greatly superior in number to the enemy, broke their ranks at the first onset, and having killed between six and seven hundred, put the rest to flight. Their officers endeavoured to rally them, but in vain. They fled precipitately, and left their cannon and provisions a prey to the victorious army.

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Toledo begins the siege.

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Progress of
the siege.

Flushed with this success, Toledo returned immediately to the siege. Having stationed the Walloons and Germans on the great road which leads to Leyden, he himself with the Spaniards took possession of an hospital, which lay near the gate of the cross. At this place he resolved to begin his operations, although the gate was covered by a strong ravelin, and the wall on that side could be more easily defended than in any other quarter. Into this blunder he was betrayed, not so much by ignorance or inadvertence, as by the contempt which he entertained for the besieged. After the success with which his arms had every where been attended, he did not expect to meet with the smallest difficulty in his present enterprise; and flattered himself that Haerlem, like the other revolted cities, would, as soon as he should begin his attack, open her gates to receive him. From the same presumption, he neglected all the precautions which are usually taken in sieges; and without opening trenches to cover his men from the enemy's fire, he planted his battery and began to cannonade the gate and ravelin. He had no sooner made a breach, than he resolved to storm it, and for this purpose ordered one hundred and fifty men to cross the ditch, by means of a portable bridge. This detachment was ordered to return, in case the breach should be found impracticable. But the rest of the soldiers, who were not less confident of success than their general, and were impelled by their avidity for plunder, without waiting for the word of command, ran forward to the bridge, and passed over it in great numbers. They soon

perceived their error. The breach was not near so considerable as they had imagined, and their scaling ladders were too short. The narrowness of the bridge, which permitted only three men to march a-breast, threw them into confusion. They stood on the brink of the ditch, crowded together, and exposed to the musquetry as well as cannon of the besieged. Still, however, the foolish ardor with which they were inspired, made them unwilling to retire, till Romero, an officer whom they highly respected, advanced towards them, and reproached them with the madness of their attempt. Do you not perceive, he cried, that the smallness of the breach renders your assault impracticable? Is this the discipline which you have learnt in the school of the duke of Alva? Thus, without orders, to expose yourselves a defenceless prey to these rebels, who insult and butcher you, while they themselves are out of the reach of danger? You will soon find an opportunity to take vengeance on them. At present it is not in your power. At length he persuaded them to retire, but not till he himself was wounded, and near two hundred private men, and a great number of officers, had fallen.

This disaster served to undeceive Toledo with regard to the facility of his enterprise; and he resolved not to expose his troops to any further danger, till he should be fully provided with every thing necessary for conducting the siege, with less expense of blood, and a better prospect of success. For this end, he gave the proper instructions to

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Supplies
sent to the
town over
the ice.

his agents in Utrecht and Amsterdam ; but all the roads which led to his camp, were so much infested by the Hollanders , that a whole month elapsed before he was in a condition to renew his operations against the town.

The prince of Orange was more successful in his attempts to secure it. He could not indeed collect a sufficient number of troops , either to raise the siege , or to force his way through the enemy's intrenchments. But the frost having continued for several weeks , not only men , but even loaded carriages , could be conveyed over the lake with greater facility than by land. The reader need not be told with what agility the Hollanders transport themselves from one place to another , over the ice , with scates. They exerted all their dexterity on this occasion , and introduced into the city fifteen companies of soldiers , together with a great number of sledges , loaded with provisions and ammunition.

In the mean time Toledo had prepared every thing requisite for resuming the operations of the siege ; and he now hastened to repair the faults which he had committed in the beginning ; proceeding with greater caution than before , but with the same activity and vigor. Having by trenches secured his troops against the fire of the besiegers , he began to batter the town with his artillery ; and at the same time employed his miners , of whom the duke of Alva had sent him three thousand from the bishopric of Liege , in working mines , and sapping the foundation of the walls. Neither labor

nor danger was avoided. But the boldness and vigilance of the citizens and garrison were in proportion to the means employed to subdue them. By countermines, they either prevented, or rendered ineffectual the mines of the besiegers; and no sooner was a breach made in the fortifications, than ditches were dug, or some sudden bulwark raised behind it, by which all access was rendered as difficult as ever. Not satisfied with acting on the defensive, they often sallied out upon the besiegers, destroyed their works, and fell upon them sword in hand, when they were the least prepared to repel their attacks.

While the Spaniards were thus kept in perpetual occupation and anxiety, the prince of Orange labored assiduously to increase their difficulties, by sending out flying parties to intercept their convoys of provisions. Some of these attempts proved successful; and as they made it necessary for Toledo to send large detachments from his army to guard his convoys, they facilitated the introduction of supplies into Haerlem, and retarded the progress of the siege.

Almost all the supplies of the Spanish army came from Amsterdam, and there was but one road by which they could be conveyed. In order to take possession of an important pass on that road, the prince had sent a detachment of troops under Antony le Peintre, who had a principal concern in the surprise of Mons. The catholics of Amsterdam having received information of this design, dispatched a number of forces, sufficient not only to

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Useless
cruelty ex-
ercised by
both parties.

B O O K secure the pass, but to engage with the enemy.
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1572. were routed, and many of them slain; among whom was le Peintre their commander. In derision of the besieged, the Spaniards having cut off the heads of le Peintre, and of another officer killed in that rencounter, whose name was Coning or King, they threw them over the walls into the city, with an inscription tied to the head of Coning, which bore, besides his name, upon which they jested awkwardly, that he was come with two thousand auxiliaries to raise the siege. Of this insult the Haerlemese showed their resentment, by an action equally barbarous. They beheaded twelve of their Spanish prisoners; and then put all their heads into a cask, which they rolled down into the trenches, after writing upon it, "The tax of the tenth penny to the duke of Alva, with the interest due to him on account of the delay of payment." In revenge for this barbarity, the Spaniards hung up by the feet and neck, a number of prisoners, in sight of the besieged; who, in return, put to death some more of *their* prisoners, in the same ignominious manner, in the view of the Spaniards. Such instances of barbarous and useless cruelty were often practised in the beginning of the present war; nor were they discontinued, till the duke of Alva and his son, who by their example contributed much to the spreading of this savage spirit, had left the Netherlands.

Toledo assaults the town.

The operations of the siege were in the meantime carried on by Toledo with as much celerity,

as the difficulty under which he labored in furnishing himself with provisions, and the numberless diseases which the severity of the season occasioned among his troops, would allow. By undermining the ravelin which defended the gate of the cross, he obliged the garrison to abandon it; and after a cannonading, which had lasted for many days, by which he laid a great part of the wall in ruins, he at last resolved to storm the breach with all his forces. For this purpose he drew them together from their several stations in the night; and that he might find the besieged unprepared, he began the assault before day-break. No precaution was neglected to insure success. The orders were explained to all the soldiers, particularly and distinctly. Each man had his station and part assigned him. Some were appointed to stand at a proper distance from the walls, to annoy the enemy in case they should appear; and those who were destined for the assault were enjoined to observe the most profound silence, till they should make themselves masters of the breach. So well was this last injunction observed, that several of the Spaniards had mounted the breach, and even scaled the walls, before the besieged were apprized of their approach. But when they had advanced thus far, they were perceived by the guards, who immediately sounded the alarm, and tumbled them all headlong, before they had time to put themselves into a posture of defence.

This assault was made near the ravelin of which the Spaniards had got possession some days before;

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Is repulsed.

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and in order to second the assailants, many Spanish officers and soldiers were standing upon the ravelin, and a great number round it. The townsmen having resolved to render this fortification useless to the enemy, had wrought a mine under it, and lodged there a quantity of gun-powder, and other combustible materials. They saw with joy, and seized instantly, the opportunity presented to them, of executing their purpose with signal damage to the enemy. A part of the ravelin, with the ground adjoining to it, was blown up; and many of the Spaniards perished. The rest of the army stood aghast at this unforeseen disaster. The citizens left them no leisure to recover from their astonishment, but rushed out impetuously, attacked them with irresistible fury, and compelled them to retire with the loss of a great number of officers, and upwards of three hundred private men.

He meditates the raising of the siege.

The failure of this attempt, in which Toledo had exerted his utmost force and skill, gave him great anxiety with regard to the issue of the siege; and some of the principal officers advised him to raise it without delay. "All the miseries of a siege," they said, "were felt more by the royal army, than by the rebels who were besieged. Through the difficult communication between the camp and Amsterdam, the troops labored under a perpetual scarcity of provisions; and suffered more from the severity of the season, than from the sword of the enemy. They would either never be able to take the place, or it would cost them infinitely more than it was worth. In the end, the conquerors would

would find themselves in as deplorable a condition as the conquered; and no army would remain, sufficient to subdue the other cities which had rebelled."

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This opinion was warmly opposed by other officers, who represented, That their success in the further prosecution of the war, would depend on the issue of the present siege. "If we raise it," said they, "we shall confirm all the other cities in their obstinacy; if we persevere, we shall render easier every future enterprise. The season cannot remain long in its present severity. One night may dissolve the ice, of which our enemies have so often availed themselves. Our loss of men will be speedily repaired by the levies which are making in the Netherlands, and by the troops which we expect from Spain. We shall soon be able to cut off the town from all communication with the other revolted cities, and when we have done this, can we doubt that the besieged will open their gates and throw themselves upon our mercy?"

BETWEEN these opposite opinions Toledo would not take upon himself to decide, but referred the matter to the duke, whose answer, carrying in it, the appearance of authority more than of counsel, showed that he was not a little dissatisfied with his son for deliberating on the subject. "You must prosecute the siege" said Alva, in the letter which he wrote to him, "till you bring it to the desired issue; unless you would prove yourself unworthy of the name you bear, of the blood from which you are sprung, and of the command with which I have

Alva's letter to his son.

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intrusted you. The more difficult this enterprize, the greater glory may you derive from it. In a siege of such importance as the present, you ought not to consider the number of days which it detains you; but the consequences with which your success or failure will be attended. You must now endeavour to effectuate by famine, what you have been unable to accomplish by the sword. You must blockade the town, instead of storming it; and you will be enabled to render the blockade complete, by the reinforcement which will soon be sent you. But if still you shall entertain thoughts of abandoning your enterprize, I will either come myself to the camp, sick as I am; or if my increasing illness shall prevent me, I will send for the dutchess of Alva to command the army, rather than suffer it to withdraw."

Frederic was stung with this reproach, and resolved to prosecute the siege, regardless of all the difficulties and dangers which had induced him to deliberate. He proceeded slowly, however, on account of his want of a sufficient number of troops to form the blockade; when, about the middle of February, the frost went off, and changed entirely the operations of the contending parties.

Battle on
the lake.

The prince of Orange had not neglected to provide for this event. A great number of vessels had been prepared, and as soon as the ice was melted, and the wind favorable, they left Leyden with a large supply of provisions; and sailing along the lake, entered into the Sparen, and got safe to Haerlem. In this way the besieged were frequently

supplied; nor could the Spaniards for some time procure a naval force sufficient to prevent it. At last the count de Bossut, assisted by the people of Amsterdam, collected a great number of armed vessels with which he made his appearance on the lake. And thus the scene was almost entirely changed, and the operations of the siege converted, for several weeks, into the various rencounters which passed between the fleets; while the one party labored to introduce supplies into the city, and the other was continually on the watch to intercept them. At first the actions were slight and unimportant, but at length the number of ships on both sides being greatly augmented, they came to a general engagement; in which, after much bloodshed, victory declared against the protestants. In this action the count de Bossut acquired great honor, and reduced the enemy's fleet to so low a pitch, that henceforth they could not venture with safety to come within his reach. He soon after made himself master of a fort in the mouth of the Sparen, and having stationed a part of the fleet there, he rendered all access to the town by water utterly impracticable.

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During these transactions on the lake, the townsmen and garrison exerted the same activity and vigor as before. They gave the besiegers no respite, but harassed them continually, by sallying out in strong bodies, sometimes in one quarter, and sometimes in another. In one of these sallies, they drove the German forces from their intrenchments, slew upwards of eight hundred of them,

The vigor
and intrepidity of the
besieged.

B O O K set on fire their tents and baggage, and carrying
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1573. returned to the town in triumph^{*}.

But Toledo was soon afterwards in a condition to prevent these eruptions, from which the besieged derived so much glory. The reinforcement which his father had been preparing, at length arrived; and his trenches were thereby secured against any attack that could be made upon them, either from within, or from without.

Their distress.

The besieged began to suffer greatly from a scarcity of provisions. There was no expedient for relief, however desperate, which they did not employ. They attempted frequently in the night, to force the enemy's lines, and to open a passage for the convoys, which, agreeably to concert, the prince of Orange sent forward, to be ready to enter the town, in case the garrison could dislodge the besiegers from their intrenchments. But they found the enemy every where prepared to receive them, and were repulsed in all their attempts. They had then recourse to another no less desperate expedient. They broke down the dike of the Sparen, and laid all the ground between the lake and the city under water. The Spaniards being obliged, in consequence of this device, to quit the part of their intrenchments to which the water reached, some flat-bottomed boats passed into the town, with gun-powder and provisions. But the relief which the besieged received in this way was

^{*} Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 218.

inconsiderable. Bossut being absolute master of the lake, the passage by which the Hollanders had entered was soon blocked up, and all access to the town rendered as difficult as ever.

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The people of Haerlem had now no prospect of deliverance, but from a body of troops which the prince of Orange had for some months been employed in assembling, with a view to attempt the raising of the siege. He had solicited aid from the queen of England, and from the French and German protestants. But the former was averse at this time from declaring herself openly against Philip; and both the latter were too much occupied at home, to have either leisure or power to afford their brethren in Holland any effectual assistance. In the mean time, the famine in Haerlem had risen to the most dreadful height. Every species of ordinary food was already consumed; and the people subsisted on the roots of the coarsest herbs, and on the flesh of horses, dogs, and other animals, against which men commonly entertain the most irreconcilable aversion. William having got information of the extremity to which they were reduced, resolved to make an effort in their behalf, with the forces which he had already collected. They consisted partly of French, German, and English protestants, but chiefly of raw troops, which had been levied hastily for the present purpose in the neighbouring cities; amounting to four thousand foot, and six hundred horse. He intended to have conducted this little army himself, but was prevailed on by the States to give the command of it to

Count Bat-
tenburgh de-
feated.

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the count of Battenburgh. Notice was conveyed to the besieged of the time, when this armament would approach Haerlem, by letters tied to pigeons, which had been brought from Haerlem to Leyden, in order to be employed as messengers to the besieged, in case all other communication between the cities should be obstructed⁷.

Battenburgh set out from Leyden with his troops, several field pieces, and a large convoy of provisions, in the beginning of July. His instructions were, to direct his attack against the quarters of the Germans stationed towards the plain of Haerlem. The besieged it was expected, would sally out upon them at the same time, and while they were thus distracted by one enemy before, and another behind them, it was hoped that the convoy of provisions would find an opportunity of entering the town. But Toledo having received intelligence of their design, drew up a part of his forces within their intrenchments, to repress the sally intended by the besieged, and led out the rest to meet count Battenburgh. His troops being greatly superior to the enemy both in discipline and number, broke their ranks, and threw them into confusion at the first onset. The general, and upwards of two thousand men, were killed; and almost the whole convoy of provisions fell into the hands of the victors.

The besieged offer to capitulate.

This disaster entirely broke the spirits of the besieged, and made it necessary for them to

⁷ Thuanus, lib. lv. c. v.

propose a surrender without delay. They accordingly sent a deputation to Toledo, with an offer to deliver up the town, on condition that the inhabitants should not be pillaged, and that the garrison should be allowed to march out of it, with the honors of war. Toledo refused to listen to these, or to any other conditions; and informed them that they must leave it to him to determine, what treatment both the garrison and citizens should receive.

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His answer.

The besieged were too well acquainted with his implacable spirit, not to shrink at the thoughts of exposing themselves to his mercy. They had not forgotten the dismal catastrophe of Naerden. They considered his answer as a declaration, that he had devoted them to destruction. The people ran in crowds from every quarter of the city, to the places of public resort, in order to learn the particulars of that fatal answer which the deputies had brought. The women, the aged, and all the more unwarlike part of the inhabitants, were overwhelmed with terror. As if their houses had been already in flames, or as if they had beheld the bloody sword of the Spaniard waving round them, there was nothing to be seen or heard, but tears, and shrieks, and groans. Their despair was soon afterwards converted into a degree of madness, by a resolution formed by the governor and garrison, to leave all such as were unable to bear arms behind them, and to force their way, sword in hand, through the enemy's lines. To prevent them from executing their purpose, the women hastened

Their resolution.

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tumultuously (many of them with their children in their arms) to the gate where the garrison had appointed to rendezvous before their departure. It was a scene truly piteous and miserable; the women either rolling in the dust, or clinging round the necks and knees of their husbands, fathers, sons, or brothers; dissolved in tears, and implored that they might be carried along with them, and suffered either to escape or perish together. The men were melted at the sight of so much anguish in persons so near and dear to them, and yielded at last to their entreaties. It was then agreed, that one half of all the military in the town should march in the front, the other half in the rear, and the women, children, and others unable to bear arms, in the middle between them. Drawn up in this form, they resolved to attempt a passage with their swords through the enemy's intrenchments. They knew it to be impossible, but that most of them must perish. "But if we open our gates to the Spaniards," said Riperda, "must we not likewise perish? And if we must die, (though still it is possible we may escape) is it not better to die fighting bravely in the field; we who have exerted ourselves so strenuously in defence of our religion and liberty; than after being stript of our arms, and bound like criminals, to receive an ignominious death upon a scaffold, or in a dungeon, from the hands of an ungenerous and unrelenting enemy?"

Toledo offers more

They were upon the point of putting their design in execution, when intelligence of it was

carried to Toledo. He considered, that if they were not diverted from it, he should, in consequence of his victory, instead of a great and important city, acquire possession only of a desolated ruin. He reflected too on the danger to which his troops might be exposed, from the fury of so many brave men animated by despair and vengeance; and therefore, without delay, he sent a trumpet to the besieged, to give them hopes of favor and forgiveness. There was a violent struggle in their minds for some time between their fears, and the hopes with which he thus inspired them. But from their knowledge of his character, their distrust and diffidence prevailed; and they refused to hearken to his proposal, till he engaged, that, on condition of their paying two hundred thousand livres, the army should be restrained from plundering the inhabitants, and that all of them, except fifty-seven, whom he named, should receive a full pardon of their offences.

This exception of so great a number of citizens, who were the most considerable persons in the town, and had distinguished themselves by their bravery in its defence, would have prevented the accommodation from taking place, had not the German part of the garrison urged in the most determined manner, that the conditions offered should be accepted. The Walloons, on the other hand, and the Dutch, were extremely reluctant and averse; because, as they were more obnoxious than the Germans, they believed that no mercy would be shown them. The garrison being thus divided

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favorable
terms.

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The surren-
der.

July 13.

in their sentiments, and many of them having, with a view to make their escape, secretly withdrawn from their stations on the walls, the inhabitants began to dread that the Spaniards, observing them grown more remiss than formerly, might take the town by storm; and therefore, without further delay, they sent a deputation of their number, to make the surrender on the terms proposed.

A regiment of Spaniards was immediately sent to take possession of the place. All persons, whether inhabitants or foreign foldiers, were ordered to lay down their arms. The citizens were commanded to retire into certain churches, and the garrison to certain monasteries, where guards were placed over them, to prevent their escape. On the same day Toledo entered the town with the Spanish troops. In order to induce the foreign foldiers, of whom the garrison chiefly consisted, to concur with the inhabitants in the surrender, Toledo had given them particular assurances of safety. And although they were strictly guarded, and not suffered to depart, yet bread had been distributed to *them* as well as to the citizens; and no violence was offered them till the third day, when the duke of Alva, who had recovered from his illness, came to Haerlem, on pretence of visiting the fortifications, but in reality to instruct his son with regard to his treatment of the prisoners.

The perfid-
ious cruel-
ty of Alva
and his son.

It was then, but too late, that this brave, though now defenceless garrison repented of having so tamely delivered up their arms; and saw the folly of trusting in the mercy of an ungenerous enemy,

whose revenge and hatred were implacable. A massacre, which had been concerted in the interview between the father and the son, was begun, by putting to death three hundred Walloons. At the same time, the brave Riperda, and other persons of note were beheaded. But the slaughter stopt not here. Several hundreds of French, Scotch, and English soldiers, besides a considerable number of the citizens who had been seized in attempting to make their escape, were likewise butchered; and when the executioners were tired with slaughtering, they tied the unhappy victims two by two, and plunged them into the river. Even the sick and wounded were carried out into the court yard of the hospital where they lay, and put to the sword.

Historians differ as to the number of those who were involved in this dismal catastrophe; and it is remarkable that some of the Spanish writers make it greater than the Dutch. By the lowest account, nine hundred brave men were executed like the vilest malefactors, who, trusting to Toledo's promise, had given up their arms, and thrown themselves upon his mercy.

It would shock the reader's humanity to offer any excuse for such inhuman cruelty; yet it must not be denied that Alva had ample matter of chagrin, when he considered how much the length of the siege, and the obstinate valor of the besieged had cost him. By the inclemency of the season, by the scarcity of provisions, and by the sword of the enemy, he had lost four thousand five hundred

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Consequences of the
vigorous defence of
Haerlem.

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men; besides a great number whom their diseases or wounds rendered unfit for service. Nor was the diminution of his forces the only loss which he sustained from this siege. It was attended with an expense, by which his treasure was exhausted. It sunk considerably the reputation of his arms; and inspired the insurgents with hopes, that an enemy, who had found it so difficult to conquer, might themselves be overcome. It afforded leisure to the other revolted cities to settle their affairs, and furnished them with the happiest opportunity of carrying on their conquests in Zealand, where the city of Middleburgh still remained in the hands of the Spaniards^s.

Mutiny of
the Spanish
troops.

Of the several inconveniencies which the duke of Alva suffered from the length of the siege, the draining of his treasury was not the least considerable; as it occasioned his falling behind in the payment of his troops, and rendered abortive all the succeeding operations of the campaign. He intended that they should have gone from Haerlem into North Holland, to secure the town of Alcmaer. But when orders were given for their march, they refused to obey. They had been greatly exasperated by the conditions granted to the people of Haerlem, because they were thereby disappointed in their hopes of plunder; and they resolved to make Toledo feel their resentment, by insisting

^s Bentivoglio, p. 117. Meteren, p. 110. Meursii Auriacus, lib. viii.

on the immediate payment of their arrears. He represented to them the prejudice which the king's interest would suffer from their remaining inactive at the present crisis. But the more they perceived their importance, the higher was the gratification of their resentment. Without regard either to Toledo's remonstrances, or to the terms on which Haerlem had been surrendered, they fixed their quarters in that city; laid the citizens, already exhausted by their sufferings, under contribution, and exercised over them the same tyrannical oppression, as if they had taken the town by storm: thus demonstrating to the inhabitants of the other cities, the absurdity of submitting to the Spaniards, whatever conditions might be offered; since, even when their commanders were willing to observe these conditions, they were violated by the soldiers, whose rapacity the general was unable to restrain.

This incident affected the duke of Alva with the most sensible concern. He was aware of the pernicious effects that must arise from it. He had ever valued himself, and not without reason, on the exact discipline which he had hitherto maintained. Inclined, but at the same time afraid, to employ rigor and severity, lest still more pernicious consequences should follow, he resolved to make trial of persuasion; and with this view he employed the intercession of the marquis of Vitelli, who was the most beloved as well as the most respected of all his officers. Vitelli exerted his utmost art and influence; and at last, with infinite difficulty, he persuaded the mutineers to accept a

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The siege
of Alcmaer.

part of their arrears, and to submit to the authority of their commanders*.

Much time having been employed in this negotiation, the season was far advanced before the army could be led to Alcmaer. This place (if they had attacked it sooner) must unavoidably have fallen into their hands. It had been the last of all the cities in North Holland, in shaking off its allegiance to Philip. The catholic inhabitants were numerous, and had been able to keep possession of one of the principal gates of the town. They had earnestly solicited Toledo to hasten to their assistance. But the mutiny of his troops having prevented him from complying with their request till it was too late, the prince of Orange had improved the leisure which this incident afforded him; and having sent forces to the assistance of the protestant inhabitants, he had wrested the gate out of the hands of the catholics; furnished the protestants with arms, and procured for them from the neighbouring cities, supplies of provisions and military stores.

Toledo was aware of the disadvantages which must attend his entering on the siege of a place, situated like Alcmaer in a marshy soil, so late in the year. But he hoped, that with so great an army as he now possessed¹⁰, he would be able to reduce it before the rainy season should begin; and

* Bentivoglio, p. 131.

¹⁰ It amounted to sixteen thousand men.

he knew that the reduction of Alcmaer would greatly facilitate his conquest of the other towns in the province. He left Haerlem therefore as soon as Vitelli had quelled the mutiny of the troops, and marched directly towards Alcmaer¹¹.

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Having planted a battery on each side of the town, he began a brisk cannonading, and in a few days made such considerable breaches, that he doubted not of being able to carry the town by storm. In order to divide the garrison, he resolved to make an assault on both sides at once. The inhabitants perceived his design, and prepared for their defence. The Spaniards having passed the ditch, by means of two portable bridges, advanced to the attack with loud shouts, and full confidence that there was no force in the place sufficient to oppose them. But they soon found that courage, when grounded on despair, can in some cases supply the want both of discipline and numbers. The garrison, seconded by the townsmen, made so intrepid a resistance, as filled the Spaniards with astonishment. They renewed their attack several times; but were at last obliged to retire with the loss of six hundred killed, and three hundred wounded. Toledo could not, either by promises or threats, persuade them to return to the assault. Soon afterwards the rains began to fall, and the Spaniards suffered greatly from the humidity of the air and soil. The duke of Alva too had received

The Spaniards bravely repulsed.

¹¹ It lies at the distance of only one day's journey from Haerlem.

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1673.

The siege
raised.

Sea-fight
near Am-
sterdam.

intelligence, that the Hollanders had formed the design of opening their sluices, in order to lay the country round Alcmaer under water. To save his army therefore from destruction, he sent orders to his son to raise the siege; which Frederic did accordingly on the eleventh of October. He then marched to the southern parts of the province, and put his troops, greatly fatigued and exhausted, into winter-quarters¹².

Alva was not more fortunate at this time by sea, than he had been by land at Alcmaer. In revenge for the assistance which the people of Amsterdam had lent the Spaniards in the siege of Haerlem, the inhabitants of Enchuyfen, Horn, and other protestant cities, had fitted out against them a numerous fleet, which they stationed in the mouth of the river Ye. With this fleet they took or destroyed every vessel that attempted to pass from Amsterdam into the Zuider sea, and thus put an entire stop to the trade of that commercial city. To remedy this evil, which must soon have proved fatal to a people who subsisted wholly by trade, the duke of Alva had come himself to Amsterdam, where he had equipped with the utmost expedition a fleet, consisting of twelve ships of war, of a much larger size than usual, of which he gave the command to the count de Bossut. This fleet was much inferior in number to that of the enemy; but this disadvantage, Alva hoped, would be compensated by the number of soldiers on board,

¹² Meteren, p. 123. Thuanus, lib. lv. sect. 8.

added to the superior size of the ships, and the skill and bravery of the commander.

As soon as Bossut approached the mouth of the river, the Hollanders left their station, and retired towards Horn and Enchuyfen. Here they received a considerable reinforcement; and soon afterwards returned, under the command of Theodore Sonoy, to watch an opportunity to encounter the enemy on advantageous terms. The two fleets for some time lay in sight of each other, and frequent skirmishes passed between them. Bossut hesitated long, whether he should venture to engage with a force so much superior; and for this reason he kept his fleet in the open sea, and in the deepest water, where he could avail himself of the size of his ships. But the people of Amsterdam, impatient under the interruption of their trade, having transmitted a false representation to the duke of Alva of the strength of the Dutch fleet, persuaded him to send positive orders for a general engagement. Bossut, though extremely diffident of success, immediately steered towards the enemy, who lay in shallow water, prepared for his attack. The combat was begun with great spirit and intrepidity, but victory soon appeared on the side of the Hollanders; who having a much greater number of ships than the enemy, attacked them on every side; and being much nimbler in all their motions, did them a great deal of mischief, while their own loss was inconsiderable. Of Bossut's fleet, one ship, with all the crew, was sunk; three were stranded, and afterwards taken by the Hollanders; and all

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The protestants victorious.

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The
first
edition
of
this
book
was
published
in
1573.Bossut is
taken pri-
soner.

the rest, except the admiral's galley, saved themselves by flight. Of this vessel, the cotemporary historians speak in the strongest terms; and represent her as one of the largest, and the best equipped, that had been ever seen. She was surrounded by a number of the enemy's smaller vessels, which battered her furiously on every side, and at length drove her upon a bank. Bossut, still unwilling to suffer her to fall into their hands, continued to make the most obstinate resistance¹³, till of three hundred soldiers on board, two hundred and twenty were killed, and all the rest wounded but fifteen. In this situation, one of the Spaniards, who remembered the scenes of treachery and bloodshed in which he had been concerned in Naerden and Haerlem, advised the admiral to receive the enemy into the ship, and then to blow her in the air. But Bossut, conscious of having done every thing that either his duty or his honor could require, refused to listen to so desperate a proposal, and chose rather to confide in an offer which was made him by the Hollanders, that if he would surrender without any farther resistance, they would spare the lives of all that were on board. On this condition the ship was accordingly given up; and Bossut, with such of the crew and soldiers as survived, was conducted to prison in the town of Horn¹⁴.

¹³ This engagement lasted for twenty-eight hours.

¹⁴ The admiral's ship called the Inquisition, carried only two-and-thirty guns. — Thuanus, lib. lv. sect. vii. Meteren, p. 125. Bentivoglio, p. 133.

Sonoy sent immediate notice of this victory to the States of Holland; who being sensible how much their safety depended on maintaining their superiority at sea, had been extremely anxious with regard to the issue of the contest; and they now appointed a solemn thanksgiving to be observed in all the churches of the province.

Their joy on this occasion was not a little increased by the acquisition of San Gertrudenburg; which gave them the command of the Maese, and a free entrance into the province of Brabant. It was taken by a detachment of their troops, under the command of the Sieur de Payette, a French protestant, who entered it in the night by scalade, and put the garrison, consisting of a cohort of Walloons under a Spanish governor, to the sword.

This loss was in some measure compensated to the duke of Alva, by an advantage which a detachment of his army gained over the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, who had marched with a body of troops to check the excursions of the Spaniards in the southern parts of Holland. St. Aldegonde's forces were cut to pieces or dispersed, and he himself was taken prisoner. Alva would not have spared the life of a man, who, by his activity in rousing the spirit of liberty among his countrymen, had rendered himself so exceedingly obnoxious, had he not been restrained by his regard for the preservation of the count de Bossut; upon whom the prince of Orange had declared he would retaliate, for

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The States
acquire San
Gertruden-
burgh.

St. Alde-
gonde taken
prisoner.

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1573.

Alva leaves
the Nether-
lands.

whatever severity should be used against St. Aldegonde²⁵.

Alva intended to have begun the next campaign with the siege of Leyden; and with this view he seized upon a number of stations in the neighbourhood of that city. But the siege, no less memorable than that of Haerlem, was reserved for his successor. Alva had, as mentioned above, applied to Philip for liberty to leave the Low Countries, on account of the bad state of his health, occasioned by the moisture of the climate, and the fatigues which he had undergone. This was believed by many to be only a pretence; while his request proceeded in reality from apprehensions, that the king had listened to the representations of his enemies, and would soon confer his office upon another. There is very little reason, however, to suppose that Philip was in the smallest degree dissatisfied with his conduct, since he appears, in all his tyranny and violence, to have acted with strict conformity to his instructions. But Philip having at last become diffident of the success of those cruel measures which he had hitherto prescribed, had resolved, not from choice, but from necessity, to make trial of some more gentle expedients. He knew how unfit the duke of Alva was to be employed in the execution of this new plan of government; and he believed that no concessions would prove acceptable to the revolted provinces, that could be made by one who had rendered himself so

²⁵ Meursii Auriacus, p. 270. Meteren, p. 125.

much the object of their abhorrence. He had therefore readily consented that Alva should retire, and had, more than a year before the present period, appointed the duke de Medina Cœli, governor of the Netherlands in his room. This nobleman having found, upon his arrival, that the provinces were in a very different state from what he had expected, and that the charge which he had undertaken would probably be attended with much greater difficulty than glory, declined entering upon it, and afterwards obtained leave from Philip to return to Spain. He remained, however, in the Low Countries till towards the end of the present year, when the new governor, Don Lewis de Zuniga and Requesens, arrived. And soon afterwards the duke of Alva, who had come to Brussels to receive Requesens, having resigned the regency into his hands, set out with his son, by the way of Germany and Italy, for Spain.

The new
governor.

On this occasion men were affected variously. Even all the protestants did not entertain the same sentiments with regard to the effects which the duke's departure was likely to produce. While some rejoiced at it from the dread which they entertained of his abilities; others considered, that for several months past his good fortune had forsaken him; and they believed that the abhorrence which his tyranny had excited towards his person and government, would, by proving a powerful bond of union among his enemies, effectually prevent them from listening to any insidious terms of accommodation which the Spaniards might propose.

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XII.

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Alva's boast.

He was regarded both by the catholics and protestants, as the chief source of all the calamities in which the Netherlands had been involved. He had received his government from the dutchefs of Parma, in a state of perfect tranquillity. By his tyranny, he had thrown it into the most terrible combustion, and kindled the flames of a destructive war, which he was conscious of being unable to extinguish, and had therefore applied for liberty to retire. He is said to have boasted to count Koningstein¹⁶, at whose house he lodged in his way to Italy, that during his government of five years and a half, upwards of eighteen thousand heretics had suffered by the hand of the public executioner; besides a much greater number whom he had put to the sword, in the towns which he took, and in the field of battle.

His government.

The situation of the Low Countries during Alva's administration, was truly deplorable. His oppression was not confined to the protestants; but great numbers too of the catholics were put to death, and their effects forfeited, on the pretence of their having given entertainment to heretics, or of having held a correspondence with them in their exile. Wives were punished with the utmost severity for affording shelter to their husbands, whom the council of tumults had condemned; children for performing the like kind offices to their parents; and in Utrecht, a father was executed for allowing his son, who had returned from banishment, to

¹⁶ Uncle to the prince of Orange.

lodge under his roof, for one night. By forcing so many thousands of the most industrious inhabitants to leave the country, and by neglecting to provide a naval force to oppose the exiles at sea, commerce was almost entirely ruined; notwithstanding which, he imposed upon the people more oppressive taxes than they could have borne, if they had been in the most flourishing condition. In levying these taxes, the utmost rigor was employed. The people were often wantonly provoked, and tumults purposely excited, from which occasion was taken to punish them with confiscation of their goods, and sometimes both with death and confiscation. From the confiscations and taxes large sums were raised; yet, by maintaining so numerous an army, and by building citadels to keep the principal towns in awe, as he received little assistance from the king, who was engaged in other expensive enterprises, he fell behind in the payment of his troops; and in order to keep them in good humor, he permitted them to live at free quarters upon the inhabitants; against whom they exercised, on many occasions, the most cruel and oppressive rapacity.

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XIII.

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Chapter of
Regulations

He applies
himself to
raise the Reg
of Middle
burg.

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE SECOND

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK XIII.

PART I.

BOOK

XIII.

1573.

Character of
Requesens.

PHILIP could not have made choice of a more proper successor to the duke of Alva than *Requesens*, who had acquired some military fame in the battle of Lepanto, and had distinguished himself in the government of Milan, by his prudence and moderation; qualities from which Philip now hoped for greater success, in quelling the rebellious spirit of his subjects in the Netherlands, than had attended the violent administration of the duke of Alva.

He applies
himself to
raise the siege
of Middle-
burgh.

To show as early as possible, that a change of measures had been adopted by the court of Spain, *Requesens* began his government with demolishing Alva's statue above mentioned, and with repressing the insolence of certain garrisons, at whose enormities his predecessor had connived¹. He then

¹ Strada, ab init. an. 1574.

applied with great industry to make the necessary preparations for the relief of Middleburgh; which, having been closely besieged by the Zealanders for more than a year and a half, was now reduced to the last extremity. Several vigorous attempts had been made, during the duke of Alva's administration, to raise the siege; but through the superiority of the Dutch fleet, they had proved abortive; and Mondragone the governor had given notice, that if he was not relieved in a few days, he would find it necessary to surrender.

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Requesens knew that nothing but the most pressing necessity would have drawn this declaration from an officer of so great spirit and fortitude as Mondragone. And he was sensible, that upon the preservation of Middleburgh, depended *that* of all the other towns in Zealand which retained their allegiance. He therefore postponed every other object of his attention; and having gone to Antwerp, he equipped there, and at Bergen op-zoom, with the utmost expedition, a fleet consisting of more than thirty ships, besides transports, with provisions and military stores².

This fleet he divided into two squadrons, one of which commanded by the vice-admiral, the Sieur de Glimes and Julio Romero, he ordered to sail from Bergen, down the Easter Scheld; and the other under Sancho d'Avila, to fall down the Hont or Wester Scheld, from Antwerp. By this measure, he intended to distract the enemy's

² Meteren, p. 131.

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attention, and to oblige them to divide their forces; and he hoped that at least one of the two squadrons might effectuate its entrance into the canal of Middleburgh.

But the prince of Orange, whose adherents were numerous in every corner of the maritime provinces, had received early information of the governor's design, and had likewise got intelligence of his plan of operations. Having passed over from Holland to the isle of Walcheren, and taken up his residence in Flushing, in order to assist the Zealanders with his counsel, William stationed a part of his fleet on the south coast of the island, to lie in wait for d'Avila; and sent all the rest, strongly, manned, and well equipped for fighting, up the Easter Scheld, with orders, as soon as possible to attack the fleet under the command of de Glimes and Romero.

Battle of
Sacherlo.

This fleet, with the greatest part of the transports, had already set sail from Bergen; and Requesens, extremely anxious for its fate, had accompanied it as far as Sacherlo. There it cast anchor, and was waiting for the rising tide, when the Zealanders, commanded by Boifot admiral of Holland, arrived in sight. De Glimes soon perceived the superiority of Boifot's fleet, both in the size and number of the ships, and was of opinion that he ought not to proceed in the intended enterprise; but he was overruled by Romero, who, prompted by his innate courage, and by that contempt, which, like the rest of his countrymen, he entertained for the Dutch insurgents, insisted that

they should try the fortune of a battle. They accordingly weighed anchor, and advanced to the enemy. In the beginning of the engagement, De Glimes's own ship ran foul of a sand bank, from which she could not be disengaged. The Zealanders perceiving her distress, attacked her on every side, and at length set her on fire. Romero hastened to her assistance; but all his attempts to extinguish the flames proved ineffectual. In a few minutes she sunk; after having communicated the flames to Romero's ship, that had come to her relief. Romero was obliged to jump overboard, and save his life by swimming³. The Zealanders had the same fortunate success against all the other ships of the enemy; they sunk some, burnt others, and took the rest. Besides De Glimes, and several other officers, near a thousand Walloons and Spaniards perished. The victory was decisive. And Requesens had the mortification, from the dike of Sacherlo, to witness this disaster, which was great in itself; but was rendered still greater, and more afflicting to him, by the fatal consequences with which he foresaw it must be attended.

D'Avila in the mean time, with the squadron under his command, had sailed from Antwerp, and advanced as far as Flushing. Had he proceeded in his voyage without delay, he must have reached Middleburgh, in spite of the Dutch fleet which had been stationed to oppose him; for it is

³ Meursii Auriacus, p. 122.

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not probable that he would have met with great resistance from that fleet, as the flower of all the forces belonging to it had been sent with Boifot. The prince of Orange, who knew this, was extremely apprehensive of the issue, and anxiously longed for Boifot's return; but he was soon delivered from his anxiety, by observing from a promontory near Flushing, that instead of hastening forward, d'Avila had cast anchor, and seemed resolved to wait for the arrival of De Glimes and Romero. In a few hours d'Avila received intelligence of their defeat; after which, despairing of being able to relieve the besieged, he immediately set sail for Antwerp. He was pursued by the enemy; but having betaken himself to flight in time, he arrived with very little loss at his destined port.

The sur-
render of
Middleburgh.

The prince of Orange conveyed intelligence to Mondragone of what had passed, by a Spanish officer whom he had taken prisoner, and at the same time threatened, that if he did not surrender the town in a few days, the garrison should be put to the sword without mercy. Great numbers of the besieged had already died of hunger, or of the unwholesome food to which they had been obliged to have recourse. Provisions of almost every kind, not excepting the flesh of dogs and horses, were consumed; nor had they any other food, but bread made of flax seed; and even this was nearly exhausted. Mondragone perceiving that the destruction of the garrison, as well as of the inhabitants, must be the certain consequence of his refusing to capitulate, consented to give up both the cities of

Middleburgh and Armuyden, on condition that the garrisons should be allowed to depart with their arms and baggage, and that the ecclesiastics, and all such of the catholic inhabitants as inclined to withdraw, should have liberty to dispose of their effects, and be transported to the continent. William highly respected Mondragone on account of his gallant conduct during the siege, and agreed to these conditions; but required that he should pledge his honor that he would procure the release of St. Aldegonde, and two or three more of the Protestant leaders, or return into captivity. In the sequel, Mondragone showed himself worthy of the confidence which was reposed in him. By his intercession with Requesens, St. Aldegonde and the other prisoners were set at liberty.*

Notwithstanding this signal triumph gained over Requesens in his first enterprise, the prince of Orange was not without apprehensions, that the difference between his character and that of his predecessor, added to the difference of measures which he seemed determined to pursue, might produce some alteration in the sentiments of the people. The high military talents, the vigor and activity of Alva, had been objects of dread and terror. They had overawed most of the provinces, and rendered the efforts of others ineffectual; but as the oppressive violence of that tyrant had at first given birth to the revolt, so it had contributed more than any other cause to cherish and support it.

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Apprehen-
sions of the
prince of
Orange.

* Meteren, p. 120. Bentivoglio.

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He puts the
people on
their guard.

Under a milder and more artful governor, William dreaded, not only that the inhabitants of the interior provinces would acquiesce in the established government, but that even the people of Holland and Zealand would be enticed, again to yield their necks to the Spanish yoke. And to prevent this, he employed every consideration that could work either on their hopes or fears.

The king had so far complied with their wishes, as to remove the duke of Alva; but how little reason they had to flatter themselves, that any greater regard would be now paid to their rights than formerly, was manifest from his choice of the new governor, who had procured his master's favor, by the exercise of cruelty over the Moors in Granada; and who, being a stranger and a Spaniard as well as Alva, could not be greatly interested in the prosperity of the provinces, nor have any other end in view, but to promote the tyrannical designs of the court of Spain. Requesens indeed had a more benign and placid countenance than Alva; but the danger to which the provinces were exposed, was for this reason the more to be dreaded by every friend of his country. Amidst the governor's professions of concern for their prosperity, no mention had been made of freeing them from that enormous load of taxes under which they groaned; or of delivering their consciences from that restraint and violence, which the former governor had imposed upon them; or of restoring the laws which Alva had so wantonly trampled under foot; or in short, of dismissing those foreign troops, from whose rapacity they had suffered such

intolerable outrage. In order to accomplish these important purposes, the provinces of Holland and Zealand had taken up arms; and although the fortune of the war had been various, yet in spite of the most vigorous efforts of the duke of Alva, with a numerous army, to reduce them, these provinces were governed by their own inhabitants, and enjoyed the free and full possession of their religious and civil rights. The other provinces ought now to imitate the example of their countrymen; and they might reasonably hope that their endeavours would be attended with success; the king having appointed a governor over them, inexperienced in the art of war, and unacquainted with the army under his command, which was at present strongly infected with a spirit of sedition and discontent. It might perhaps appear rash and daring for the inhabitants of so narrow a territory as the Netherlands, to enter the lists with so potent an enemy as the king of Spain; but the power of that monarch was not in reality so formidable as it seemed. The great extent of his dominions served rather to embarrass and encumber him, than to add to his strength; and considering the distance of his place of residence, and the difficulty of transporting troops either from Spain or Italy, there was little reason to apprehend that he would ever be able to subdue the people of the Netherlands; if they acted with that unanimity and spirit which became them, in a cause, in which, not only their property, and their existence as a commercial state, but their religion and civil liberty, were at stake."

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The last
attempt of
count Lewis
of Nassau.

By these and such other arguments, did the prince of Orange animate the people to co-operate with him, in asserting their liberty, in opposition to the plan formed by the court of Spain to enslave them.

Mean while, his brother count Lewis, who had resided in Germany ever since the surrender of Mons, was employed in attempting to persuade the protestant princes there, to assist him in his preparations for a new invasion of the interior provinces; to which, notwithstanding the failure of his former enterprises, Lewis was prompted, partly by his knowledge of the mutinous spirit of the Spanish troops, but chiefly by the prospect of that assistance which it was now in his brother's power to afford him. It was concerted between the two brothers, that as soon as count Lewis had finished his levies, the prince should advance with a body of troops towards the interior provinces, either to make a diversion in his brother's favor, or to unite their forces.

Lewis found it extremely difficult to procure money to defray the expense of his intended expedition. His brother's fortune as well as his own were almost ruined by their former military enterprises. The States of Holland were involved in greater expense than they were able to support. They had, in conjunction with the prince of Orange, made application to the queen of England; but this princess, being unwilling to embroil herself with Philip, had refused to assist them. Lewis had begun his preparations, in hopes of receiving


receiving supplies from some German princes, who had promised their assistance, but who were either not inclined, or unable to fulfil their engagements. To save himself from the affront of abandoning an undertaking, in which a great number of French and German protestants had engaged at his request, he opened a negociation with Schomberg, ambassador of Charles the Ninth of France, who at this time courted the favor of the protestant princes in Germany, with a view to facilitate the election of his brother the duke of Anjou, to the crown of Poland. Between Lewis and Schomberg, who met at Francfort on the Maine, it was agreed, That if Charles should, in behalf of the inhabitants of the Low Countries, declare war against the king of Spain, the provinces of Holland and Zealand should be immediately delivered into the hands of the French monarch; on his engaging to maintain all their rights, and in particular, the free exercise of the reformed religion. But if Charles should not make open war, it was agreed, that count Lewis should have three hundred thousand livres to assist him in his present enterprise; that the French king should have the sovereignty of Holland and Zealand, and that some of the German princes should be surety for the fulfilment of this condition. A part of the money was paid, and Lewis was thereby enabled to complete his levies, which amounted to between three and four thousand horse, and seven thousand foot.

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^s Thuanus, lib. lv. Meteren, p. 133. — Charles died soon after, and the treaty had no other consequences.



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He began his march, accompanied by his brother Henry, and Christopher, son of the elector Palatine, in the beginning of February; and despising the rigor of the season, he advanced with great rapidity towards the Netherlands, in hopes of finding the governor unprepared. Having crossed the Rhine and the Moselle, he directed his course towards Guelderland, with an intention to pass the Maese at Maestricht, and to pursue his march through Brabant, till he should unite his forces with those which his brother had engaged to bring to his assistance.

The governor's perplexity.

With so great dispatch and secrecy had Lewis conducted his preparations, that Requesens remained ignorant of his design, till he was informed that he had begun his march. By this intelligence the governor was thrown into great perplexity. His troops had been lately so much reduced, that it was impossible for him to oppose both the brothers at the same time; and he considered, that to unite his forces, and employ them against Lewis, would expose the maritime provinces an easy prey to the prince of Orange. His anxiety was increased by the discovery of an intrigue, which had been formed by William's adherents, for the surprise of Antwerp. Nor was he entirely free from apprehensions that his troops might refuse to quit the towns in which they were stationed, till they should receive payment of their arrears. Having convened a council of his principal officers, and heard their opinions of the measures which they thought most proper to be pursued, he resolved

to remain, together with the Marquis of Vitelli, in Antwerp, to watch the secret machinations of the prince of Orange; and such troops as could be soonest drawn together, were immediately sent off under Sancho d'Avila, to oppose the passage of count Lewis over the Maese. The rest followed soon after; having been persuaded to leave their quarters, by a promise that their arrears should be paid, as soon as the provinces were delivered from the impending danger.

Lewis in the mean time advancing towards the frontier, had arrived within a few miles of Maestricht, where he pitched his camp; in expectation that his friends in the place would be able to make themselves masters of one of the gates. But Requesens having discovered his intention, had dispatched several companies of light armed troops before the main army, to secure the town. These troops arrived in time to prevent the friends of Lewis from executing their design; and in a few days afterwards, they were joined by d'Avila with the rest of the forces.

Lewis was not prepared for undertaking the siege of a place so completely fortified as Maestricht; and after some trials of strength in two or three skirmishes with the Spaniards, he decamped, and marched down the East side of the river, till he came to Ruremonde; but there too, as well as in Maestricht, the protestants were intimidated and overawed, and not a single person ventured to declare in his favor. He continued his march in the same direction, resolving to hasten forward till

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he should join his brother, who was advancing to meet him in the country which lies between the Maese and the Waal.

D'Avila aimed at nothing for some time, but to prevent Lewis from transporting his army over the river, and with this view he had marched as near him as possible, having the river between them; but receiving a reinforcement of two thousand veteran troops, and finding, by the information of his spies, that Lewis had laid aside his first design of crossing the Maese, and was on full march towards the prince of Orange, he considered, that it was of the highest importance to prevent their junction; and that for this purpose it was necessary to compel Lewis as soon as possible to engage. With this intention he proceeded with the utmost celerity down the river, and having crossed it by a bridge of boats at the town of Grave, he thus got between count Lewis and his brother's army. Lewis, anxious to prevent this, had avoided every unnecessary delay; but his troops, chagrined at being refused admittance first into Maeftricht, and afterwards into Ruremonde, had proceeded in their march with much less alacrity than the Spaniards. He received the first intelligence of D'Avila's having crossed the Maese when he arrived at Mooch, a village at the distance of only one league from the Spanish army, and on the same side of the river. He soon perceived the necessity to which he was reduced, either to give the enemy battle, or to retire. To retire, he saw, must be extremely difficult and dangerous, on

account of the disorder and consternation which commonly attend a retreat; and therefore he did not hesitate to try the fortune of a battle, although he knew how much inferior his undisciplined forces were to the Spaniards, who were select veteran troops, animated by the consciousness of superior prowess, and commanded by d'Avila, a person of extraordinary abilities, who, by merit alone, had raised himself from the station of a common soldier, to the rank of general.

To enable him to resist so formidable an enemy, Lewis resolved to remain in his present situation at Mooch, and to cover his infantry with a strong intrenchment. His cavalry, though reduced by desertion, was still superior to that of the enemy; but from this superiority, the nature of the ground, which rises into hills at a little distance from the river, did not suffer him to derive any considerable advantage. He drew them up as well as the unequal face of the country would permit, on the right of his camp; and upon a hill behind his main army, he placed a squadron of chosen troops, with which he intended either to fix the victory, if it should appear doubtful; or, in case of a defeat, to open a passage through the enemy to his brother, who had now advanced as far as Nimeguen to meet him. He had just time to put his troops in order of battle when d'Avila arrived, having his infantry on the right, and on the left his cavalry, flanked by a body of musqueteers, designed to support them against the superior numbers of the German cavalry.

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Battle of
Mooch.

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D'Avila began the engagement by sending three hundred men to attack the enemy's lines. The troops which had been appointed to defend them, advanced briskly towards the Spaniards, and gave them a gallant and resolute reception; but they were soon compelled to retire. The Spaniards followed, and attempted to enter the camp along with them. The action there was bloody and obstinate, and fresh succours hastened from both armies to the assistance of the combatants. But the cotemporary historians differ so widely from each other in their accounts of this engagement, that it is impossible to know the truth. Some authors affirm, that the Germans acquitted themselves with honor, and made a bold and vigorous resistance. Others say, that only the French troops in count Lewis's army performed their duty, while the Germans refused to advance unless their arrears were paid, and remained obstinately in their camp till the Spaniards broke into it, and, after making prodigious havock among them, put them to an ignominious flight. In the beginning of the action, the German cavalry proved an overmatch for their antagonists; and having fallen with great fury on that part of the enemy's horse that was nearest them, they drove them to a distance from the field of battle; but when they were forming themselves again for a new attack, some fresh squadrons of the Spanish cavalry advanced, and threw them into disorder. The Spanish musqueteers, who had been placed to support the horse, were then of signal use. With their shot they

Lewis defeated and slain.

galled the Germans in flank, and greatly augmented their confusion. Count Lewis and the Palatine attempted, but in vain, to rally them. These princes did every thing to restore the battle that could have been done by the most expert commanders, while they endeavoured to animate their troops by their example, and gave conspicuous proofs of the most heroic valor. Their efforts might have been crowned with success, if a body of Spanish lances had not arrived when the German reiters had begun to give way. The reiters were overpowered; above five hundred of them were killed, and of the infantry between three and four thousand. The victory was decisive, and the value of it to the conquerors was greatly enhanced by the deaths of count Lewis, his brother Henry, and the Palatine; all of whom the cotemporary historians describe as having exerted the highest degree of vigor and intrepidity, although none of these writers were able to procure information of the manner in which they fell. Their death was matter of great lamentation to the protestant confederates, and especially the death of Lewis, who had made so many great exertions in their behalf.

As soon as the prince of Orange received the melancholy news of this disaster, he began to return towards Holland, being convinced that now, when he was deprived of his brother's aid, it would be in vain for him to attempt to keep the field⁶.

⁶ Bentivoglio, p. 143. Thuanus, lib. lix. sect. xv. Van Meteren, p. 132.

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Mutiny of
the Spanish
troops.

William expected that they would have immediately followed him, in order to improve their victory, whilst the terror which it inspired was recent; and they would probably have done so, had not the Spanish troops sullied the glory which they had acquired, by rebelling against their officers on the next day after the battle. D'Avila could not instantly fulfil his engagement to pay their arrears. Almost three years pay was due to them. Even before the present expedition, their patience had been worn out, and it appears to have been the hopes of plunder, or the dread of consequences fatal to themselves, that induced them to march against the Germans, more than their confidence in the promise which d'Avila had made them. Being now freed from their apprehensions of personal danger, and disappointed in their expectations of being enriched by the spoils of the enemy, who were still poorer than themselves, they demanded from their general the immediate fulfilment of his promise; and when they only received new assurances of the same kind as those with which they had been amused before, they threatened to take vengeance on him for his falshood and deceit. He and the other officers endeavoured to appease them, but in vain. In order to avoid their fury, he was obliged to make his escape secretly from the camp; and immediately after his departure, they ran to arms, expelled their officers, and, having from among themselves elected other officers and a commander in chief, they quickly left Mooch, and directed their march to Antwerp, with an intention

to live at free quarters upon the inhabitants of that wealthy city, till they should extort payment of their arrears.

Requesens having received intelligence of their design, had remained at Antwerp; and, if he had complied with the counsel of Champigny, governor of the town, and taken precautions for securing a part of the fortifications which was unfinished, he might have frustrated their attempt; but being extremely diffident of the Spanish part of the garrison; which had the same ground of discontent with the mutineers, and flattering himself with the hopes of being able to appease them, he suffered them to enter the city without resistance, to the number of three thousand men. They had no sooner entered, than they formed themselves in order of battle. The citizens were overwhelmed with terror, and many of them fled precipitately out of the city. Requesens rode up to the mutineers, and remonstrating to them on the pernicious tendency of their conduct, he prayed, entreated, and threatened them; but could not, by addressing either their hopes or fears, draw any other concession from them, but that they would abstain from plunder, on condition that they should receive immediate payment of their arrears, and that the Walloons and Germans under the command of Champigny should be ordered to quit the town. With this last request, the governor thought it expedient to comply; and thus the mutineers were left in full possession of the place, without any force to controul them. The first object of

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They take
possession of
Antwerp.

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their attention was to secure the gates, after which they dispersed themselves over the city, and took up their quarters in the houses of the principal inhabitants, where they studied to create expense, and night and day to give disturbance and uneasiness. They were perpetually demanding the fulfilment of the governor's engagements; and as they daily threatened to sack and plunder the town, if he did not speedily comply with their requests, the people were disquieted with continual apprehensions and alarms. The mutineers required payment not only of their own arrears, but of those too which had been due to such of their companions as had died of diseases or fallen in battle. At length, the sum of one hundred thousand florins was raised by the inhabitants; and the governor was obliged to pledge his jewels and furniture for the remainder, and to grant a pardon, confirmed by a solemn oath, to all concerned in this sedition; after which the mutineers returned under their former officers, and went to join the rest of the army which was now in Holland, and had already begun the siege of Leyden.

May 30.

Destruction
of the king's
fleet.

From this mutiny, Philip's interest in the Netherlands suffered greatly in several respects. In the time of d'Avila's expedition against count Lewis, Requesens having exerted his utmost vigor and activity, had equipped a numerous fleet, which he intended to employ in the recovery of Zealand. When the mutineers arrived at Antwerp, this fleet, which was not yet of sufficient strength, lay under the walls of the city. Adolphus Hanstede, the

commander, anxious for his charge, and apprehensive that the seditious soldiers might, in order to extort compliance with their demands, take possession of the ships, had removed them to a place at some distance from Antwerp, where they were out of the reach of the Spaniards. But in avoiding this danger he fell into a greater. The Zealanders, whose partisans were continually on the watch, quickly received intelligence of his change of station, and resolved to improve the opportunity which was thus presented to them. Having attacked him when he was utterly unprepared for defence; they took forty of his ships; sunk and destroyed several others; and rendered all the rest unfit for service. By this severe blow, the plan which Requesens had projected, for recovering the maritime towns, was entirely disconcerted. The fleet now destroyed, was to have acted in conjunction with another, which Philip had been preparing in the ports of Spain. But as the Spanish fleet, was deemed too weak to contend singly with the enemy, the design was laid aside for the present; and no future governor of the Low Countries ever found it practicable to revive it².

Whilst the Zealanders availed themselves of the sedition in the Spanish army by sea, the prince of Orange had been equally intent on deriving advantage from it by land. On receiving information of the fate of his brothers, he had begun his march, towards Holland; but when intelligence was brought

² Bentivoglio, p. 149. Meteren, 137.

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him that the Spaniards had mutinied, he resolved to improve the present opportunity, of making some new acquisition. Passing over into the isle of Bommel, which is formed by the confluence of the Maese and the Rhine, he engaged the chief town in it to espouse his interest; and having fixed his head-quarters there for some time, he gave support to his friends in the island, and reduced to great extremity such of the people as still adhered to the Spanish government. The marquis of Vitelli was dispatched by Requesens to oppose his progress. That able commander rendered abortive a design which the prince had formed on Bois-le-duc; and the prince, on the other hand, took measures which prevented the town of Bommel from falling into the hands of Vitelli. But the attention of both was soon after this engrossed by a more important and interesting object, the siege of Leyden, to the relation of which I shall proceed, after mentioning an attempt of Requesens, to put an end to the war, by publishing a new act of indemnity in the name of the king.

Act of indemnity.

Although several persons were excluded from the benefit of this indemnity, yet it was much more comprehensive than that which had been published some time before by the duke of Alva. It did not, however, produce the desired effect. The people were not conscious of that guilt which Philip's pompous deed of clemency imputed to them; they believed that they had suffered wrong, instead of having done it; and they could not be grateful to him for dispensing with a punishment,

which they thought it would have been in the highest degree tyrannical to inflict. Besides this, the pardon was clogged with a condition, by which almost all the inhabitants of Holland and Zealand, amounting to many hundred thousands, and great numbers too in the other provinces, were excluded. This was, that the protestants should renounce their religion, and return into the bosom of the church; a condition from which Philip's bigotry would never suffer him to depart, nor the zeal and sincerity of the reformers permit them to accept. Requesens could not be ignorant of this, yet he entertained some hopes at this time of bringing about an accommodation, by means of St. Aldegonde, who had not as yet obtained his liberty. The governor sent Champigny and Junius de Jong to treat with him; but when St. Aldegonde informed them that no peace would be ever agreed to by the maritime provinces, unless the question concerning religion were left to the decision of the States, Requesens, who knew that Philip would never consent to that condition, ordered the conference to be immediately dissolved.

He now bent his whole attention to the siege of Leyden. He had blockaded that city for several months in the winter season, and reduced the inhabitants to great distress; but he had been obliged to desist from his undertaking, and to call off his troops to oppose the German army. They left their stations in the neighbourhood of Leyden

The siege of
Leyden.

¹ Bentivoglio, p. 150.

B O O K on the 21st of March, and resumed them on the
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In order to form a just conception of the operations of this memorable siege, it is necessary to remember that Leyden lies in a low situation, in the midst of a labyrinth of rivulets and canals. The city was large and populous; and at the time of the siege was surrounded with a deep ditch, and a strong wall, flanked with bastions. That branch of the Rhine which still retains its ancient name, passes through the middle of it; and from this stream such an infinity of canals are derived, that it is difficult to say whether the water or the land possesses the greater space. By the canals, the ground on which the city stands is divided into a great number of small islands, united together by near a hundred and fifty stone-bridges, that are equally subservient to the beauty of the place, and the convenience of the inhabitants. Leyden is at the distance of a few hours journey from the Hague, Delft, and Gouda, and only a little farther from Rotterdam on the one hand, and Haerlem on the other. On account of its situation, as well as on its own account, it was deemed a place of the first importance, and a prize worthy of all the ardor which was displayed by the contending parties.

The prince of Orange, who had received notice of the governor's intention to renew the siege, communicated his intelligence to the citizens; and exhorted them to furnish themselves with stores of provisions, and to send out of the town all such

persons as would be useless in defending it. They were not sufficiently attentive to these injunctions. The prince complained of their remissness, and informed them, that for three months at least it would not be in the power of the States to raise the siege.

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To retard the approach of the Spaniards, he ordered ten companies of English adventurers, under the command of colonel Edward Chester, to take possession of two forts, one at the sluice of Gouda, and the other at the village of Alphen, by which the enemy must pass in their way to the city. These troops did not answer the expectation which William had conceived of their behaviour. The five companies which were placed at the sluice of Gouda, after a short resistance, betook themselves to flight; and the other five, after a skirmish in which no person fell on either side, basely imitated the example of their countrymen, and retired under the walls of Leyden. The citizens, who from their ramparts had beheld their ignominious behaviour, and suspected them of treachery, refused to admit them within the town. The English ascribed their conduct to the insufficiency of the fortifications which they had been appointed to defend; but not being able to wipe out the suspicion entertained of their fidelity, they all deserted to the enemy, but a few whom the people of Leyden received with open arms*.

The prince of Orange having intended, that the English forces, after being obliged to quit their

* Meteren, p. 139.

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first stations, should have retired into the town, had not provided any other troops to defend it. The inhabitants were therefore reduced to the necessity of trusting for their defence, to their own valor and conduct: a circumstance, which at first had a formidable aspect, but which in the end proved the cause of their preservation; since it was thereby much longer before they were reduced by famine, than it would have been, if, besides themselves, they had had a numerous garrison to support.

Janus Dou-
za, chief
magistrate
of Leyden.

The government of Leyden was committed on this occasion to Janus Douza¹⁰, a person of noble birth; and well known in the literary world, by his poetical productions. By his example, and his eloquence, this illustrious patriot kindled in the minds of his fellow-citizens, such a zeal for liberty, and so great an abhorrence of the tyranny of Spain, as rendered them superior to every distress, and in a great measure supplied their want of military skill. They must, however, have been found inferior to the Spaniards; and if Valdez, the Spanish commander, to whom Requesens committed the conduct of the siege, had pushed his operations with proper vigor, he must certainly have made himself master of the town. But whether he wanted to save his men, and to carry his end without bloodshed; or despaired, with the skill and force which he possessed, to be able to reduce so

The blockade
is formed.

¹⁰ Or Jan Vander Does, lord of Noordwick.

strong

strong a place by sack and storm, he did not think of any other expedient for subduing it, but that of blocking it up on all sides, so as to prevent the entrance of supplies. To this one point all his operations were directed. By a circular chain of more than sixty forts, which communicated with each other, and ran quite round the city, he invested it on every side, and not only rendered it impossible to introduce supplies, but even cut off all intelligence between the besieged and their friends in the other cities, except what was conveyed by pigeons, in the manner to which the protestants had recourse during the blockade of Haerlem¹¹.

By one of the forts called Lammen, the besieged having been deprived of the benefit of pasturing their cattle in the neighbouring meadows, they sallied out with great fury upon the Spaniards, and almost got possession of the fort; but after an obstinate and bloody contest, they were at last obliged to retire. The Spaniards fortified themselves in that station more strongly than before; and the besieged now despaired of being able, either in that, or any other quarter, to remove them to a greater distance from the city. Instead of this, they apprehended daily their nearer approach to it; and expected that they would soon open their batteries, in order to prepare for taking it by storm. This belief served to quicken the inhabitants;

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Conduct
and resolu-
tion of the
inhabitants.

¹¹ These pigeons were embalmed, and are still preserved in the town-house of Leyden. *Les delices des Pays bas.*

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and the women as well as the men were employed day and night, without ceasing, in strengthening the fortifications. An account was taken of the stock of provisions within the town; and in order to make it hold out as long as possible they began to husband it betimes. They were perpetually exhorting and animating each other, and expatiating upon the cruelty and perfidy of the Spaniards, and the unworthy fate of the people of Zutphen, Haerlem, and other places, who had trusted to their faith and mercy. When they were solicited to return to their allegiance by Lanoy, De Lique, and other natives of the Low Countries; they made answer, in the words of a celebrated Latin Poet,

Fistula dulce canit volucrem dum decipit auceps.

To other letters, in which they were desired to reflect on the misery to which they must ere long be reduced, they replied, that they had, upon the most mature consideration, resolved rather to die of hunger, or to perish with their wives and children in the flames of the city, kindled by their own hands, than submit to the tyranny of the Spaniards ¹².

Their distress.

That misery which, during the first two months of the siege, existed only in idea, was at last realized. Their whole stock of ordinary provisions being consumed, they were obliged to have

¹² Another saying, still more ferocious, is recorded by some historians; That rather than submit to so perfidious an enemy, they would feed on their left arms, and defend themselves with their right. Van Meteren, ubi supra.

recourse to the flesh of dogs and horses. Great numbers died of want; and many by the use of this unnatural food. The resolution of the people at length began to fail, and they now believed their present calamities to be superior even to those they should experience under the Spanish government. Some of them conceived a design to deliver up the town, and formed a secret association for this purpose. But their plot being detected, means were taken to prevent them from putting it in execution. A great number of people having come one day in a tumultuous manner to a magistrate whose name was Adrian, exclaiming that he ought either to give them food, or deliver the town into the hands of the enemy, "I have solemnly sworn, he replied, that I will never surrender myself, or my fellow-citizens, to the cruel and perfidious Spaniard; and I will sooner die than violate my oath. I have no food, else I would give it you. But if my death can be of use to you, take, tear me in pieces, and devour me; I shall die with satisfaction, if I know that by my death I shall for one moment relieve you from your direful necessity."

By this extraordinary answer, the people, struck with astonishment, were silenced, and their fury was for some time appeased.

The prince of Orange, who was not ignorant of the extreme misery to which the besieged were reduced, had done every thing in his power to accomplish their relief. He had already collected large supplies of provisions; but could not,

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resolve to
lay the
country un-
der water.

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with all his activity and address, raise a sufficient force to open a passage into the city. When he found that the situation of the besieged would not admit of longer delay, he convened an assembly of the States of the province. And the deputies, after considering the strength of the enemy, and the amount of their own forces, perceived it to be impracticable to relieve the besieged, either by land, or by the river and canals, agreed to have recourse to an expedient, which was dictated by despair, and was the only one at present in their power to employ. They resolved to avail themselves, against the Spaniards, of that furious element, from which their country had often suffered the most dreadful devastation; to open their sluices, to break down the dikes of the Maese and the Iffel, and by thus laying all the country round Leyden under water, to get access to the besieged with their fleet. Nothing could be more repugnant to the ideas of this people, than such a resolution. To drain their lands, to exclude the water, and preserve their dikes, were then, as they are still, objects to the Dutch of almost continual attention, and which cost them annually an immense expense. But they were at present animated by objects still more important and interesting; and their love of liberty, joined to their dread of popery and the Spanish yoke, prevailed over every other consideration. The damage, which it was supposed would arise from the measure adopted, was estimated at six hundred thousand guilders. But they considered, that if the Spaniards should succeed in their present enterprise, not only

the region to be overflowed, but all the rest of the province, would fall under their subjection. This the States regarded as infinitely worse than either poverty or death; and in their present disposition, they would have chosen to ruin the country altogether, rather than leave it to be enjoyed by an enemy whom they held in such abhorrence. They now applied themselves to the demolition of those mounds, upon which their existence as a nation depends, with a degree of industry and ardor, equal to that which they were accustomed to employ in repairing them, after the ravages of an inundation.

The water, after its barriers were removed, diffused itself over all the adjacent fields; and in a few days, almost the whole region which lies between Rotterdam, Gouda, Delft, and Leyden, was overflowed. The Spaniards were thrown at first into the utmost dread and terror; but when they understood the cause of this unexpected inundation, and observed that the water did not rise above a certain height, they recovered from their astonishment. They were obliged to abandon such of their forts as were situated in the lower grounds, and to retire to those which stood higher; but of these last, they hoped to be able to keep possession, and to continue the blockade, till the famine, which they knew raged in the town with dreadful fury, should conquer the obstinacy of the citizens, and bring the siege to a conclusion.

The prince of Orange, in the mean time, was employed with the utmost diligence in preparing

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every thing necessary to secure the successful execution of his intended purpose. He ordered to be built, at Rotterdam and other places, near two hundred flat-bottomed vessels, having each of them ten, twelve, fourteen, or sixteen oars; and these he mounted with guns, and manned with eight hundred Zealanders; a rude and savage, but a brave and determined band, animated at once by religious zeal, and the most implacable hatred against the Spaniards; and whose appearance was rendered horrid by the scars of innumerable wounds, which they had received in their late naval engagements. They were brought from the fleet by Boissot, the admiral of Zealand, to whom the conduct of the present enterprise was committed¹³.

With such of the vessels as were already equipped, Boissot left Delft in the beginning of September, and directed his course towards Leyden. But the water had not as yet risen to a sufficient height, and the banks of the rivers and canals, in which only there was a proper depth of water, were so strongly fortified, as to render his approach to the city impracticable. From some of their forts he obliged the Spaniards to retire, but others were of sufficient strength to withstand his most vigorous attacks. In order to avoid these, he continued to break down more dikes as he

¹³ The spirit by which these men were actuated, may be conceived from their method of distinguishing themselves; which was by wearing a half moon on their caps, with this inscription, Turks rather than papists. Meteren, 140.

advanced, and in his progress, had several bloody engagements with the enemy. The blockade, however, remained still as close as ever. Boissot began to be apprehensive of the issue. Heaven seemed not to favor his design. The north-wind continued much longer than had been ever known at the present season, and retarded the water in its ascent. The prince of Orange, when Boissot entered upon this expedition, had been confined to his chamber by a dangerous illness. He was now recovered, and came to visit the admiral's disposition of his ships, which he found to be exactly conformable to the directions which the States had given him; but their design, the prince perceived, must prove abortive, and all their labor and expense be lost, unless the wind should change soon to another quarter, and the autumnal tides rise as usual.

With extreme impatience they now expected the approach of these tides, which are commonly the subject of dread and terror to the Hollanders. The situation of the besieged was become the most deplorable and desperate. During seven weeks there had not been a morsel of bread within the city; and the only food had been the roots of herbs and weeds, and the flesh of dogs and horses. Even all these were at length consumed; and the people reduced to live on soup made of the hides of animals which had been killed. A pestilence succeeded to the famine, and carried off in a few weeks some thousands of the inhabitants. Those who survived, overwhelmed with anguish at the

The anxiety
and misery
of the citi-
zens.

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dismal scenes which they daily beheld, were scarcely able to perform the mournful office of burying the dead. In this dreadful situation, they saw from their walls, the sails and flags of the vessels destined for their relief; but had the mortification to perceive, that it was utterly impossible for them to approach. It is not surprising that some of the people, finding their misery greater than they were able to endure, should have entertained the thoughts of surrendering the town to the enemy. Some conspiracies were again formed for this purpose; but they were discovered and defeated by the vigilance of Douza, supported by a great majority of the people, to whom neither the pestilence, nor famine, nor death, in its most hideous forms, appeared so dreadful, as the tyranny of the Spaniards.

Their deliverance.

But the time of their deliverance was at hand; and Heaven interposed at last in a conspicuous manner in their behalf. Towards the end of September, the wind changing from the north-east to the north-west, poured the ocean into the mouths of the rivers with uncommon violence; and then veering about to the south, it pushed the water towards the plains of Leyden, till they were converted into a spacious lake, in which the Spanish forts were seen scattered up and down, and many of them almost covered with the water.

Boissot seized with ardor the opportunity which was thus presented to him. And though several of the enemy's fortifications still lay in the way by which it was necessary for him to advance,

he soon obliged the Spaniards to abandon them. The Zealanders pursued them, sometimes on foot along the dikes, and sometimes in their boats; and had several fierce rencounters with them, in which, from the advantage which their boats afforded them, they were every where victorious. The situation of the Spanish troops at this time was truly deplorable. Some were swallowed up in the mud and water; and others attempting to march along the dikes, were either killed by the fire from the boats, or dragged down with hooks fixed to the ends of long poles, and put to the sword without mercy. Fifteen hundred perished in their retreat.

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All the forts were now forsaken, except the fort above mentioned, called Lammen, of which, if the Spaniards had kept possession, they might have retarded the approach of the fleet for several days. This fort was much stronger, and stood higher than the rest. But when the garrison understood that their general had fled, and that the Zealanders on the one hand, and the besieged on the other, were preparing to begin an attack, they abandoned their station, and by torch-light effectuated a junction with the rest of the forces, in the middle of the night.

In this manner was the siege of Leyden raised, in the beginning of the fifth month after the blockade was formed. Boissot advanced without delay to the gates of the city. The people, pale and meagre, ran, as their small remains of strength would allow, to meet him; and many of them so

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greedily devoured the food which he distributed, that what was intended for their relief, proved the cause of their instant destruction; for provisions of every kind in the city had been entirely exhausted, and the besieged were so weakened, that if the blockade had continued two days longer, they must all have perished¹⁴.

When they were somewhat refreshed with the food which Boissot had brought, they accompanied the magistrates to one of the churches, where they rendered thanks to the Almighty for their deliverance. Never was any assembly more deeply agitated. By the consideration of their signal and unexpected deliverance, when they were upon the brink of ruin, joined to their remembrance of the dismal scenes which they had witnessed, and of the many friends and fellow-citizens whom the famine and pestilence had carried off, their minds were overpowered at once with gratitude and sorrow. They were dissolved in tears; and mingled together the voices of praise and of lamentation.

The cotemporary historians have further recorded,

¹⁴ They escaped still more narrowly from falling into the hands of the enemy. In the night immediately preceding, and at the very time when the Spaniards were making their retreat from the fort of Lammen, a great part of the wall of the city having fallen down, the noise reached the ears of the Spaniards; who, if they had known the cause, might have entered the town without resistance. But their dread represented the noise to their imaginations as the approach of the enemy, and served only to precipitate their flight.

that when the prince of Orange received information of the raising of the siege, being engaged in public worship in one of the churches at Delft, he stood up, and read to the audience the letters which contained the intelligence, after which, the States being convened, a day of general thanksgiving was appointed.

The Spanish army took their route by the way of Amsterdam and Utrecht, and attempted to get possession of the last of these places by surprise; but the gates being shut against them, and a contribution of money offered, they were prevailed on to pursue their march towards Maestricht, where they were put into winter-quarters ¹⁵.

¹⁵ Meteren, p. 139. Meursii Auriacus, p. 130. Bentivoglio, p. 151.

The Spaniards threw all the blame of the failure of their enterprise upon their general; whom they accused of having been remiss in his operations against the town, on account of a bribe of two hundred thousand florins, which they alledged he had accepted, either from the States of Holland or from the people of Leyden. Whether there was any ground for this accusation, does not appear with sufficient evidence. But the soldiers flew to arms, seized his person and confined him, till he agreed to pay them the two hundred thousand florins, which, they said, he had received from the Hollanders.

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Negotiations
for peace.

THE difficulties which the Spaniards encountered in the several enterprises that have been related, gave Philip a very different idea of the spirit, vigor, and resources of the malecontents, from what he had hitherto entertained; and determined him to listen to an offer, which his cousin the emperor Maximilian made at this time, of mediating a reconciliation. Maximilian was prompted to interpose his influence, partly perhaps by concern for the interest of his kinsman, but chiefly by his apprehension, that through the close connexion which subsisted between the Dutch and German protestants, the flame which raged with so much fury in the Low Countries, might at last diffuse itself into Germany. Having therefore interceded with Philip to grant the insurgents favorable terms, and obtained powers to negotiate an agreement, he transferred these powers to count Schwartzzenburgh, whom he sent into Holland, in the beginning of the year 1575, attended by several German nobles. On the count's arrival in Dort, he had an interview with his kinsman the prince of Orange; with whom he employed all his own influence, and that of the emperor, from whom he brought a confidential letter to the prince. From the respect due to the emperor, William consented to a congress in the city of Breda. But as he could not be persuaded, that Philip would

be ever brought to offer conditions, which the States could accept with safety, he believed, that the treaty proposed would prove abortive, and therefore he exhorted the States to keep themselves in a posture of defence, and to prosecute with vigor their preparations for renewing the war, when the congress should be dissolved. The prince himself was not of the number of the deputies; nor did those who were appointed, though less obnoxious to Philip's resentment, think it safe to trust themselves in the power of the Spaniards in Breda, till Romero, and Mondragone, and two other persons of distinction, were sent into Holland as hostages.

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From the proceedings at this congress, and the mutual distrust which the deputies discovered, the reader will easily perceive the causes which rendered ineffectual, not only the present attempt, but likewise all the endeavours which were afterwards employed, during the space of forty years, to reconcile the contending parties.

The demands of the States of Holland and Zealand consisted of two articles; that the governor should immediately dismiss the foreign troops; and that a general assembly of the States of all the provinces should be held to determine the several points in controversy, whether civil or religious.

March 14th.

In answer to these requests, the Spanish deputies observed, that it was unreasonable to call the Spaniards by the name of foreigners, since they were equally the subjects of the king as the people of the Netherlands, and had done him the most signal

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service, in that very country from which he was now requested to expel them. That the Germans, French, and English, in the service of the States, might with much greater propriety be denominated foreigners. That the king did not intend, in case peace were established, to retain the Spanish troops in the Low Countries any longer than necessity should require; but that it would be highly improper to urge him any further on this subject, as he could not, consistently with honor, dismiss the forces in the present posture of his affairs. They added, that after tranquillity was restored, the king would not be averse to the convocation of the States, nor oppose their deliberating concerning such affairs as properly belonged to them. That he would be ever ready to listen to their counsel, and would regulate his conduct agreeably to it in every thing that was just and reasonable. And that, in the mean time, he was graciously pleased to make them an offer of a full indemnity of their past offences, upon the following conditions: That all cities and forts, with their artillery and stores, should be delivered into his hands; that every heretical form of worship should be proscribed; and that all such persons as were unwilling to forsake their errors, should dispose of their effects and leave the country.

To these declarations and offers of the Spanish deputies, those of the States replied, that notwithstanding what had been said, they must still adhere to their first request of having the provinces delivered from the oppression of the Spanish and other

foreign troops. These troops were indeed subjects of the king of Spain; but they were not subjects of the duke of Brabant, or the earl of Flanders, Holland, or any other of the provinces, in which therefore they could not be suffered to remain, without a violation of a fundamental law of the constitution. It was true, that the French and English troops were foreigners; but these troops had come into the Low Countries at the desire of the States; they had never assumed to themselves any share in the government, and were deemed necessary by the States for their defence against the Spaniards; whereas the Spaniards had, from their first entrance into the Netherlands, treated the inhabitants as enemies and slaves; had arrogated to themselves every important branch of the administration, and had, on many occasions, exercised the most unrelenting cruelty, indulging, in the most abandoned manner, their lawless lust and avarice, to the utter ruin of great numbers of the innocent and faithful subjects of the king. It would be impossible to restore tranquillity to the provinces while these men were allowed to remain, nor were they friends to the king or the peace proposed, who advised him to retain them. If the service which the king had received from his Spanish troops, were compared with the mischief of which they had been the authors, it would be found that they had done infinitely greater harm than good; and that, by the lawless rapine which they had exercised, they had received much more than a sufficient compensation for all their services. The

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inhabitants of the Low Countries were conscious of having often contributed to advance the glory of the Spanish crown. Nor could even their late conduct, if justly considered, be interpreted as a breach of their duty to the king, since they had never opposed his exercising any rights which appertained to him as sovereign of the provinces; and although they had taken up arms, they had never employed them but in vindicating those rights and privileges which the king himself had sworn to maintain, or in defending their lives and fortunes, their wives and children, against the violence and lawless tyranny of the Spaniards.

It gave them much concern to find, that the king would not agree to summon an assembly of the States till peace should be restored, as they were convinced that no other means so effectual could be devised for establishing peace on a firm and permanent foundation. It gave them still greater concern to hear the deputies, in the name of the king, express themselves, as if they looked upon the States only as counsellors, whose advice he would or would not follow, according as he should judge expedient. This they could not help considering as an intimation, that the States were to be limited in the exercise of their authority; and if this was intended, no useful purpose could be served by calling them together. With the conditions annexed to the proffered indemnity, it was impossible they could comply. They could not deliver the cities and forts into the hands of the Spaniards, without being apprehensive of the fraud exemplified

exemplified in the fable of the war between the wolves and the sheep, in which the latter were persuaded to give up their auxiliaries, the dogs, into the hands of their crafty foes. For they had not forgotten the fate of the counts Egmont and Horn, and many others, who repented, when it was too late, of putting faith in promises which their enemies could violate with impunity. And with respect to the other condition; that all heretics should quit the country, as they could not believe the religion now established in Holland and Zealand to be heretical; so if all who had renounced the popish faith were to be deemed heretics, and expelled from the Netherlands, there would not be a sufficient number left to keep the dikes in repair; the country would be stripped of the greatest part of its inhabitants, and ere long be buried in the waves. They concluded with entreating the deputies to take the representation they had made in good part, as proceeding from their zeal for the interest of the king as well as of the provinces; and with praying Almighty God to inspire the king and his ministers with milder sentiments than those which they had hitherto embraced.

In the reply which was made to this remonstrance, the Spanish deputies, after complaining of the spirit in which it was composed, said that the king would so far comply with the request relative to the foreign troops, as to send them away immediately after the terms of peace were settled; provided the States would at the same time dismiss

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the foreigners in their service, and deliver up the cities and other fortified places. He would likewise summon the assembly of the States, as soon as the present disturbances had subsided; but he could not, consistently with his dignity, submit to their decision, the conditions on which peace was to be established; since this would be to abandon what he regarded as his peculiar prerogative, and to allow them to prescribe where it was their duty to obey. In particular, he was determined never to refer to their decision the important question concerning religion. The States, as well as the king, had sworn to maintain the catholic faith; and no consideration would ever prevail on him to suffer them to depart from it in the smallest article. He was not afraid of depopulating the maritime provinces by the expulsion of heretics; on the contrary, he believed that these provinces would flourish more, for that tranquillity which unity of faith would ensure; and if the heretical ministers were removed, he doubted not that the people would soon perceive the folly into which they had been betrayed, and return into the bosom of the church.

May 31st.
Final answer of the
States.

The deputies of Holland and Zealand, after consulting their constituents, gave the following as their ultimate reply, That they were willing to refer the several points of difference, the dismissal of the Spanish troops, the delivering of the cities, forts, and military stores, the nature of the security to be given for the fulfilment of the condition of the peace, and even the article of religion, to

the general assembly of the States of all the provinces: and they were willing, they said, to make the last of these concessions, not from any intention of giving up their religion, which no consideration would induce them to forsake; but from the deep concern which they felt on account of the long continued calamities of their fellow-citizens; to put an end to which, they were ready to abandon their native country, if the States should find it necessary to establish a religion; with which their consciences would not suffer them to comply.

Count Schwarzenburgh, now perceived that no greater concession could reasonably be expected. He represented to the governor, that considering how deep the protestant religion had struck its roots in the maritime provinces, the extirpation of it could not be speedily accomplished; and he urged him to grant a truce for six months, during which time the exercise of that religion should be permitted, and every lenient measure employed to soothe and conciliate the minds of the people. But Requesens had not authority from the king to agree to this request; and he refused to grant even a truce of two months, except on condition that the protestants should abstain from their mode of religious worship, and oblige their ministers immediately to quit the country. With this condition Count Schwarzenburgh knew that the maritime provinces would never be persuaded to comply. He therefore despaired of being able to bring his negotiation to the desired issue, and soon after set out for Germany. The congress was

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The conference dissolved.

B O O K dissolved. The hostages were restored; and the
XIII. contending parties, having their resentment more
1575. inflamed than ever, applied themselves to the
 prosecution of the war¹⁶.

The war
 renewed.

July 12th.

The deputies had no sooner left Breda, than Requesens published an edict, prohibiting all communication with the malecontents; and immediately afterwards sent his troops, under the count de Hierges, to lay siege to the town of Buren; which they soon obliged to capitulate. From Buren they marched to Oude-water, and in spite of a brave and vigorous defence, they took it by storm; exercising at this place their wonted fury, and putting the garrison and all the inhabitants to the sword, without distinction either of sex or age. Hierges proceeded next to Schowen upon the Leck. The prince of Orange made haste to send a reinforcement to the garrison. But the inhabitants dreading the same fate as that of the people of Oude-water, obliged the garrison to surrender. After which, Hierges directed his march towards Crimpen. Vitelli, in the mean time, with the forces under his command, reduced a number of places which lie between the Leck and the Vahal; and Mondragone was no less successful in the quarter of Holland, which borders upon Brabant.

The gover-
 nor under-
 takes the
 conquest of
 Zealand.

But Requesens did not incline that his troops should push their conquests in Holland any further at present. In compliance with his instructions, he resolved to bend his whole attention to the reduction of some of the principal towns in

¹⁶ Meteren, p. 146. — 152. Bentivoglio, lib. ix. ab initio.

Zealand, which Philip was desirous of acquiring, for the reception of a fleet to be sent from Spain. In order to accomplish this design, Requesens drew off his troops from Holland; and had, some time before, prepared a number of flat-bottomed vessels, proportioned to the depth of the gulfs and canals. In these vessels he intended to have transported his troops to Zealand; but the prince of Orange having received intelligence of his design, and collected a naval force of the same kind, much superior in number, he relinquished his first plan, and adopted another that seemed equally difficult and dangerous. This was to imitate what was done by Mondragone, when he raised the siege of Tergoes, and to make the soldiers wade through an arm of the sea, which was five miles broad.

In the north-east parts of Zealand, there are three islands much larger than the rest, Tolen, Duveland, and Schowen. Tolen, which lies nearest to Brabant, was in the hands of the Spaniards; and between this island and Duveland, lies the little isle of Philipsland, which is separated from Duveland by the canal, or arm of the sea, over which Requesens intended that his forces should pass on foot. It was known from some experiments which had been made, that this canal was fordable; nor was it quite so broad as that which Mondragone's troops had passed over to the relief of Tergoes. But there was still much reason to suspect that the attempt would be found impracticable.

Such of the officers as were of this opinion, observed that there was a wide difference between the

Bold and
singular en-
terprise of
the Spani-
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enterprise in question, and that of Mondragone, whose men had no other obstacles to encounter but those of the passage, and needed only strength and patience to ensure success; whereas, in the present case, the enemy had taken the alarm, and were continually upon the watch; the ford was in a manner besieged by their numerous vessels, which were ready to attack the Spaniards, when they would be unable to defend themselves. And even allowing that they should surmount these difficulties, and effectuate their passage, yet what remained for them, on their approach to the opposite shore, but to be attacked by a fresh and vigorous enemy, advantageously posted before they could disentangle themselves from the mud and water.

By these considerations some of the principal officers were induced to remonstrate against the intended enterprise, as too hazardous and desperate; and they were of opinion, that no attempt ought to be made on Zealand till the fleet from Spain should arrive. But this prudent counsel was not suited to the bold intrepid spirit which animated the greater part of the Spanish officers. The remembrance of their former victories, joined to their contempt of the malecontents, inspired them with confidence of success; and they were unwilling to divide the glory of their conquests with their countrymen, who were supposed to be on their way from Spain. If this enterprise, said they, be impracticable in the day, why may we not undertake it in the night; when we shall either elude the vigilance of the enemy; or, if they

get information of our design, yet we shall have little reason to dread their efforts, as they will be obliged to fire their guns at random, and spend their force in air. The troops posted on the other side to oppose our landing, will act, as their countrymen have often done on similar occasions. The boldness of our adventure, and the daring countenances of our men, will overwhelm their dastardly spirits with dismay and terror.

Requesens was not naturally fond of rash or daring enterprises; but being exceedingly desirous to carry his scheme of subduing Zealand into speedy execution, he transported three thousand select troops, composed of an equal number of Spaniards, Walloons and Germans, to the isle of Philipland. Then having ordered d'Avila to attend him with the fleet, on board which he put one half of these forces, he gave the command of the other half, destined to attempt the passage, to Osorio d'Ulloa, a Spanish officer of distinguished courage, who had warmly exhorted him to undertake this bold and singular expedition.

On the 28th of September, as soon as it was dark, and the tide had begun to retire, Ulloa entered the water at the head of his troops, with the guides before him. The troops were followed by two hundred pioneers; and the rear-guard was formed by a company of Walloons, commanded by an officer of the name of Peralta. They could march only three men a breast, on the top of a ridge of earth or sand, and were often obliged to

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wade up to the shoulders, and to bear their muskets on their heads, to preserve them from the water. They had advanced but a little way, when the Dutch and Zealanders approached, and began a furious discharge of their small arms and artillery. And not satisfied with this, many of them leaped into the water, and with hooks fastened to the ends of long poles, laid hold of the soldiers, oppressed with the weight of the element through which they toiled; massacring some, and plunging others in the waves. Nothing but the darkness of the night, which prevented the two squadrons of the enemy's ships from acting in concert, could have saved the royalists from destruction. But, notwithstanding the difficulties under which they labored, they persisted bold and dauntless in their course, exhorting and assisting one another; and without quitting their ranks, repelling the enemy, and defending themselves as well as their desperate circumstances would allow. Their calamities increased as they approached to the opposite shore. For besides, that their vigor was impaired, they had deeper water to pass, and the enemy's ships could come nearer to the ford. At last, however, they reached the land, in time to save themselves from destruction. The banks were lined with a numerous body of troops; and if these troops had behaved with an ordinary degree of resolution, it is impossible that the Spaniards, drenched as they were with mud and water, and exhausted with fatigue, could have stood before them. But unfortunately, in the beginning of the attack, their commander was

killed, by an accidental shot of one of his own men. Consternation seized his troops, and they fled in the most dastardly manner, before an enemy unable to pursue.

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This extraordinary adventure, though it succeeded beyond what could justly have been expected, was not executed without loss. The pioneers were all either overtaken by the tide, or destroyed by the enemy. The rear guard under Peralta saved themselves by returning back. Of the troops under Ulloa, a considerable number was killed or drowned, and others wounded. But among the killed there was only one person of distinction, named Pacheco; concerning whom it is recorded, that being wounded by a musket-shot, and unable to advance, and some of his men urging him to suffer them to bear him on their shoulders; he replied, "*That would serve only to retard your march. My wound is mortal; I die, and not without some honor in so glorious an enterprise.*" Saying this, he sunk down into the water¹⁷.

¹⁷ Bentivoglio, p. 168. This historian gives the same authority for the above-mentioned particulars, as for those of the passage at Tergoes; the testimony of Rivas, governor of Cambray, who was an actor in both.

The Spaniards were not a little encouraged by an appearance then rare, but since familiar and common, an Aurora Borealis, or northern light; which shone all the time of their passage, and which they interpreted as a sign wrought by Heaven in their behalf.

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When the Dutch and Zealanders saw that, in spite of their opposition, the royalists had accomplished their design, they quitted the canal, and went to give notice of what had happened to the inhabitants of the sea port towns, which they supposed the enemy intended to attack. Requesens immediately laid hold of the opportunity which their departure afforded him, to transport the rest of his forces to Duveland; where they joined their companions, and soon compelled all the protestant troops on the island to fly over to Ziricsee, the capital of Schowen.

The reduction of that city was the immediate and principal object of the present expedition. For besides, that Requesens hoped, by possessing Ziricsee, to be able to disturb the communication between Holland and Zealand, he considered it as the fittest place for the reception of the reinforcement which he expected from Spain; and he intended to make it the seat of his strength in that quarter, till he should collect a naval force sufficient to ensure the conquest of Middleburgh, Flushing, and the other towns in Walcheren. Towards Ziricsee, the army now commanded by Mondragone, proceeded without delay. Before they could reach it, they found it necessary to pass over the canal, which separates Duveland from Schowen, and on the opposite side of which they saw the enemy prepared to dispute their passage. This did not deter them from the prosecution of their design. Animated by the example of their leaders, they leaped

without hesitation into the canal, which was near a league over, having the bottom full of mud, and advanced forward with such undaunted intrepidity, that the enemy, regarding them as more than men, abandoned their station, and left the passage free and undisputed.

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Mondragone would have immediately begun the siege of Ziricsee, but thought it necessary beforehand to make himself master of certain posts, which the Zealanders had fortified, in order to secure the communication between the inhabitants of that town, and their friends in the other islands and on the continent. These forts were three in number; one on the south near Borendam, and the other two called Browerhaven and Bommene, on the north and east. Through the imprudent confidence of the Spaniards, who made an assault on the first of these forts too soon, it cost the lives of sixty of that nation, with Peralta their commander; besides a considerable number of Germans and Walloons. The fort of Browerhaven submitted without resistance; but that of Bommene, which was better fortified, was likewise more valiantly defended than the other two. Du Lis, a French officer, commanded the garrison, consisting of Germans, French, and English; into whose breasts he had infused the same generous and dauntless spirit with which he himself was animated. The behaviour and fate of this brave determined garrison deserves a place in history. At the time of high water their fortification was impregnable, as

The desperate
defence
of Bommene.

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at that time the sea filled both the ditch which surrounded it, and a canal which passed through it; but at low water, and for some hours before and after that time, the ditch was fordable, and the enemy could advance to the very foot of the wall. Both Requesens and Vitelli had come to direct the operations of the siege. Agreeably to their commands, the royalists, after approaching as near as possible to the ditch, by means of trenches, opened a large battery, which continued firing upon the fort for two days incessantly, till a sufficient breach was made. Then waiting till the water had retired, they made a furious assault; but the besieged withstood their most vigorous efforts, and at last obliged them to retire, with the loss of a hundred and fifty killed, and twice that number wounded. The Spaniards, enraged on account of their repulse and loss, returned to the assault next day, and began to storm the fort on different sides at the same time. Both parties were highly agitated with fury and despair, and both were alike determined either to die or conquer. The prospect of the returning tide wrought equally on the fears of the assailants, and the hopes of the besieged. The former knew, that if they did not carry their point soon, they must a second time suffer the shame and slaughter of a repulse, and the latter considered, that if they could hold out a few hours longer, the water would deliver them for the present, and the enemy be perhaps deterred from renewing the assault. Incited by

these reflections, the combatants on both sides exerted all their vigor, and displayed a degree of fortitude and prowess which seldom occurs in the annals of history. Each person regardless of his safety, and intent only upon annoying the enemy, the conflict was as bloody and desperate, as the time was critical and important. It had lasted for near six hours, and many of the bravest on both sides had fallen. At last, the assailants, perceiving the quick approach of the tide, and collecting and exerting at once their whole force, overpowered the besieged with their numbers, and burst forward irresistibly within the walls of the fort; in which the garrison still continued to resist, till there was not a single person left to enjoy the glory of so illustrious a defence. The royalists paid dear for their victory; above two hundred men, besides those who had fallen in the first assault, were killed upon the spot, and a much greater number wounded¹⁸.

They now proceeded to the siege of Ziricsee; and in this undertaking their difficulties were greatly augmented, and the siege prolonged by a resolution of the inhabitants, who had broken down the dikes of the canal, and laid the adjacent country under water. This measure, of which the States of Holland had lately set the example during the siege of Leyden, showed how firmly determined the citizens were to make a vigorous

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The siege
of Ziricsee.

¹⁸ Meursii Auriacus, p. 147.

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defence; and rendered impracticable all the ordinary methods of conducting sieges, by trenches, batteries, and assaults. Mondragone perceived, that the reduction of Ziricsee must be a work of considerable time, and that the only expedient which he could employ, was to block it up on every side, so as to prevent the entrance of supplies. These it could receive only by the way of a small canal dug from Ziricsee, to the great one above mentioned, which separates Schowen from the isle of Duveland.

In order to secure the communication between these canals, the Zealanders had fortified the banks of the smaller, where it is joined to the greater; and while they retained possession of the batteries which they had planted there, they secured a free entrance to the ships which were sent from Holland and Walcheren with supplies. To deprive them of this resource, and lock up the mouth of the small canal, was the first and principal object of Mondragone's attention. For this purpose he stationed his ships in those parts where the water was deepest; and formed in the most shallow parts, a stacado, a work of a prodigious labor, which employed his troops for several months, and was attended with considerable bloodshed. By perseverance, however, he brought it at last to a conclusion; and then having drawn another stacado of the same kind, from an island which lay in the entrance of the canal, he joined the two stacados together by strong iron chains, and thus rendered all access impracticable.

During the progress of these operations, the protestants embraced every opportunity of introducing supplies into the city; and they were greatly favored by the season, which was so much milder than usual, as to leave the river and canals navigable through the whole of winter. But in the beginning of February, the enemy's works were completed, and from that time, all attempts to relieve the besieged, by the way of the small canal, proved ineffectual. Their friends were therefore obliged to turn to another quarter.

In the beginning of the siege several cuts had been made in the dike of the great canal, on the side of Schowen, in order, as was mentioned above, to overflow the country. Through one of these cuts, near the village of Dreischer, the prince of Orange proposed to convey supplies to Ziricsee across the inundation; and he committed the execution of his design to count Hohenloe, a German nobleman of the most unquestionable spirit and resolution; but a storm arising, and the Spaniards having encamped most of their forces, and planted batteries on the dike, close by the cut, they obliged Hohenloe to retire. The prince, not discouraged by this check, prepared to make a second attempt with a more powerful armament. And in order to animate his troops, he resolved to conduct the enterprise himself.

He reached Dreischer, and approached the cut at the time of high water. In the beginning of the attack he threw the enemy into confusion,

The prince of Orange attempts in vain to relieve it.

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made considerable slaughter among them, and carried off some pieces of cannon from their batteries. But the Spaniards, roused by the danger which threatened them, quickly recovered their stations, and made a bold and vigorous resistance, till the tide began to retire; when the prince perceiving it to be impracticable to advance, was obliged, in order to save his fleet from destruction, to return into the great canal. Boissot the admiral, whose ship was much larger than the rest, did not retreat in time; and his ship having struck against the bottom, he himself, and about three hundred of his crew, either perished in the waves, or were killed by the enemy. This was the last attempt for the relief of the besieged; who being at length overpowered with their miseries, agreed to surrender the town into the hands of Mondragone; and that general, desirous to put a period to so tedious an enterprise, granted them such favorable terms, as they were willing to accept¹⁹.

This siege had lasted near nine months, and during all that time had occupied the greatest part of the Spanish army.

Death of
Vitelli.

But before the surrender of Ziricsee, other events had happened, which rendered those that have been related of small importance to either party; and which, while they disappointed the hopes entertained by the Spaniards of completing the conquest of Zealand, in a great measure

¹⁹ Meteren, p. 155. Bentivoglio, p. 170.

delivered

delivered the confederates from those disquieting apprehensions which the late success of the Spanish arms was calculated to excite. The first of these events was the death of Vitelli, who was, without controversy, the ablest and most experienced general at that time in the Netherlands.

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Vitelli's death was quickly followed by that of Requesens. In carrying on the siege of Ziricsee, much greater sums had been necessary than he was able to supply. From Spain, he knew that, considering the exhausted condition of the king's finances²⁰, occasioned by his war with the Turks, no money could be expected; and the States of such of the provinces as retained their allegiance, were either unwilling, or unable to comply with his demands. Thus, great arrears were due to his troops, and they had already begun to mutiny, and to exercise the most intolerable oppression on the people; to whom he had been obliged to grant the liberty of wearing arms for their defence, from a well grounded apprehension, that if he had not permitted them to do this, they would have done it without his authority²¹.

Death of
Requesens.

Requesens had too much sensibility, and too little strength of mind, either to endure patiently the mortifications, or to encounter resolutely the difficulties, to which he was exposed. His vexation and chagrin preyed incessantly on his health and

²⁰ Meteren, p. 156.

²¹ This liberty had been taken from them by the duke of Alva.

BOOK spirits, and at length brought on a fever, of which
XIII. he died in a few days; leaving behind him a much
1576. higher character for civil, than for military accomplishments, in which he was confessedly much inferior to his predecessor the duke of Alva ²².

²² Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 464. Strada, tom. ii. p. 35.

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HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

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AFTER the death of Requesens, who had been prevented from nominating his successor by the violence of his disease, the council of state assumed the reins of government; and as the king hesitated for some time in his choice of a governor, he found it necessary to confirm their authority.

This revolution afforded great satisfaction to the people of Holland and Zealand; who flattered themselves with hopes, that, now, when the administration was lodged in the hands of their fellow-citizens, the war would not be carried on with the same animosity and ardor as before. At first, however, the council entered heartily into the late governor's designs, and prosecuted, with vigor, the plan of operations which he had left unfinished. And they continued to do so till their attention was called to objects of a still more interesting nature, than the reduction of the maritime provinces.

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The government in the hands of the council of state.

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Mutiny of
the Spanish
troops.

The Spanish cavalry had, as already mentioned, begun to mutiny before the death of Requesens. During the siege of Ziricsee, the infantry remained obedient to their commanders, partly from being kept in perpetual employment, and partly from the hopes of enriching themselves by the plunder of that city; but being disappointed in these hopes by the articles of the capitulation, and large arrears being due, to the payment of which even the contributions of the people of Ziricsee were not applied¹, they flew to arms, deposed their officers, elected others, and a commander in chief from among themselves; and then, having sworn mutual fidelity over the sacred host, they abandoned all their conquests which had cost them so much labor and blood, and passed over to Brabant; intending to take possession of some considerable fortified place, from whence they might make excursions, and plunder the neighbouring towns and villages.

They seize
on Allost.

The council of state sent count Mansfeldt to appease them; but no offers or promises which the count was empowered to make, could divert them from their design. They hoped, by the rapidity of their march, to have entered Brussels by surprise; but both the inhabitants and garrison were prepared to oppose them. They failed likewise in an attempt on Mechlin. Then leaving

¹ Meteren says, that the Walloons laid hold of the money, and with great dexterity excluded the Spaniards from the town.

Brabant, they turned suddenly towards Allost in Flanders ; and made themselves masters of that town , by climbing over the walls , in the middle of the night , when the citizens were off their guard. They could not have acquired possession of a place more suitable to their design ; as it was situated in the midst of a rich and fertile country , and lay at nearly an equal distance from Brussels, Ghent, and Antwerp. They had no sooner displayed the standard of rebellion in Allost, than they were joined by most of the other Spanish troops in the Low Countries ; after which they began to exercise every species of violence and outrage, both against the citizens and the inhabitants of the country round.

The prince of Orange remained not idle or unconcerned, in this critical conjuncture. He had too much sagacity not to discern , and too much zeal and dexterity not to avail himself of so favorable an opportunity of advancing his designs. By his letters , and emissaries, he endeavoured to rouse the spirit of the people, and to persuade the council, “ That now was the time when they might deliver themselves for ever from the tyranny of Spain. By the good providence of God, the government had fallen into their own hands. It ought to be their unalterable purpose, to hold fast the power which they possessed , and to employ it in delivering their fellow-citizens from that intolerable load of misery under which they had so long groaned. The measure of the calamities of the people , and of the iniquities of the

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They are
declared re-
bels by the
council.

Spaniards, was now full. There was nothing worse to be dreaded than they had already suffered; and nothing to deter them from resolving either to expel their rapacious tyrants, or to perish in the glorious attempt. "

These exhortations, enforced by accounts which were propagated of the enormities committed by the Spanish troops, found an easy admittance into the minds of persons of all ranks. The council of state were no less enflamed than the people; and resolved to publish an edict, declaring the Spaniards to be rebels against the king. Barlaimont, Mansfeldt, Viglius, even the Spanish officers of the highest rank, and Rhoda, president of the council of tumults, seemed at first inclined to concur with the other counsellors; but perceiving that their resentment was not confined to the mutineers, but extended likewise to all the friends of the Spanish government, they began to alleviate the outrages of the soldiers, and openly opposed the publication of the edict; alledging, that troops which had mutinied on account of not receiving their pay, could not justly be considered as rebels; and that the edict would serve only to exasperate them still more against the people, while the council was not provided with force sufficient to restrain their excesses. But these reasons were held in great contempt by a majority of the council; who, having expelled the dissenting members, accused them of holding correspondence with the mutineers, and threw them into prison. Then having elected the duke d'Arschot for their

president, in the room of Viglius, they published an edict in terms strongly calculated to increase the odium against the Spanish troops; calling on the people to concur with them in driving out that lawless and rapacious crew, who, under the pretext of procuring payment of their arrears, would, if they were not speedily prevented, bring utter ruin upon the Netherlands.

Nothing could have been more consonant to the general spirit of the Flemings, than the sentiments contained in this edict. It served as fuel to that flame which was already kindled, and which now burst out with redoubled violence. To give greater weight to the measures which had been already taken, and to those which they intended to pursue, the council called an assembly of the States; and all the provinces, Luxemburgh excepted, sent deputies to attend. This assembly had no sooner met than hostilities were begun. The citadels of Antwerp, Ghent, Valenciennes, and Utrecht were in the hands of the Spaniards. Romero commanded in Lieres; and Maestricht was garrisoned by some companies of German infantry. To acquire possession of these important fortresses, and to prevent the Spanish troops from uniting themselves into one body, were the objects upon which the States bestowed their first and principal attention. They were successful in gaining over to their side the regiments of Walloons in the Spanish service; and they raised so great a number of militia of the country, as, when joined

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Hostilities
between the
Spaniards
and Flemings.

BOOK with the Walloons, formed a considerable body
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The Spaniards, on the other hand, prompted by Rhoda, and animated by the brave and active d'Avila, exerted themselves no less strenuously in counteracting their designs. An officer of the name of Vargas, having drawn together eight hundred horse in the neighbourhood of Maestricht, had advanced as far as Visenach, in his way to Allost, in hopes of prevailing on the mutineers to act in concert with him. At Visenach he was met by two thousand foot and six hundred horse, which the States had sent to oppose him. But the Spaniards were not so much inferior in number, as they were superior in military discipline. Vargas supplied his want of infantry by making a company of Burgundians quit their horses. The Flemish troops, though they began the attack with great impetuosity, fell soon into disorder; and the Spaniards broke in upon their ranks, and put them to flight, with considerable slaughter.

Vargas continued his route to Allost; and was seconded, in his application to the mutineers, by d'Avila and Romero; but neither the importunity of their officers, nor a regard to the honor of their nation, or to their personal safety, could overcome their obstinate resolution to remain in Allost, till they should receive payment of their arrears. From Allost, Vargas led his troops, with the utmost expedition, to Maestricht, which, he was informed, the Germans in garrison there had agreed to deliver to the States. The execution

of their design had been retarded by some companies of Spaniards, a part of whom were in possession of one of the gates, and the rest stationed in the town of Vich. This town lies on the east side of the river, and is connected with Maestricht by a bridge over the Maese. Vargas, having transported his troops, and joined his countrymen at Vich, had a sharp engagement with the townsmen upon the bridge; but as they were not supported by the Germans, he soon compelled them to retire. They paid dear for this attempt to assert their liberty. The Germans, instead of acting as their friends, united with the Spaniards, and both together plundered the town without mercy².

But the memory of the calamities which the people of Maestricht experienced on this occasion, was effaced by those which soon afterwards befel the citizens of Antwerp. The States had labored in vain to persuade the Spanish garrison in the citadel to deliver it into their hands. They now resolved to compel them; and, with this view, they had brought into the city a numerous body of Walloons and other troops. They had much reason for that solicitude with which they desired to get possession of this important fortress; which, on the one side, communicated with the town, by a spacious esplanade, and on the other, with the adjacent country. The States were not sufficiently aware of the danger to which, from these two circumstances united, the city of Antwerp was

The sacking
and plunder
of Antwerp
by the Spaniards.

² Meteren, p. 164. Bentivoglio, p. 178.

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exposed. Champigny^s the governor had endeavoured to rouse their attention to this danger, and had earnestly exhorted them to block up the esplanade by batteries and trenches; and, at the same time, to order all the troops that could be spared, to encamp without the town, so as to prevent the Spaniards at Allost and other places from entering the citadel. But they wholly neglected the latter part of this advice, and they were too late in beginning to put the former in execution. They believed that the garrison would not venture to sally out upon the town, in which there was so great a number of troops to oppose them; and they flattered themselves with the hopes of being able to compel them to surrender, before they could receive assistance from their countrymen. For this purpose, two strong batteries were planted on the esplanade; while the townsmen were employed either in pushing forward the trenches, or in raising mounds for the security of the town.

The siege of the castle of Ghent was carried on at the same time, and the States had conceived the most sanguine expectation of success; when the noise of the artillery reached from both places to the mutineers in Allost; and, awakening in them some sparks of their native warlike ferocity, produced a more powerful effect upon their minds, than all the exhortations and entreaties of their commanders.

^s He was brother to cardinal Granvelle, and was as averse from the Spanish interest as his brother was attached to it.

Navarese , their leader , seized dexterously this opportunity which their present disposition afforded him ; and , calling them together , exhorted them to reflect upon the folly of suffering the fortresses besieged to fall into the hands of the Flemings. “ That artillery , ” said he , “ which is now thundering in our ears , is levelled against us , no less than against the garrisons of Ghent and Antwerp. When the Flemings shall have subdued the rest of our countrymen , can we doubt that they will next turn their arms against us , who are the principal objects of their resentment ? Can you imagine that the States will then lend a more favorable ear , than at present , to your requests ? Believe me , they will ere long extinguish the debt which they owe you , in your blood. Let us march instantly to the relief of the citadel of Antwerp. We shall soon oblige the enemy to raise the siege. We shall , in spite of the townsmen , and the raw troops which they have brought to their assistance , make ourselves masters of the richest city in the world , and take ample revenge , for the unworthy treatment we have received. ”

He would have proceeded ; but was prevented by shouts of applause , and exclamations from every quarter , to arms ! to arms ! They were now as impatient to leave Allost , as they had formerly been reluctant. On the 3d day of November , and only a few hours before sunset , they began their march ; hoping to reach the citadel of Antwerp early next morning , unobserved by

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the enemy. Having found greater difficulty in passing the Scheld than they expected, they did not arrive till noon; notwithstanding which, being joined by four hundred horse, under Vargas and Romero, who had acted in concert with Navarese, they entered the citadel, without meeting the least opposition. The citizens were no sooner informed of their arrival, than they suspected their design, and were filled with the most dreadful apprehensions. Champigny the governor, whose advice had been so unfortunately disregarded, saw the approaching storm, and did every thing in his power to avert it.

But the impetuosity of the mutineers did not leave him time for completing the arrangements which he intended. These men, impelled at once by avarice and revenge, rejected with disdain the invitation given by d'Avila to repose and refresh themselves after their march. With rage and fury in their countenances, they demanded the signal to advance; calling out, that they were determined, before night, either to perish in the conflict, or to fix their quarters in the city. They were in number between two and three thousand, and the garrison, together with the troops brought by Vargas and Romero, amounted nearly to the same number. Navarese led on the mutineers, and the remainder were commanded by Romero. Nothing could exceed the intrepidity with which these two determined bands, vying with each other, attacked the trenches. The citizens displayed at the first onset, great bravery

and resolution; but, being unable long to withstand the impetuous attack of the Spaniards, and being galled at the same time by the artillery of the citadel, they at length gave way, and fled with precipitation along the two streets which lead from the parade into the centre of the city. The Spaniards were seconded by their cavalry; which bore down all before them, and followed close upon the rear of the vanquished, till they reached the great square, in the centre of which, stands the Guildhall or Palace. There the fugitives, being joined by some fresh troops, made a halt, and rallied; but they were soon broken a second time, and would have been all cut to pieces, if they had not taken shelter in the palace, and in the houses of the square. From the windows they kept, for some time, a brisk fire upon the enemy, and did considerable execution, but the Spaniards, who were accompanied by the retainers of their camp, set fire to the houses, with hay, straw, and other combustible materials, not sparing even the palace itself; which was esteemed one of the richest and most magnificent in the world. It was quickly reduced to ashes; and of those who had taken refuge in it, some perished in the flames, and some by the sword, in attempting to escape, while others frantic with despair flung themselves headlong from the windows*.

The Spaniards then dispersed themselves over the city; overpowering all opposition with irresistible

* Thuanus.

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impetuosity. Had their number been sufficient either to murder, or to overtake the prodigious crowds that fled before them, the carnage of that memorable day would have been still more dreadful. Of the citizens near seven thousand perished; while the loss of the Spaniards amounted only to two hundred men. So great is the superiority in battle, of regular discipline, and prompt obedience to command. For though the citizens fought with extraordinary courage, like men whose all was at stake, they acted not in concert, and although they had been marshalled by Champigny, as well as the time would allow, yet, from want of practice, they were soon thrown into confusion; and, from the same cause, they were unable to recover their ranks, or return to the charge.

Justice would oblige us to bestow on the Spanish troops the praise due to the most heroic valor, if, besides the rapacity which impelled them, they had not disfigured the lustre of their victory by exercising a degree of barbarous cruelty, of which, at that period, the Spaniards alone, of all the nations in Europe, seem to have been capable. Antwerp, at the time of this catastrophe, was in the most flourishing condition. Companies of merchants from almost every commercial nation, resided in it, possessing storehouses and factories filled with the most precious commodities. Great numbers of the citizens too were the wealthiest in Europe. Their magnificent houses were adorned with the most costly furniture; and their shops and

warehouses stored with prodigious quantities of gold and silver stuffs, and all other kinds of valuable effects, collected from every corner of the globe. Upon these the Spaniards seized, without any discrimination of the owners, and without considering whether the persons whom they pillaged, were friends or enemies. The plunder that lay open and unconcealed was immense; but was far from being sufficient to satiate the avarice of the Spaniards. They exercised the most unrelenting cruelty upon all whom they suspected to have concealed their treasures; and nothing was to be heard in the city, but either the shrieks and groans of the sufferers, or the lamentations of those whom they compelled to witness the torments of their husbands, wives, or children. Cotemporary historians have described some of the several species of torture which they inflicted; but the reader's modesty would be offended, and his humanity shocked by the recital^s.

In this manner were these men, for three days and nights, employed in plundering and butchering by turns, a people who were subjects of the same prince as themselves, and from whom (whatever ground of complaint they might pretend against the council of State) they had never received the smallest injury, or provocation. Nor does it appear that their officers interposed to moderate their excesses, till the soldiers, exhausted with fatigue, were about to give over of themselves.

^s Thuanus and Meteren.

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The money in specie which was extorted, amounted at least to eight millions of guilders, besides a prodigious quantity of gold and silver, in plate, stuffs, and furniture, which the owners were not able to redeem. The loss which the people of Antwerp sustained by the burning of so many buildings, was not less than what they suffered by the rapacity of the soldiers. The most beautiful part of the city was burnt to the ground; and great numbers of shops and warehouses, containing the richest goods, were consumed to ashes⁶.

The States
receive assist-
ance from
the Prince of
Orange.

Whilst the barbarity exercised against the inhabitants of Antwerp, excited sentiments of compassion towards the unhappy sufferers, it greatly augmented that abhorrence which the Flemings already entertained towards the Spaniards, and made them more solicitous than ever to deliver themselves from a yoke which was now become intolerable. But the great superiority which the Spanish troops discovered on every occasion over the raw undisciplined forces of the States, created much anxiety, with regard to the success of their endeavours. The council of state perceived the necessity of having recourse to foreign aid; and they willingly accepted an offer, which was made them at this juncture by the prince of Orange, of some cannon, ammunition, and troops, with which they pushed forward the siege of the citadel of Ghent, and soon obliged the garrison to capitulate.

⁶ Meteren, p. 164. Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 471. Benvoglio, p. 178.

This

This seasonable assistance contributed not a little to advance the prince's views. Immediately after the death of Requesens, he had projected a scheme of uniting all the provinces, and had exerted himself with great activity and address, in carrying it into execution. The States entered readily into his ideas. Deputies were appointed, and invested with proper powers, by the several provinces; and in the congress, which was held at Ghent, a treaty of confederacy was concluded, under which all the provinces, except Luxemburgh, were comprehended.

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The confederacy of Ghent.

November 8th.

In this confederacy, so well known in the history of the Netherlands by the name of the Pacification of Ghent, it was agreed between the Catholic provinces on the one hand, and those of Holland and Zeeland, with the prince of Orange, on the other, that there should subsist between them, an inviolable alliance, peace, and friendship; that all past injuries should be buried in oblivion; that all prisoners, and in particular the count de Bossut, should be set at liberty without ransom; that the contracting parties should, to the utmost of their power assist each other in expelling the Spaniards from the Netherlands; that as soon as the provinces should be delivered from these bloody oppressors, and tranquillity established, a general assembly should be held of the States of all the provinces, for redressing grievances, reforming abuses, and restoring the constitution to its primeval state; that the prince of Orange should remain high admiral and governor of the maritime provinces;

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and that he, and all others, whose property had been confiscated, should be reinstated in their possessions and dignities; that all the decrees of the duke of Alva, relative to the tumults and heresy, should be abolished; but that in the Catholic provinces, only the Roman Catholic religion should be exercised; while in those of Holland and Zealand, all matters, whether civil or religious, should remain on their present footing, till a general assembly of all the States should be held⁷.

Arrival of
Don John of
Austria.

The deputies who were now convened, whom the historians call likewise by the name of the States, entered immediately upon the execution of the articles of this confederacy, by transporting to the frontier of France such of the Spaniards as had been taken prisoners in the citadel of Ghent: and they had begun to make preparations to dislodge them from other places, when they were informed that Don John of Austria, whom Philip had made choice of for governor, had arrived in the province of Luxemburgh. In some respects, Don John was admirably qualified for this new station, to which his brother had appointed him. His affable and insinuating manners were fitted to conciliate the affections of the people whom he was sent to govern; and his military accomplishments qualified him to pursue the war with vigor, against the revolted provinces. But in the critical situation into which the late enormities of the Spaniards

⁷ Meteren, p. 169. Bentivoglio, l. ix. sub fine. Thuanus, l. lxii. sect. 13.

had brought the Netherlands, other talents besides these were requisite; such as prudence, patience, and self-command, together with skill and dexterity in managing the passions, and the prejudices of men; qualifications which Don John possessed not in any considerable degree.

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His conduct upon his first arrival was ill calculated to allay those suspicions which the Flemings entertained of the king's design in sending him to the Netherlands. Having stopt at Luxemburgh, he wrote letters to the council and the States, in which he informed them, that he would not come to Brussels, the usual residence of their governors, unless hostages were given him for their peaceable behaviour, a guard appointed for the security of his person, and the same unlimited command of the fleet and army conferred upon him, which the preceding governors had enjoyed. He lamented the outrages which had been committed by the Spanish troops; and promised, that, if the States and people should maintain their obedience to the king, and their profession of the catholic faith, the injuries which they had sustained, should not pass unpunished. But he added, that if they failed in either of these respects, they should, in that event, find him no less prepared for war, than he was inclined to peace.

His imprudence.

The States and council were ignorant, till they received these letters, of the light in which their late conduct was considered by the court of Spain.

The States apply for advice to the Prince of Orange.

* Meteren, p. 174.

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They believed that, as the steps which they had taken were necessary for the preservation of the people, it was impossible they could be offensive to the king; and they were extremely surprised, thus to meet, not only with distrust, but even threats, and a defiance, where they were conscious of having merited approbation and applause. They trembled therefore at the thoughts of putting themselves in the power of the new governor, and were greatly at a loss to determine what answer they should return to his demands. On this occasion, they had recourse to the Prince of Orange for advice. And William readily embraced the opportunity, which was thus presented to him, of confirming his countrymen in those suspicions to which the governor's conduct had given rise.

His advice.
Dated November.
30th.

"As it was but too manifest," he said, "from the strain of Don John's letter, that he intended to tread in the footsteps of his predecessors, the States and council had much need to exert all their firmness, prudence, and circumspection. They ought seriously to consider of the important charge with which they were intrusted; and to remember, that, upon their present conduct it depended, whether they, and their wives, and children, and fellow-citizens, should for the future enjoy those rights which belonged to them as natives of the Low Countries, or should be again exposed to the lawless tyranny of the Spaniards. They ought to exercise with vigor the power which they possessed, and resolutely reject all terms of agreement with the governor, by which the fundamental laws of

the State might be brought into danger, or their own authority abridged. Enter not, said he, into any accommodation with him, till the Spaniards, and all other foreign troops be actually dismissed. Trust not to any soothing promises which he may give you, of dismissing them at a more convenient season. Remember how the king himself, when he went to Spain, assured you, that the troops which he then left behind him, should, in three months afterwards, be withdrawn, and yet they were suffered to remain for more than a year and a half; and would, notwithstanding your solicitations, have still remained, if the calamity which befel his army in Africa, had not made it necessary for him to remove them. Let no consideration persuade you to listen to Don John's request of being invested with the unlimited command of your forces. By granting this, you will furnish him with weapons against yourselves. Nothing can express his distrust more strongly, than his unprecedented requisitions of hostages, and a guard for the security of his person. If you comply with these demands, you will enable him to annihilate your authority, and to trample under foot your most sacred rights and laws. It is impossible to believe that one who discovers so much solicitude to strip you of your power, can seriously intend your welfare. Is it not more reasonable that the governor should trust the States, than that the States should lay themselves at the mercy of the governor? Such demands were never made, even by your princes themselves; whose practice always was to come unarmed to your

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assemblies, and to take an oath to maintain your privileges, before they received from you any promise of obedience. Consent not to put yourselves under the power of John of Austria, upon easier terms than have been ever insisted upon with your native princes. Require him, previously to his admission, to interpose his authority for the immediate departure of the Spanish troops; and solemnly to engage to govern the State according to its fundamental laws⁹. To these conditions, your late fatal experience will justify you, if you add, that you shall have the power of assembling yourselves twice, or even thrice a year, if you shall judge it to be expedient; that the citadels shall be raised to the ground; that the right of appointing the governors and magistrates shall be vested in you and that without your consent, no military force shall be levied, and no garrisons stationed in the towns or forts. At present, it little imports you to consider whether or not this conduct will give offence to the king, for it is mere delusion, if you flatter yourselves that you have not already offended him. Promises, soothing speeches, and professions of affection on his part, will not be wanting; but you will discover the last degree of weakness, if, after what you have experienced for several years past, you are not sensible, that nothing now remains for you, but either miserably to bend

⁹ Here the prince mentions the particular privileges to which he alludes, and the times when they were obtained. Meteren, p. 175.

under the yoke, from which you have so happily escaped, or to employ with vigor and fortitude the means with which Providence has furnished you; and which, I doubt not, may yet prove effectual for your security, provided you maintain harmony and concord among yourselves¹⁰."

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This letter, in some measure, produced the desired effect. It put to silence all those who were for receiving Don John on his own terms; and the States, more suspicious than ever of his design, resolved to insist upon the dismissal of the troops, and the confirmation of the pacification of Ghent, as conditions, without which they would never agree to acknowledge his authority. And that they might not be found unprepared, in case of his refusal, they gave orders for making new levies; drew together an army at Wavre, between Brussels and Namur; and dispatched ambassadors to solicit assistance from foreign courts.

The States
apply for aid
to foreign
powers.

In Germany, where they were powerfully seconded in their applications by the prince of Orange, they engaged in their interest, John Casimire, count palatine of the Rhine. In France they did not confine their application to the Calvinists, but likewise prevailed upon the duke of Anjou, the king's brother, to espouse their cause, by setting before him the prospect of an establishment in the Low Countries, more suitable to his rank than he could expect to obtain in his brother's

¹⁰ Meteren, p. 175, 176. Bentivoglio, lib. ix. ab initio. Thuanus, l. lxii. sect. 15.

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dominions. From the queen of England, their envoy met with the most gracious reception. It was matter of the highest satisfaction to this fagacious princess, to see her inveterate enemy thus embroiled with his Flemish subjects; but, as she was still desirous to avoid an open rupture with Philip, she chose to assist them with money rather than with troops, and gave them 40,000 pounds, with a promise of continuing her favor, on condition (which she added in order to save appearances) that they should adhere to the pacification of Ghent, and not throw off their allegiance to their legal sovereign.

Their nego-
ciation with
Don John.

While the States were making these preparations to vindicate their rights by force of arms, they sincerely desired to attain their end, by negotiation with the governor. For they had too long groaned under the calamities of war, not to wish most earnestly for peace, provided that blessing could be secured, without making a sacrifice of their liberties. Don John, on the other hand, discovered an extreme reluctance to comply with the conditions which they required of him; but he endeavoured to dissemble his sentiments, and attempted, by fair speeches, to cajole and deceive them. Still, however, he continued to show his diffidence, by insisting upon having a numerous guard for his person; and by refusing his consent to the departure of the Spaniards, unless the States should at the same time dismiss the foreign troops in their service, and give hostages, to

remain in the hands of a neutral power, till their engagements should be fulfilled. BOOK
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The States, whose jealousy was kept alive by the repeated warnings of the prince of Orange, easily penetrated into Don John's designs; and they resolved, if possible, to convince him, by one decisive step, that it was in vain for him to expect they would ever depart from the terms proposed. In their assembly at Brussels, on the 5th of January, 1577, they drew up a new deed of union, in which they engaged in the most solemn manner, to maintain inviolably for ever the pacification of Ghent; to spare neither their goods, their persons, nor their lives, in order to fulfil it; and to regard as perjured traitors, all those who, participating in the present union, should by word, deed, or counsel, counteract it. A copy of this deed, subscribed by the governor and deputies of all the towns and provinces, by the nobility, prelates, and other dignified ecclesiastics; and by the members of tribunals, councils colleges, and chapters, together with a solemn ratification of it by the council, was sent by the States to Don John, as their final answer to his demands¹¹.

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This measure contributed not a little to promote the end proposed. It gave Don John a proof of firmness, on the part of the States, which he little expected, and showed him the necessity of either agreeing to the conditions which they so earnestly required, or of resolving instantly to have

Their agreement with him.

¹¹ Meteren, p. 179.

B O O K recourse to arms. Inflamed by ambition and the
XIV. love of war, he would not have hesitated a moment
1577. what part to act, had not his instructions from the
king required that he should avoid coming to an
open rupture with the Catholic provinces. He
considered likewise, that the States had got the
start of him, and were already well prepared to
repel force by force. Nor was he ignorant of the
encouragement which they had received, to hope
for succour from the neighbouring powers; or of
the danger to which great numbers of the Spanish
troops, surrounded by their enemies, were expos-
ed, of being reduced by famine. Influenced by
these considerations, and trusting, that ere long,
after quieting their suspicions, opportunities would
offer of depriving the States by degrees of that
power of which they were at present so tenacious,
he entered into a negociation with their deputies
at Marche en Famme, a city in Luxemburgh;
and after many obstructions and difficulties, con-
March 12th. cluded a treaty with them, which they fondly
termed the perpetual edict.

In this treaty he engaged, that all the foreign
troops in the service of Spain should leave the Ne-
therlands, and never return thither without the
consent of the States; that the Spaniards and
Italians should depart within the space of forty
days, and the Germans, immediately after receiv-
ing satisfaction with regard to their arrears;
and that all the cities and forts possessed by these
troops should, as soon as they were relinquished,
be delivered to the States, together with the stores

of ammunition, arms, and provisions. He ratified the pacification of Ghent. He consented that all prisoners detained on account of the late disturbances, should immediately be set at liberty, except the count of Buren¹². And he promised that diligent inquiry should be made, concerning the outrages lately committed by the troops; that justice should be executed against the guilty, and a reasonable compensation made to the sufferers, either in the Netherlands, or in Spain, according as the king should be pleased to determine.

The States, on the other hand, engaged to preserve inviolable their allegiance to the king; to maintain the profession of the Roman Catholic faith throughout all the provinces; to receive Don John as governor general of the Netherlands, and immediately to furnish him with 600,000 florins, for the payment of the Italian and Spanish troops, in order to prevail on them the more easily to depart for Spain or Italy.

As soon as this treaty was concluded, ambassadors were dispatched by the Catholic States, who alone were concerned in it, to the prince of Orange, and the States of Holland and Zealand, to desire their concurrence. It might easily have been foreseen, that this application could not be attended with success. For although the maritime provinces had consented, in the pacification of Ghent, to submit the question of religion to the decision of a general assembly, to be held after the

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The States
of Holland
refuse to
concur.

¹² Son of the prince of Orange.

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departure of the Spaniards ; yet in that assembly they knew that they would have leisure to employ all their influence in behalf of their religion, and to offer such reasons against proscribing it, as they hoped would prove a sufficient counterpoise to the religious zeal of the popish States. Without this expectation it can hardly be supposed, that Protestants, whose sincerity in their profession was so unquestionable, would ever have agreed to leave to others the determination of a matter in which they were so deeply interested : and therefore it is not surprising, that they declined acceding to the treaty now presented to them, in which this important point had, without obtaining their consent, been so hastily decided. But lest they should alarm the bigotry of the Catholic provinces, they took no notice in their answer, of this, which was their principal objection. They began with saying, that they could not enough praise that generous zeal which the States had displayed, in delivering their country from the tyranny of the Spaniards; and they rejoiced to find that they still persisted in their resolution of adhering to the pacification of Ghent. But after considering attentively the treaty which had been transmitted to them, they were sorry to observe, that it was extremely ill calculated to answer the laudable intentions of the States. For besides several other objections of great weight, there was no proper provision made, in this treaty, for the regular calling of assemblies: in a convention, held on purpose to restore and secure their rights, an open infraction

of them was ratified, by their consenting to the unjust detention of the count of Buren; the States had failed in the respect and gratitude which they owed to the queen of England and the duke of Anjou; and certain articles of the treaty were derogatory to the honor of the Netherlands; particularly that article, by which, instead of insisting upon a restitution of those invaluable effects, of which the Spaniards had plundered the inhabitants, they had promised money to those men, notwithstanding their having been solemnly declared traitors and rebels by the States themselves, and by the council of state, when clothed with the authority of the king.

The catholics could not but be sensible of the strength of these objections. Their impatience to be delivered from the Spanish troops, and their eager desire of peace, had betrayed them into that precipitation of which they had been guilty. They could not avail themselves now of the superior penetration of the prince of Orange. The treaty was already concluded, and nothing remained for them, but to watch the governor's motions with an attentive eye, till the troops were removed to such a distance, that they could not easily be recalled. Don John was at great pains to dispel their suspicions. For that purpose, he employed all his influence to persuade the Spaniards to depart; and he at length prevailed, though not till he had distributed among them the money which he had received from the States. This brave, but ferocious, and savage band then set out upon their

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Departure
of the Italian
and Spanish
troops.

BOOK march for Italy, like an army in triumph; loaden
XIV. with the spoils of their fellow-subjects, and with-
1577. out compunction for the rapacity and violence
 which they had exercised¹.

Don John's
 admission to
 the govern-
 ment.

Their departure diffused universal joy through-
 out the Netherlands, and the people indulged the
 flattering hope, that the king, having been at
 last touched with their calamities, had resolved
 to treat them with greater lenity and moderation
 than they had experienced since the beginning
 of his reign. Their satisfaction was heightened by
 the popular character of the governor, who was
 in the prime of life; elegant and graceful in his
 person and deportment; lively, facetious and
 affable, and who gained exceedingly from the
 comparison which men naturally formed of his
 insinuating manners, with the reserve and austerity
 of the king. He was received in Brussels with
 such marks of respect as had never been shown to
 any former governor; and persons of all ranks
 flattered themselves with the prospect of a just and
 mild administration.

His impolitic
 conduct.

They did not long enjoy this soothing prospect.
 Although Philip himself had ratified the perpetual
 edict, and Don John had, before his admission to
 the regency, sworn in the most solemn manner, to
 observe it, it soon appeared that nothing was far-
 ther from the intentions of either. The limitations
 which that edict imposed upon the sovereign's
 authority, were utterly repugnant to Philip's

¹ Thuanus, lib. lxiv. sect. 6.

temper, as well as to the plan which he had formed for the government of the Netherlands; nor would he ever have empowered his brother to make so many concessions to the States, as the perpetual edict, or pacification of Ghent, contained, but in order more effectually to strip them afterwards of that very power which he now consented they should enjoy. But Don John was, from his natural impetuosity, incapable of executing this scheme; which required a much higher degree of circumspection and experience, as well as patience and dissimulation, than he possessed. His court was perpetually filled with Spaniards, and other foreigners, who had rendered themselves abnoxious to the natives; nor were any of the Flemings admitted into his confidence, but such as had shown themselves devoted to the Spanish interest; while those who had discovered an attachment to the liberty of their country, were kept at a distance, and treated with indifference or contempt. This circumstance contributed not a little to revive that jealousy of his designs, which he had been so solicitous to allay. But the States were still more alarmed, when he made them the following proposals: that they should not any longer withhold from him the authority which his predecessors had enjoyed, but allow him to act as captain-general, as well as governor of the provinces: that they should empower him, without waiting for the determination of the general assembly of the States, to execute the two articles of the late treaty, which related to the obedience due to the

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king, and the re-establishment of the Catholic religion: and that, if the prince of Orange would not immediately agree to accede to the perpetual edict, the States should break off all correspondence with him, and reduce him and the maritime provinces to obedience, by force of arms. With these proposals the States refused to comply, but expressed their refusal in the softest terms; and without taking notice of his demand, to be allowed to act as captain-general, they represented to him that, by the pacification of Ghent, both he and they were bound to wait for the meeting of the general assembly of the States; to whose decision the prince of Orange, and the States of Holland and Zealand, had engaged to submit.

His duplicity

Don John perceiving that he was not likely to persuade them, grew more impatient than ever under his present restraints, and resolved now to employ either force or fraud, as opportunities should offer. The States could not fully penetrate his design, but they perceived how much he was dissatisfied with his situation, and what difficulty they would find to obtain the fulfilment of his engagements in the perpetual edict. This served to render them more than ever solicitous for the departure of the German troops, which, it had been agreed, should remain in the Netherlands, till they received payment of their arrears. These arrears amounted to a very great sum, which the States were utterly unable to raise at the present juncture. But, having raised a part of it, they made an offer of that to the Germans, and desired they

they would accept of goods and security for the rest. In order to make a further trial of Don John's sincerity, they entreated him to employ his influence, to procure their consent. Don John readily agreed to this request; and declared that, if the Germans should refuse to comply, he would, at the hazard of his life, compel them. Having summoned their commanders to meet him at Mechlin, he went thither, as if on purpose to persuade them, but in reality to inflame their minds against the States, and to exhort them to remain in the Netherlands, in the service of the king. Having had the success which he desired with some of the principal officers, and judging it necessary now to redouble his hypocrisy with the States, he wrote to them, lamenting that a much greater sum was necessary to satisfy the German troops, than could be procured in the Low countries; and offering to send his secretary Escovedo to represent their situation to the king. This artifice was not altogether without effect. The States could not believe that Don John was capable of so great deceit, as he was now practising against them. They agreed to his proposal, and, as an expression of their gratitude, they settled a pension of 2000 ducats on Escovedo, who set out immediately for Spain; but with a design extremely different from that which was pretended.

Don John in the mean time carried on his intrigues with the German officers, and hoped soon, by their means, to get possession of the fortified towns in which they lay. But before any of the

He seizes on
the castle of
Namur.

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plans which he had formed with this view were put in execution, he judged it necessary to withdraw from Brussels, and, if possible, to make himself master of some place of strength near the frontier, where he might remain in safety till he should find himself in a condition to take the field. Of all the frontier towns, Namur appeared the fittest for his purpose; being conveniently situated for the reception of the troops, to which he expected the king would soon give orders to return from Italy. It happened that Margaret de Valois, queen of Navarre, intended at this time to pass through Namur in her way to Spa. On pretence of paying his respect to Margaret, he left Brussels, and arrived in Namur, with a great number of the nobility and others, who were favorable to his design. But as the governor of the castle was a person of strict fidelity, Don John was obliged, in order to accomplish his aim, to have recourse to the following stratagem. Feigning to set out in the morning for the chase, he took his way by the castle; where having stopt, and inquiring for the governor, he pretended a curiosity to see the fortifications of the place. The governor, flattered with this visit, and suspecting nothing hostile from men who seemed equipped only for hunting, readily admitted, not only Don John himself, but his attendants; some of whom having arms concealed under their apparel, immediately seized upon the gate¹⁴.

July 24th.

¹⁴ Bentivoglio, lib. x. p. 192. 195. Meteren, p. 185.

John having thus secured possession of the castle, the town was, by the assistance of count Barlaimont, governor of the province, soon subjected to his authority. He observed with triumph, that the day on which this event happened, was the first day of his regency. It might with greater propriety have been said, that it was the first of those calamities which pursued him to the grave.

After such an open violation of his faith, there could be little room for any future negociation with the States. Yet, in a letter which he wrote to them on this occasion, he regretted that the plots which had been laid to deprive him of his life or liberty, had obliged him to have recourse to so hostile an expedient: and he affirmed, that he was still ready to observe the conditions of the perpetual edict; but declared that he would not quit his present situation, till they should make provision for the security of his person, against the machinations of his enemies.

The States and council were greatly astonished, when they received intelligence of this event. They had wished for nothing so much as to preserve the provinces from being plunged afresh into the calamities of war. They considered that some of the principal cities in Brabant were in the hands of the Germans. They knew not what part these troops might act, if hostilities with the governor should take place; and they could not imagine that he would have ventured on so manifest a breach of the perpetual edict, without the prospect of some powerful support. They immediately

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The astonishment of the States.

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dispatched ambassadors to remonstrate with him on the nature and consequences of his conduct, and to request him to return to Brussels. They promised to make the most serious inquiry into the machinations of which he complained, desired that he would name the persons guilty, and assured him, that nothing should be wanting on their part to provide, in the most satisfactory manner, for the security of his person.

Of the reality of these machinations he could produce no other evidence, but some anonymous letters, which, he said, had been transmitted to him. But as no person was named in these letters, and the authors of them were utterly unknown, all men believed them to be a forgery of his own, or of his courtiers, designed to serve as a pretext for his present treachery.

The answer which he made to the States showed clearly, that, in the steps which he had taken, he had been influenced by a motive very different from that which he pretended — That the States should put him in full possession of the authority, which the preceding governors had exercised; that they should give him the entire command of the army; break off all communication with the prince of Orange, and the provinces of Holland and Zealand, and compel them to accede to the perpetual edict. These were some of the conditions, to which if they did not agree, he acquainted them, that he was unalterably determined not to return. The States represented the inconsistency between the former of these demands, and the perpetual edict;

and reminded him of the utter impossibility, under which they found themselves, of complying with the latter, without violating their faith, which they had pledged, in the pacification of Ghent, to the maritime provinces. He still persisted in his resolution; and the States were equally inflexible.

They were confirmed in their purpose, by some letters writ by Don John and Escovedo to the king, and Antonio Perez his secretary, which were intercepted in Gascony by the king of Navarre, and send by him to the prince of Orange, who transmitted them to the States. In these letters, the necessity of the speedy return of the Italian and Spanish troops was urged with the utmost earnestness and importunity. The diseases of the Netherlands, said Don John, admit of no other cure, but lopping off the parts affected: and, to the same purpose, Escovedo observed, that fire, and the shedding of blood, were the only means by which the disorders that prevailed, could be remedied. For no man here, said he, whether among the nobility or people, performs the duty that he owes either to God or the king. Opinions the most abominable universally prevail; and every man lives as he lists, without law or rule. To which he added, That if the king did not send the necessary troops and money soon, he was afraid that Don John, who could not endure his present situation, would quit the Netherlands, and try his fortune elsewhere.

While these letters served to alienate the Flemings more than ever from Don John, they raised to

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Discovery of
his design.

The States
get a number
of towns into

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their possession.

the greatest height their admiration of the penetration and sagacity of the prince of Orange, who had given them early warning of the governor's duplicity, and whose predictions were now so remarkably fulfilled. They entered with greater ardor than ever into his views, and in conformity with his advice, they resolved to lose no more time in negotiating, but without delay to put the provinces into a posture of defence, before the return of the Spanish forces. Whilst their levies, and other military preparations, were going on, they labored with great solicitude to persuade the Germans to deliver up the towns in their possession. Their success was in some measure retarded by the governor's intrigues with the officers, but the States, having at this time greater facility than Don John, in employing either money or force, according as the one or the other was most likely to prove effectual, had greater influence with the soldiers; who not only refused to listen to their officers, but put some of them under arrest, and gave them up to the states, together with the towns and citadels. In this manner the States recovered Bergen-op-Zoom, Tolen, Breda, Boisle-duc, and several other places; and they had the good fortune likewise to defeat a body of Germans, in the governor's interest, who were upon their march to surprise the citadel of Antwerp. After which, prompted partly by the apprehensions which this attempt, though unsuccessful, had excited, and partly by the remembrance of the many calamities which the citadels, in other places as well as

Antwerp, had occasioned to the inhabitants, they resolved to demolish these fortresses; and gave orders for this purpose, which were executed by the people with inexpressible alacrity¹⁵.

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Don John, in the mean time, endeavoured to make himself master of some places in the neighbourhood of Namur; and he succeeded in his attempts upon Marienburgh and Charlemont. But, being forsaken by the duke of Arschot, and almost all the other nobility who had attended him to Namur; and perceiving that the States were much farther advanced than himself in their military preparations, he sent them word that he had solicited the king for liberty to leave the Netherlands; and would immediately retire to Luxemburgh, to wait the issue of his application, provided the States would agree to desist from hostilities till the king's instructions should arrive. But the States, suspecting from their former experience that he intended nothing by this proposal but to render them more remiss in their preparations, gave him for answer, that before they would listen to any terms of accommodation, he must deliver up the city and castle of Namur. To this Don John refused consent; and thus the negociation was broken off, and all hopes of terminating the dispute amicably were extinguished¹⁶.

The States, considering war now as unavoidable, resolved to invite the prince of Orange

The States
invite the
prince of

¹⁵ Meteren, p. 187. Bentivoglio, tom. ii. p. 212.

¹⁶ Bentivoglio, p. 198.

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Orange to
reside at
Brussels.

His recep-
tion.

to reside at Brussels; and accordingly five of their number were appointed to carry him an invitation, couched in terms so flattering and respectful, and so expressive at the same time of their gratitude for his former services, that it was impossible he could hesitate to comply with their request. Having obtained the consent of the States of Holland and Zealand, he went first to Breda, and thence to Antwerp and Brussels. His reception in the places through which he passed, was such as might be expected from a people, by whom he was held in the highest respect and veneration. Ardent to behold him, after an absence of several years, during which he had undergone so many labors, and been exposed to so many dangers in their service, they poured out in multitudes, to the distance of several miles, to meet him. In his passage from Antwerp to Brussels, one side of the canal was lined by the inhabitants of the former of these places, and the other, by those of the latter; while the banks resounded with the joyful shouts of a grateful people, who saluted him with the glorious appellations of the Father of his Country, and the Guardian of its Liberty and Laws. Nor were these demonstrations of joy confined to the vulgar, who are always sincere, but often precipitate and inconstant in their applauses; persons of all ranks vied with each other in testifying their respect and gratitude; and immediately after his arrival, the States of Brabant and the States-general concurred in electing him governor of the province of

Brabant¹⁷; a dignity which had been hitherto bestowed only on the viceroys, or governors-general of the Netherlands.

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The promising condition of the Netherlands.

By his wisdom and moderation, as well as by his vigilance and industry, William fulfilled the most sanguine expectations of his countrymen. But, notwithstanding his address and prudence, and skill in managing the minds of men; qualifications which he possessed in the most eminent degree; he could not preserve that unanimity among the Flemings, which it was of so much consequence for them, in the present juncture, to maintain. At no period had they enjoyed so fair a prospect of securing their liberty on a firm and permanent foundation. Besides the advantage of having a person of so great experience and abilities to guide their counsels, the Spanish troops were entirely withdrawn; the king's finances were greatly exhausted with the wars in which he had been continually engaged; almost all the fortified places were in the hands of the States; and the people were animated universally with the most violent abhorrence of the Spanish government. But the States were prevented from improving the opportunity which this fortunate concurrence of circumstances afforded them, by a spirit of division and animosity, which sprung up, partly from the jealousies of the nobility, and partly from the intemperate religious zeal and bigotry of the people.

Philip de Croy duke of Arschot, the marquis

Sources of

¹⁷ Vide Hist. Métallique, tom. i. p. 235.

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animosity
and discord.

of Havrée his brother, the count de Lalain, and several others of the catholic nobility, had, since the death of Requesens; distinguished themselves as strenuous assertors of the liberties of their country. They had promoted with all their influence the pacification of Ghent, and had concurred with their countrymen in the invitation given to the prince of Orange to reside at Brussels. But when they reflected upon the extraordinary marks of attachment which William had received, and saw him vested with an authority and dignity in Brabant, which only the sovereign or his viceroys had hitherto enjoyed; above all, when they contemplated his great abilities and experience in the conduct of affairs; they foresaw that they must content themselves with acting a subordinate part in the government, and that the States would, in every branch of administration, be directed by the prince of Orange, who must therefore reap the glory of whatever should be achieved, and, without the name of sovereign, exercise a supreme and sovereign authority. Stung with envy, and desirous to conceal the motive of their conduct, they began to affect an extreme anxiety at the danger to which the catholic faith was exposed, by the States reposing such unreserved confidence in one who was an avowed friend of the new religion. On this pretence, which never received any color from the prince's conduct, they formed themselves into a confederacy, with a design to counteract him. And in order to give their party consistency, weight, and influence, they resolved to invite

the archduke Matthias, brother of the emperor, to take upon him the government of the provinces.

This resolution they not only formed, but executed, without the knowledge or authority of the States. They dispatched a messenger to Matthias with the greatest secrecy, and entreated him to leave Vienna without delay.

Nothing could exceed the temerity of those who gave this invitation, but the imprudence of Matthias in accepting it. For besides, that he was called only by the least powerful of the two parties into which the Flemings were divided, he could not be ignorant how injurious and affronting his conduct must be thought by his kinsman the king of Spain. It is some alleviation of his folly, that he was only twenty-two years of age; and that, considering the numerous progeny which his father had left behind him, there was little probability of his obtaining any settlement in Germany, suitable to his rank. At the time of the death of Requesens, he had made an offer of his service to the States, and he accepted greedily of the present invitation. His enterprize being of such a nature that he durst not discover it to the emperor, he set out from Vienna in the middle of the night, with a small number of attendants. No sooner was his brother apprized of his design, than messengers were dispatched to bring him back, and letters sent to the princes whose States he must pass through, entreating them to stop him; but Matthias travelled faster than the messengers, and, in a few days, reached the town of Lierres in Brabant.

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The Flemish nobles give an invitation to Matthias.

His arrival.

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He is admitted
governor
by the
States.

The States, astonished at the news of his arrival, and highly incensed against those who had invited him, complained loudly of the insult offered to their authority; and would have instantly formed the resolution of rejecting him, had they not been dissuaded from it by the prince of Orange. William foresaw the advantages which might arise from that rivalry, into which Matthias had entered with his kinsman Don John, and from the seeds of enmity which were thereby sown between the German and Spanish branches of the house of Austria. He reckoned it rather fortunate, that Don John had received so unpardonable an offence from the catholic nobility: and he considered how fatal to the general interest of the provinces all division must necessarily prove, in the present critical conjuncture of their affairs.

Influenced by these considerations, he exhorted the States to overlook the injurious treatment which they had received, and persuaded them to agree, not only to receive Matthias with all the respect due to his high rank, but even to elect him governor, on such conditions as they should judge proper to require. This conduct, the most prudent that could have been adopted in the present circumstances, furnished no sort of triumph to the duke d'Arschot, and the other catholic nobility. On the contrary, it mortified them exceedingly, to observe that Matthias owed his election not to them, but to the prince of Orange; whose authority, which they intended to have controlled, was

now considerably augmented, and more firmly established than before.

Soon after this, they received a still more sensible mortification. The duke d'Arfchot having lately been appointed governor of Flanders, had set out for the city of Ghent, to take possession of his government. Not long after his arrival, a deputation of the inhabitants having urged him with much importunity to reinstate them in their ancient privileges, of which they had been deprived, in the time of Charles V. he was heard to declare, that that seditious multitude, which made so much noise about their privileges, should ere long be punished as they deserved, notwithstanding their being supported by the prince of Orange. This saying being repeated by some who heard it, and circulated all over the city, inflamed the minds of the people with rage and indignation. They ran to arms, surrounded the governor's house, and threw him, and his friends and attendants, into prison. The prince of Orange, dreading the consequence of so violent a procedure, and believing the duke to be now sufficiently humbled, interceded with the Ghentese, and procured his liberty; but no solicitations could induce them to release his adherents. In this manner was the duke d'Arfchot's importance in the Netherlands almost annihilated. Matthias perceiving this, saw it to be his interest to connect himself with the party of which the prince of Orange was the head; and readily accepted the government, with a condition to which the States required his consent, that

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Mortification of the nobility.

B O O K the prince should be his lieutenant general in all the
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Matthias made his joyful entry into Brussels, in the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and seventy-eight, when both he and the prince of Orange were admitted to their respective offices, after taking an oath to maintain the laws, and to regulate their conduct according to the instructions which should be given by the States¹⁸.

Application
 of the States
 to Philip.

Don John sent an ambassador to protest in his name against these proceedings. But the States had some weeks before this time declared him an enemy to the Netherlands, and paid no regard to his protestation. As they were persuaded, however, that they had done nothing but what was authorized by the fundamental laws of the constitution, they wrote an account of their proceedings to the king, declaring that they still held their allegiance to him inviolable; and praying, that he would confirm their election of his kinsman Matthias as the most likely means of restoring tranquillity to the provinces. They had very little reason to expect that Philip would listen to this request. He looked upon their conduct in a light extremely different from that in which they themselves regarded it; and considered their presumption in rejecting the governor whom he had appointed, and still more that of nominating another without his consent, as an act of the most audacious rebellion. The States were too well acquainted

¹⁸ Meteren, p. 196. 202.

with his character, not to entertain some apprehensions that such might be his sentiments ; and therefore, while they omitted nothing in their power to assuage his resentment, they endeavoured to secure themselves against the effects of it, by interesting the neighbouring powers in their behalf, and by establishing unanimity between the religious parties into which the provinces were divided.

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In order to accomplish this last and most important object, a new treaty of union was concluded, in which, besides confirming the pacification of Ghent, the catholics and protestants promised mutually to support each other ; and engaged, that they would join together in opposing all persecution, on account of religion, from whatever quarter it should come¹⁹.

The neighbouring powers were not unconcerned spectators of these transactions. The emperor²⁰ saw with much anxiety, that those flames which had burnt so long in the Netherlands, were now likely to burst out with greater violence than ever. But having been educated at the court of Madrid under Philip, with whom he wished to live on amicable terms, he had shown himself exceedingly displeased with the conduct of Matthias; had given Philip entire satisfaction with regard to his own intentions; and had resolved to take no other part in the dissensions of the Netherlands, but that of employing his intercession and advice. He did

The emperor.

¹⁹ Meteren, p. 197.

²⁰ Rodolph II.

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not, however, oppose the levies which the count Palatine was making for the service of the States, either because he knew that his prohibition would not have been regarded, or because he desired to preserve a strict neutrality between the contending parties.

Henri III. of
France.

Henry III. of France was too much occupied in his own dominions, to have leisure to enter deeply into the affairs of the Netherlands. For many ages, France had seen no king of whose reign the people entertained more sanguine expectations. Having in his early youth, been appointed commander in chief by his brother Charles, he had given signal proof of uncommon abilities. The French nation had flattered themselves with the hopes of seeing their kingdom restored by him to its ancient splendor; his fame was universally diffused; and the Polish nobility had, with general applause, conferred upon him their elective crown. But when, upon his brother's death, he left Poland, and succeeded to the crown of France, it is inconceivable how great a change he seemed to have undergone. Irresolute, inconstant, indolent, and voluptuous, with a mixture of the most ridiculous superstition, he lost the confidence of the catholics as well as protestants, whom he favored and betrayed by turns. The unsteady and unskilful hand, with which he held the reins of government, added daily new force to the virulence of faction, till every member of the state, and almost every individual in the kingdom was infected. The queen-mother employed all her art
and

and influence to support his authority, but could not restrain her younger son, the duke of Alençon, now duke of Anjou, from putting himself at the head, sometimes of one party, and sometimes of another, in opposition to the king. To this prince, who was now the presumptive heir of the crown, the Flemings addressed themselves; after having in vain applied to the king himself for protection. Anjou listened with much pleasure to their application; and having conceived hopes of obtaining the sovereignty of the provinces, he made them the most flattering promises of assistance. Henry, far from opposing the duke's designs, considered his leaving France as the most fortunate event that could happen; since he would be thereby delivered from a great number of restless intriguing spirits, by whom the tranquillity of his kingdom had been disturbed. But as he declined on this occasion to assist his brother in levying forces, partly from inability, and partly from the dread of embroiling himself with Philip, Anjou was not in a condition, till some time after the present period, to fulfil his engagements.

The Flemings mean-while received the most seasonable assistance from the queen of England. Don John had, some months before, endeavoured to prepossess Elizabeth in *his* favor; by representing, that the disturbances in the Netherlands were entirely owing to the prince of Orange, and his adherents, who had broken the pacification of Ghent, and by their intrigues prevailed upon the States, to violate the perpetual edict. Elizabeth

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The States
apply for aid
to the duke
of Anjou.

They receive
assistance
from Eliza-
beth.

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pretended to give credit to this representation, and ordered her ambassador to reproach the States with their infidelity, and even to threaten them with her resentment, in case they should refuse to adhere to their engagements. Thus far this artful princess went, in order to persuade Philip that she seriously desired his subjects in the Netherlands to maintain their allegiance. But in reality she wished for nothing less. In a political light (that light in which the conduct of Elizabeth ought almost always to be considered) nothing could be more desirable to her, than that the troubles of the Low Countries should continue; and, if either of the two contending parties should finally prevail, that victory should fall rather on the side of the people, than of the king. But when she considered the inequality of the dispute between him and the Flemings, she dreaded that the latter, if left to themselves, must soon be compelled, either to relinquish their pretensions, or to throw themselves for protection into the arms of France. She had therefore resolved to watch carefully over their conduct, and to afford them, from time to time, such assistance as their circumstances should require. She lent a favorable ear to the defence which was made by the prince of Orange and the States against Don John's accusation; and she admitted of their justification the more willingly, as in the representation given her of Don John's conduct on this occasion, she found reason to believe that his intentions were no less hostile with regard to herself, than with respect to the States and

the prince of Orange. For William had taken particular care to inform her of some intercepted letters of Don John's, from which it appeared, that he entertained a secret correspondence with the queen of Scots; that he had formed a plan, to which the pope was privy, for setting that princess at liberty; and that he was incited to attempt this, not only by the desire of distressing Elizabeth, but likewise by the wild ambition of marrying the Scottish queen, and attaining, through her, possession of the British crowns.

After this discovery, Elizabeth resolved no longer to keep any measures with Don John, but to exert herself with vigor in opposing his re-admission into the government of the Netherlands. With this intention she gave the most gracious reception to the marquis d'Havrée, the ambassador of the States, and entered readily into a treaty, by which she engaged to furnish them with an immediate supply, both of money and troops; upon condition, that the commander of these troops should be admitted into the council of state; and that, during the continuance of the war, no step should be taken, nor any alliance formed, without her consent²¹.

Elizabeth had no sooner subscribed this treaty, than being still desirous to avoid an open breach with Philip, she dispatched an ambassador²² to Madrid, to represent to him, that in her late

²¹ Meteren, p. 197. Bentivoglio, p. 202. Camden, anno 1577, &c.

²² Thomas Wilkes, clerk of the council.

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transaction with the States, it was far from her intention to encourage them to withdraw their allegiance; that, on the contrary, she had employed the only means likely to prove effectual to prevent them from casting themselves in despair into the hands of some other power. She was deeply interested, she acknowledged, in saving her neighbours from oppression; especially the Flemings, with whom the commercial interests of her subjects had long been, and still were so closely connected. This she hoped would plead her excuse for exhorting him to substitute in the room of his brother a governor, in whom the people could repose greater trust and confidence; and with whom she herself could maintain a more friendly intercourse, than she could ever hold with Don John, after having discovered his design to invade her dominions. She concluded with entreating him to redress the grievances of his Flemish subjects; offering to mediate between him and them, if her mediation could be of use; and declaring, that if they should refuse to fulfil their late engagements, or attempt to make any innovation contrary to the pacification of Ghent, she would assist him in reducing them to obedience by force of arms²³.

Elizabeth could not mean any thing by this embassy, but the fulfilling of an empty ceremonial, which was received by Philip, and performed by her with equal insincerity. She did not wait for

²³ Carte, book xviii. Camden.

a return to her embassy, but proceeded instantly to carry into execution her treaty with the States. Both the troops and money which she engaged to furnish, were immediately sent over; and the latter was remitted by the States to prince Casimire, to enable him to complete his levies.

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The States had collected a considerable body of forces, which they stationed in the neighbourhood of Namur; and if they had followed the counsel of the prince of Orange, who exhorted them to lay siege to that important fortress, they might have made themselves masters of it, and prevented the return of the Spanish troops. But many among them being still unshaken in their allegiance to the king, as well as in their attachment to the popish faith; nothing but their remembrance of the cruelties of Alva, and the late enormities of the Spanish troops, could have induced them to concur in the measures which the majority had adopted. These men fondly imagined that Philip would be moved with their calamities, and persuaded to comply with their requests. Being for this reason unwilling to begin hostilities, they urged strongly the expediency of a defensive war: and thus the army was suffered, for several months, to remain inactive, and time imprudently given for the arrival of the Italian and Spanish troops ²⁴.

Imprudent
delays of the
States.

Although Philip did not entirely approve of his brother's conduct, and desired to have obtained

The return
of the Spa-
nish troops.

²⁴ Meteren, book viii. ab initio.

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his ends by negociation and artifice; yet, having failed in this way, he resolved, without hesitation, to employ force; and he had accordingly sent orders to Alexander Farnese, the prince of Parma, to lead back the troops from Italy, to the Netherlands, without delay. On their arrival at Namur, being joined by other troops, which Don John had levied in the neighbouring provinces, they composed an army of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse; while that of the States amounted only to ten thousand foot and one thousand five hundred horse; and was no less inferior to the enemy in discipline, than in number. The States now saw their folly in having neglected to make themselves masters of Namur, as an entrance had thereby been secured for the Spaniards into the centre of the Netherlands.

Don John was at this time in a situation much more suitable to the talents which he possessed, than those negociations and treaties in which he had been hitherto engaged. He had longed with extreme impatience for the arrival of the forces, and ardently desired to be revenged upon the States for the injurious treatment which he imagined he had received. Having got information that their army, commanded by the Sieur de Goignies, had left their camp in the neighbourhood of Namur, and were retiring towards Brussels, he resolved to attack them on their march. With this intention he sent his cavalry before, under the prince of Parma, and followed them himself, as quickly as possible, with the foot. Farnese executed the trust

committed to him with great valor. At the head of his battalion he attacked the Flemish cavalry with uncommon fury, and though they gave him a spirited reception, he soon compelled them to retire. In the mean time Don John came forward with a chosen body of infantry, and afforded him such a powerful support, as enabled him to drive the enemy's horse before him, till he entered along with them into the ranks of their main army. The Flemings believing the whole Spanish forces to be at hand, and being utterly unprepared for so sudden an attack, were soon thrown into confusion and dispersed. About three thousand were killed, and a great number, with the commander in chief, were taken prisoners. The loss on the side of the conquerors was inconsiderable.

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Battle of
Gemblours.

January 31.

After this victory Don John reduced Gemblours, Louvain, Sichem, Nivelles, and several other places, both in Brabant and Hainault. He desired likewise to have laid siege to Brussels; but his council of war were of opinion, that his strength was not adequate to so great an enterprise, and thought it more expedient to aim at easier conquests, till his army should be reinforced.

The States in the mean time received an abundant compensation for their losses in the southern provinces, by the acquisition of Amsterdam. To this wealthy city, which even then was the greatest in the northern provinces, the duke of Alva had, as mentioned above, given the most particular attention; having expelled the protestants, and put the government entirely into

Amsterdam
accedes to the
confederacy.
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the hands of rigid catholics. These men, supported by a numerous garrison, had baffled all the attempts which had been made by the States of Holland to reduce them. But being now hemmed in by their countrymen both by sea and land, and their trade almost ruined, they at last consented to accede to the pacification of Ghent, and agreed to disband the popish garrison, to recal the protestant exiles, and to allow them to hold their religious assemblies without the city. It was not long before they repented of these concessions. The protestants being inflamed with zeal for their religion; impatient under the restraints which in the late agreement had been laid upon them, fired with resentment for former injuries, and suspicious that the catholics were again meditating schemes for their expulsion, they flew to arms, and having suppressed the exercise of the popish faith, they drove all the priests, and others whom they suspected of malignant designs, out of the city²⁵.

Philip's answer to the States.

In the midst of these transactions John de Noircharmes, Baron de Selles, arrived from Spain, with Philip's answer to the application which the States had made to him some months before. It was such as they had reason to expect, and contained an absolute denial of their requests, with regard to the removal of Don John, and the ratification of the election of Matthias.

The States prosecute the war.

Convinced by this denial, of the folly of those hopes which they had entertained, that the

²⁵ Meteren, p. 207.

king would yield to their entreaties, and sensible that they had suffered considerable loss, from that want of dispatch and secrecy which is incident to the procedure of a numerous assembly; they enlarged the powers of Matthias and the prince of Orange, and invested them, and the council of state, with authority to conduct the operations of the war, without having recourse on every occasion to the assembly of the States.

No time after this was unnecessarily lost. The troops which had been dispersed at Gemblours were collected, and of these, and the new levies, an army was composed, amounting to eight thousand foot and two thousand horse, partly Flemings, and partly Scots and English. This army was stationed in the neighbourhood of Lierres, in the centre of Brabant, under the command of the count de Bossut. Don John's army, after he had put garrisons into the towns which he had taken, was still superior in number; and therefore he resolved to march towards Bossut, before the auxiliaries, which the States expected from France and Germany, should arrive. But he soon found that he had now to contend both with troops and a general much superior to those whom he had encountered at Gemblours. Bossut had, from a sense of the inferiority of his forces, pitched his camp near the village of Rimenant, in a situation extremely advantageous for preventing the enemy from penetrating further into the provinces. On the one side it was defended by the Demer, and on the other, by a wood; and was fortified both

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Battle of Rimenant.

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The prince
of Parma.

before and behind with strong intrenchments. Notwithstanding this, Don John resolved to attack it, unless he could provoke the count to quit his lines, and give him battle. The prince of Parma, who from his early youth was no less wise than brave, remonstrated against this resolution, as being dangerous and desperate. But Don John, being confirmed in his purpose by the other officers, gave orders for his army to advance, after having sent before a select body of troops, to attack an important post, without the camp, which was guarded by some English and Scotch forces, under colonel Norris. Among the assailants was Don Alphonso Martinez de Leyva, at the head of a company of two hundred men, whom he maintained at his own expense, and who were all either gentlemen, or soldiers who had distinguished themselves in former wars. These men attacked the British troops with uncommon fury. After a short resistance, the latter began to retreat, but in good order, and with their faces turned towards the enemy. The Spaniards, to second whom Don John had sent several battalions of fresh troops, not suspecting any artifice, and believing the enemy to be intimidated, followed them with much precipitation, till they had past a narrow defile within reach of the artillery of the Flemish camp. Norris then returned to the charge, and the combat was renewed with greater fury than ever. He was reinforced with troops sent him from the camp, and both parties, being nearly equal, seemed determined to die or conquer. This

The Spaniards re-
pulsed by the
English.

gallant Englishman animated his army by his own example, and had three horses killed under him. The Scots, impatient of the heat, fought in their shirts, and astonished the enemy with the singularity of their appearance. In the mean time, a body of troops, which had been placed in ambush, attacked the Spaniards in flank, and Bossut continued to fire upon them incessantly with his artillery. They must all have perished, had not the prince of Parma obtained liberty from Don John to advance at the head of the cavalry to their relief. By his superior prudence, he would have prevented this inconsiderate enterprise; and now, by his prudence and bravery united, he saved the troops from those fatal consequences, to which through their own and the general's confidence, they had been exposed. About nine hundred men however fell on the field of battle, and a few more were taken prisoners²⁶.

Don John, having thus failed in his attempt, and being sensible that he could not, with his present army, keep the field against the numerous forces that were ready to pour in upon him from France and Germany retreated, with the resolution of acting for the future on the defensive only, and pitched his camp under the fortifications of Namur.

The States concluded about this time their treaty with the duke of Anjou, which consisted of

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August 1st.

Treaty of the
States with
Anjou.

²⁶ Bentivoglio, book x. Strabo, l. iii. Meteren, p. 225. Thuanus, lib. lxvi. sect. xii.

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the following articles: — That, under the title of Protector of the Netherlands, the duke should furnish, at his own expense, ten thousand foot and two thousand horse: that all the conquests which he should make on the Flandres side of the Maese, should belong to the States; and those on the other side to himself: that, for the accommodation of his troops, Landrecy, and Quesnoy in Hainault, and Bapaume in Artois, should be put in his possession: that the States should not enter into any agreement with Don John, without the duke's consent: and that in case they should hereafter think proper to elect another sovereign, they should make choice of the duke; but that in the mean time the government should remain entire in the hands of the States.

Designs of
the States.

Agreeably to the first article of this treaty, Anjou had assembled a considerable body of troops in the neighbourhood of Mons, to which place the States sent a solemn embassy to entreat that he would quicken his march into the interior provinces. They intended, that their own army should unite with his, and that of Casimire, and that all the three armies should act in concert with one another, in expelling Don John, before he should receive a reinforcement from Spain or Italy. Nor was it without apparent reason that they entertained the hopes of accomplishing this design. Prince Casimire had passed the Rhine and the Maese, and advanced as far as the town of Diest in Brabant. His army, when joined with that of the States, amounted nearly to forty

Their nu-
merous army.

thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and was greatly superior to any which Don John could muster to oppose it.

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But a variety of causes concurred in rendering almost useless these mighty preparations; and a spirit of division arose, by which the people in the more fertile provinces lost for ever that liberty, for which they had so strenuously contended, at the very time when it was most in their power to secure it on a firm and permanent foundation. For although, according to the testimony of the catholic, as well as the protestant historians, nothing could exceed the prudence and moderation with which the prince of Orange conducted the affairs of government, it soon appeared, that no human wisdom was sufficient to preserve harmony and concord, where there were so many grounds of jealousy and discontent. Of this discontent and jealousy, religious bigotry was the principal, but not the only cause. Ambition and interest joined their influence to that of religion, and not only divided the people themselves into factions, the most inveterate and hostile, but created suspicion and discord between them and the foreign powers which they had called to their assistance.

Its operations rendered ineffectual.

The queen of England had heard, with great uneasiness, of the late treaty between the States and the duke of Anjou. She knew not, at this time, how far Henry was concerned in his brother's enterprise, nor what schemes of conquest these two princes might have formed. She considered what great advantages their neighbourhood

B O O K afforded them for the execution of these schemes;
XIV. and foresaw the prejudice which might accrue to
1578. the English nation, if the Netherlands were to fall under subjection to the crown of France. In order to prevent this, and counterbalance the power and influence of Anjou, she had made such ample remittances of money to prince Casimire, as had enabled him to augment the number of his army, which consisted wholly of protestants, considerably above what the States had either expected or desired. This alarmed the jealousy of all the catholics in the Low Countries, who dreaded the approach of so great an army of reformers, and suspected that Casimire, in concert with Elizabeth, had conceived the design of extirpating the popish faith. They did not conceal their apprehensions. Even the prince of Orange, and other moderate protestants, joined in remonstrating with Casimire on the necessity of his dismissing a part of his forces. But this remonstrance served only to alienate him from the prince of Orange and the council, and to render him less attentive to their instructions with regard to the conduct of the war. He was likewise highly offended with the preference which the States had given to the count of Bossut, by appointing him commander in chief of the army; and he made them feel his resentment, by the slowness of all his military operations, and his continual demands of supplies for the payment of his troops²⁷.

²⁷ Reidanus, p. 25, 26.

But the intemperate zeal and ambition of the protestants were productive of still more pernicious effects. Not satisfied with the security from persecution which they had enjoyed since the pacification of Ghent, they took courage from the great number of protestants in the army, and petitioned Matthias and the States, to be allowed to hold their religious assemblies openly in churches, and to be admitted, on the same footing with the catholics, to the several offices of government. They ought certainly to have remained silent, as they had done hitherto, till the common enemy had been expelled, and the public tranquillity established. Yet their conduct admits of some apology; their party had greater influence now than it was likely to possess, if the catholics were delivered from their dread of the Spaniards, and they could not foresee those fatal consequences with which their application was afterwards attended.

But whatever judgment may be formed of their discretion, the States thought it necessary, lest the army should have proved refractory, to comply with their requests. The pacification of Ghent required that religion should remain on the same footing on which it stood at the time of that treaty, till the States of all the provinces should be assembled; yet the States, now partially assembled, consented, not only that the protestants should have access to all public offices, but likewise that they should have churches allowed to them in every place where a hundred families resided; upon this condition, that in Holland and Zealand

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Intemperate
zeal and am-
bition of the
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The unhap-
py conse-
quences.

the same indulgence should be granted to the catholic inhabitants. To this decree they gave the name of the Peace of Religion; and each of the provinces was left at liberty to accept or reject it, as they should judge expedient.

In some cities it proved a salutary remedy for the disorders with which they were distracted; but, in many others, it added malignity to that poison, which raged in the minds of the more violent religionists, and was the source of the most pernicious animosity and discord. It gave no contentment to the zealots of either party, but contributed to inflame them more than ever against each other, by adding fresh materials to that inveterate jealousy and rancor which their bigotry inspired, but which had been laid asleep for some time past, by their apprehensions of the common danger. The catholics every where, but in a few cities of Flanders and Brabant, opposed the execution of this decree; and the reformers derived little advantage from it, except in those places where they overpowered their antagonists by superior numbers. In the provinces of Artois and Hainault, where the reformation had never made any progress, the people rejected the decree with the most determined obstinacy, and refused to allow the exercise of any other religion but the catholic within their territories; while the protestants in Ghent and other places, actuated by the same intolerant and bigoted spirit, expelled the popish ecclesiastics, seized their effects, and spoiled the churches of their ornaments.

Between

Between the people of Ghent and the Walloons²³ a particular ground of enmity had subsisted, ever since the former had cast the duke d'Arfshot and his attendants into prison. For most of these were persons of rank in the Walloon provinces; and the Ghentese had not only rejected every solicitation in their behalf, but had even treated them with severity during their confinement. The Walloons were, for this reason, the more readily incensed by the accounts which they received of the late enormities committed against the catholics, which they justly regarded as a violation, on the part of the protestants, of their late engagements. Forgetful therefore of the danger which threatened them, and listening only to the voice of indignation and resentment, they began to separate themselves from the other provinces, and refused to contribute their share of the money necessary for the payment of the troops. "We took arms," said they, "to vindicate our liberty; but what will it avail us to be delivered from the Spanish yoke, if we must submit to a yoke no less galling and intolerable, imposed upon us by our countrymen; who, under the pretext of zeal against the tyranny of the Spaniards, show now that their only design has been to tyrannise over us themselves." The other provinces represented to them the mischievous consequences with which their conduct must be attended, and accompanied their representations

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Discord between the Walloons and Flemings.

²³ The natives of Artois, Hainault, and the other southern provinces.

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The effects
of that dis-
cord.

with prayers and threats ; but the Walloons remained inflexible, and soon afterwards they gave a striking proof of their hostile disposition, by refusing to deliver the towns of Landrecy, Quefnois, and Bapaume, to the duke of Anjou, in conformity to the treaty above recorded. Not satisfied with this, they began to prepare openly for war, and employed the contributions, which had been raised for paying the army of the States, in levying forces against the Flemings. The Flemings quickly armed themselves in their defence, and several rencounters happened between the Walloons and them, that were equally pernicious to both.

Prince Casimire's troops and those of the States had been for some time past united, and Don John was not possessed of a force sufficient to oppose them ; but the factious and refractory spirit of the Walloons and Flemings had diffused itself into almost every part of the Netherlands, except the provinces of Holland and Zealand. Many cities withheld their contributions, and the army was extremely ill provided with every thing necessary to render the operations of the campaign effectual. Bossut's principal object was to compel the enemy to a general engagement; and for this purpose, after taking two or three towns of little consequence, he led his troops within view of the camp in which Don John had intrenched himself, under the fortifications of Namur. With an army so much superior in number to the enemy, the count might have forced the intrenchments; but being neither furnished with pioneers, cannon, or

a sufficient quantity of ammunition, and finding Don John unalterably determined to keep within his camp, he was obliged to retire. His troops, in the mean time, were highly discontented, on account of their want of pay. His discipline was unavoidably relaxed. The country was oppressed and plundered. Casimire accepted of an invitation from the Ghentese, to assist them with a part of his forces against the Walloons. It became dangerous to keep the remainder of the army any longer in the neighbourhood of the Spanish camp, and it was soon afterwards found impracticable to support it. A part of the troops therefore was disbanded, and the rest were put into garrison in the fortified towns.

The duke of Anjou's army was not better provided with the means of Subsistence than that of the States, and its operations were equally insignificant. Conscious of his inability to fulfil his engagement, Anjou grasped at those pretexts for eluding them, which the conduct of Casimire, and that of the Walloons, afforded him. He complained bitterly of the treatment which he received from the latter, who not only refused him admittance into the towns which the States had promised for the accommodation of his troops, but showed themselves no less unwilling to furnish him with provisions, than if he had come to invade, and not to protect and defend them. He seems likewise to have suspected, and not without some reason, that Casimire had formed some private designs, inconsistent with that establishment which he him-

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Conclusion
of the cam-
paign.

self had in view in the southern provinces; and that he had carried his troops to the assistance of the people of Ghent, in order to pave the way for executing those designs. He therefore refused to join his army with that of Bossut, unless Casimire should return to it; and when Matthias and the prince of Orange failed in their endeavours to prevail on Casimire, (to whom the Ghentese had advanced a considerable sum of money, to induce him to remain with them) Anjou broke up his camp, and suffered a part of his army to go over to the Baron de Montigny, who was commander in chief at that time of the forces of the Walloons²⁹.

Such was the conclusion of this campaign, and such the issue of all the mighty preparations which the States had made for a vigorous prosecution of the war. The people themselves, instead of uniting their efforts against the common enemy, wage war with one another, in violation of the most solemn engagements, into which they had entered only a few months before; and the princes, who had undertaken to deliver the Flemings from the Spanish yoke, enlist themselves, in opposition to each other, under the banners of those inveterate factions, which threaten this unhappy people with destruction.

Casimire went over to England to justify his conduct to Elizabeth, and Anjou sent an ambassador to the States to make an apology for *his*, by representing, that his troops had joined those of Montigny without his consent; but that the

²⁹ Meteren, p. 233. Grotius, p. 60.

States had no reason to dread the consequences of that step, since the Ghentese would be thereby more easily restrained from their excesses. The States, thinking it prudent to dissemble their resentment, admitted of his apology; and, that they might still remain on friendly terms with him, they assured his ambassadors, that they had a just sense of gratitude for the efforts which the duke had made in their behalf; that, as soon as possible, they would refund his expenses; and that, if they should ever find it necessary to elect another prince, in the place of the king of Spain, they would make him an offer of the sovereignty.

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During the course of the transactions that have been related, Don John had kept his troops within their camp at Namur. They might now have left it without danger; but Don John had been seized, some weeks before, with a violent illness, which cut him off before he had reached the thirtieth year of his age. His death was by some ascribed to poison; but, according to others, it was owing partly to disease, and partly to that chagrin which he conceived from the negligence with which his repeated applications for money and troops were treated by the Spanish ministers. Fond to excess of military glory, and conscious of talents which would probably have ensured success, he lamented bitterly the necessity which the weakness of his army imposed upon him, of remaining so long inactive, and solicited his brother for a reinforcement with the most earnest importunity. Nor was it only because Philip was averse to a

Death of
Don John
of Austria.

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vigorous prosecution of the war, that he deferred complying with his request. After that renown, which Don John acquired in the battle of Lepanto, his conduct, as above related, contained so clear a discovery of his views, as could not but alarm the suspicious temper of the king, who thenceforth kept a watchful eye upon all his brother's most secret motions; and when he sent him to the Netherlands, resolved never to intrust him with such a numerous army as might enable him to execute any ambitious design. Philip's suspicions were, during his brother's residence in the Low Countries, kept perpetually awake, by reports of his having formed a design of marrying the queen of Scots. To these reports Philip gave credit, perhaps too easily. By *his* orders, Don John's secretary Escovedo, who had fomented his master's ambition, was privately put to death. It was believed by many, that he issued the like orders with regard to his brother, and that this young heroic prince died of poison, given him by certain popish ecclesiastics, instigated by the court of Spain. But whatever ground there was for this persuasion, there is little room to doubt that, from jealousy of his brother, more than any other cause, Philip withheld the supplies necessary for carrying on the war. And to this circumstance, the troops of the States were indebted for their preservation from that ruin, to which their divisions had exposed them^{3°}.

^{3°} Meteren, p. 234. Grotius, &c.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

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DON JOHN having on his death-bed appointed the prince of Parma to succeed him, his choice was soon afterwards approved, and ratified by the king.

This young prince had on many occasions, since his arrival in the Netherlands, given proof of consummate prudence and the most intrepid valor. Temperate, vigilant, and indefatigable, he could descend to the most minute detail in all military operations, and was always the first to expose himself to toil and danger, and the last to retire. Pliant in his manners, and insinuating in his address; he could speak most of the European languages, and accommodate himself to the soldiers of all the different nations of which the army was composed. He possessed a vigor of bodily constitution equal to that of his mind, joined with

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The prince
of Parma

governor.

His character.

BOOK an elevated martial air and aspect, which served,
XV. in time of battle, to fill the enemy with terror,
 and to inspire his own troops with courage and
 confidence of success.

1579. He had no sooner performed the last offices to
 his friend and kinsman, than he applied himself
 assiduously to fulfil the duties of that important
 station to which he was now advanced. While
 the army of the States remained in the field, he
 was obliged, through the smallness of his numbers,
 to follow the same plan which his predecessor had
 pursued, and to keep his little army strongly for-
 tified within their camp; but when, from the
 causes above explained, not only the army of the
 States, but likewise the Germans and French
 under Casimire and Anjou, were all either dis-
 banded, or put into winter-quarters, Farnese, con-
 sidering this as the proper season for action, re-
 solved to undertake the siege of some important
 place, by the acquisition of which he might in-
 crease his resources for carrying on the war.

He hesitated for some time, whether he should
 enter first upon the siege of Maestricht, or that of
 Antwerp. The benefit which he would have de-
 rived from the possession of the latter of these
 places, was greater than any which could arise
 from that of the former, as Antwerp was the prin-
 cipal seat of wealth and commerce in the Nether-
 lands, and was situated in the most advantageous
 manner for prosecuting the conquest of the mari-
 time provinces; but having weighed attentively
 the difficulties to be surmounted in the siege of a

place of so great extent and strength as Antwerp, he wisely resolved to begin with the siege of Maestricht, in which he could engage with fewer forces, and a greater probability of success¹.

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In order to conceal his design from the States, he directed his march towards Antwerp, and had a sharp rencounter with a body of French and British forces, which were sent out to obstruct his approach. These he forced to retire under the fortifications of the city; immediately after which he turned back suddenly, and invested Maestricht, before the States had time to furnish that town with the necessary supplies of stores and provisions.

The inhabitants were not numerous in proportion to the extent of the place²; but it was strongly fortified, and the want of numbers was abundantly supplied by the martial spirit of the people, who, being exposed by their situation to frequent invasions from foreign enemies, were well accustomed to the use of arms. About fifteen hundred of them were enrolled; and by these, and a thousand regular troops, together with two thousand of the country people, who served as pioneers, Maestricht was defended for almost four months, against an army of 15,000 foot and 4000 horse, the best-disciplined and bravest troops in Europe, whose operations were directed by the greatest military genius of the age. Amongst the besieged there were two persons,

He lays siege
to Maestricht.

¹ Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

² It is five Italian miles in circumference.

B O O K Schwarzenburgh de Herle, a Fleming, and Tappin,
 XV. a Frenchman, who conducted the defence with a
 1579. degree of wisdom and intrepidity that excited
 universal admiration and applause.

Conduct of
 the siege.

The prince of Parma, having arrived before the town in the beginning of March, sent Mondragone, with a part of the army, to the east side of the river, to invest the town of Vich; whilst he himself remained on the other side, where he intended to make his principal attack. His first object was to prevent the States from introducing any supplies or reinforcements. With this view, he shut up the Maese with two bridges of boats, one above and the other below the town, and drew quite round his camp, on both sides of the river, strong lines of circumvallation. Immediately after taking this precaution, he began to make his approach to the walls by trenches. The garrison had the courage to make several sallies, by which his operations were retarded. At length, however, when by perseverance and the power of superior numbers, his trenches were sufficiently advanced, he planted two batteries, one against the gate of Tongres, and the other against the curtain, between the gate of Hoxter and that of the Cross. While the batteries were played off with great success, the royalists pushed forward the trenches, and were ready to enter into the fossé, or ditch. The breach at the gate of Tongres, was the first made practicable, and Farnese resolved to assault it with a select body of troops, drawn from the several nations of which his army

was composed. By thus mingling them together, he enflamed their ardor and emulation; but they met with equal ardor on the part of their opponents, and, after an obstinate and bloody conflict, were obliged to retire.

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The prince, believing that this first attempt had failed through the smallness of the breach, renewed the fire of his batteries with redoubled fury, and prepared for a second attack. In order to weaken the garrison by dividing it, he resolved to make an assault at each of the two breaches at the same time. His troops advanced, in the face of the enemy's cannon, with the most undaunted intrepidity. The besieged stood undismayed till they approached, and nothing could exceed the fury with which both parties began the combat. Their fire-arms soon ceased to be of use to them; for they came immediately to close fight, in which they could employ only their pikes and swords. In one of the breaches De Herle, and in the other Tappin, gave the most splendid proofs of capacity and valor. The assailants, enraged at meeting with such obstinate resistance from an enemy so much inferior in number, exerted their utmost vigor to overpower them. The action was furious and desperate. The ruins of the wall, and the ground on both sides, were strewed with the dead and dying. Stones hurled down from the bulwarks, and artificial fires, which the besieged launched among the assailants, increased the confusion. Those fires happened to lay hold of the barrels of gun-powder which stood near for

Brave defence of
Maastricht.

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the use of the combatants. The explosion was terrible, and many on both sides perished by this fatal accident. The air resounded with cries, and shrieks, and groans. The earth was covered with mangled carcases; yet those who survived still maintained their ground with the same unconquerable obstinacy as before, and, from the horrid scene which lay around them, seemed only to derive fresh rage and fury. The prince of Parma gave orders at last, with much reluctance, for founding a retreat. The resolution and fortitude of the besieged, he perceived, were not to be overcome. Even if he could have mounted the breach, and kept possession of it, this would not have availed him, as other fortifications had been raised within, which rendered the town almost as impregnable as before.

Upon reviewing his troops, the prince found that many of his best officers had fallen, and that the regiments of Spanish veterans were extremely diminished. He soon completed his numbers by making draughts from the garrisons of the towns in his possession. But when he reflected on the character of the besieged, he perceived the necessity of laying aside all thoughts of taking the town by storm, and resolved to content himself with the slower method of undermining the fortifications, employing for this purpose a prodigious number of pioneers, and taking effectual care in the mean time, to render it impossible for the besieged to receive any reinforcement or supplies.

The States were not neglectful of the preservation of a place, where both the garrison and inhabitants had shown themselves so worthy of their attention. Having some time before received the celebrated La Noue into their service, they had appointed him governor of Maestricht, and given him the charge of conducting thither the reinforcements which they intended for the relief of the besieged. Nothing was omitted by la Noue to fulfil their expectations; but so pernicious were the consequences of that spirit of discord, which still raged as furiously as ever, between the protestants and catholics, that, although the council of state, seconded by the prince of Orange, gave him all the assistance in their power, he was never able to collect a force sufficient to execute his purpose. The situation therefore of the besieged was become extremely deplorable. The garrison, which in the beginning of the siege consisted of a thousand men, was now reduced to four hundred, and the citizens and country people had suffered a proportionable diminution. Their provisions began to fail, and their store of gun-powder was nearly exhausted.

Their distresses were much augmented towards the middle of June, by their loss of a ravelin, which had enabled them to give great annoyance to the enemy. To acquire possession of this ravelin had been the chief object of the prince of Parma's operations for several weeks; and, though he met with the most spirited resistance, he at length accomplished his design, and could, with a large

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The States attempt in vain to relieve it.

B O O K cavalier which he constructed, overlook the walls,
XV. and scour the town with his guns, almost from the
1579. one end to the other. Still however the besieged, animated by the hopes of relief, refused to capitulate.

Maestricht
taken by sur-
prise.

But the siege was brought to a conclusion much sooner than either of the two contending parties had reason to expect. On the 29th of June, it was suspected by some Spanish soldiers, that the wonted vigilance of the garrison was relaxed. In order to know the truth with certainty, these men crept silently to the top of the rampart, and found that the defendants were not only few in number, but overpowered with fatigue and heat, and buried in sleep. Of this they carried information to the general; who without delay ordered such of his troops as were nearest, to ascend the rampart with as little noise as possible. They were immediately followed by all the rest of the army. The garrison were thus suddenly overwhelmed, and almost all of them were put to the sword. The inhabitants fought desperately; but they sunk at last under the superior force of the assailants, who spared neither sex nor age; and continued the slaughter, till of eight thousand citizens, only three hundred remained. De Herle escaped by disguising himself in the habit of a menial servant; and Farnese issued strict orders to spare the life of the valiant Tappin³.

The prince of
Orange la-
bors to quell
the tumults
in Ghent.

During the siege of Maestricht, various political negotiations were carried on by the opposite

³ Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i. Meteren, lib. ix.

parties. The prince of Orange had at this time the chief direction of all the measures that were pursued by the States and council; Matthias having, from a consciousness of his own want of experience, left the entire administration in his hands. The dissensions between the Walloons and Flemings had from the beginning given him deep concern, and he had omitted nothing in his power to heal them. Among the Walloons he had little influence, by reason of their abhorrence of his religion, and the jealousy which they had conceived of his designs. On the other hand, the Ghentese, who in that age, were noted for their turbulent and seditious spirit, had been wrought up by certain factious leaders to a degree of madness, and were long deaf to all the remonstrances which he could employ. St. Aldegonde, whom he sent to deal with them, exerted, but in vain, all the address and eloquence for which he was so highly celebrated. The interposition of Matthias and the States was equally ineffectual. Nor did they pay any greater regard to the representations and threats of Elizabeth, who sent over an ambassador* on purpose to persuade them. At length the prince of Orange went himself to treat with them. They had lately inveighed against him, with great severity, for his moderation towards the catholics; and had suffered some of their preachers to arraign him on this account, as insincere in his religious profession. But, being flattered with that regard

* Mr. Davidson.

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and confidence of which his present visit was expressive, they resumed their wonted affection to his person; and, after he had staid among them some weeks, they complied with the several requests which they had hitherto rejected. They consented to make restitution of the goods of which they had plundered the popish ecclesiastics; permitted the re-establishment of the rites and ceremonies of the Romish church, forbad all abusive language, whether in the pulpit or in private assemblies, and engaged to yield a more prompt obedience for the future to the authority of the States⁵.

It soon however appeared, that nothing but William's personal influence had induced them to make these concessions. In a few months afterwards, being incited by the same factious leaders to whom they had formerly listened, they indulged themselves in the most unjustifiable excesses; they plundered the churches and monasteries, expelled the ecclesiastics from the town, and seized their effects, which they distributed among the Germans, whom they had called to their assistance against the Walloons. These and other enormities occasioned the prince of Orange to visit the Ghentese a second time; when they made him an offer of the government of the province. He prudently declined accepting this offer; but having again employed all his influence to quash the present dissensions in the city, he

⁵ Thuanus, lib. lxvi.

succeeded

ſucceeded ſo far as to be able to compel Imbiſe the chief magiſtrate, together with his factious adherents, to leave the city. He likewiſe put the magiſtracy into the hands of the more moderate reformers, ſet at liberty ſuch of the Walloon nobility as were ſtill in priſon, and procured for the catholic inhabitants, liberty of private worſhip, and ſecurity from moleſtation⁶.

William labored with no leſs earneſtneſs to aſſuage the reſentment of the Walloons, who, although they had not been the firſt aggreſſors, perſiſted in their hoſtile diſpoſition, with the moſt unconquerable obſtinacy. By the artifiſes of Matthew de Moulard, biſhop of Arras, the count de la Lain, the marquis de Roubais, and others of the nobility, who beheld with deep malignity William's unrivalled credit and authority, the people had conceived the moſt incurable ſuſpicions, that, far from being actuated by a diſinter-eſted attachment to the civil or religious liberty of the provinces, he intended only his own exaltation, and was preparing to eſtabliſh it upon the ruins of the catholic faith. They lent a deaf ear therefore to every plan of accommodation that was propoſed, either by the prince himſelf, or by Matthias and the States; who, they knew, were entirely directed by his councils⁷.

The prince of Parma was too ſagacious not to diſcern the advantage which this diſpoſition of the

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The prince
of Parma
gains over
the Wal-
loons.

⁶ Grotius, lib. iii.

⁷ Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 29.

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Walloons afforded him, for drawing them back to their allegiance. Soon after the death of Don John of Austria, he had, for this purpose, begun a negociation with their leaders; upon which he had bestowed particular attention, in the midst of those military occupations in which the siege of Maestricht had engaged him. In order to frustrate his endeavours, the prince of Orange and the States remonstrated to the Walloons on the infidelity which would be justly imputed to them, if they should enter into any separate terms of agreement; and represented to them the danger to which they would thereby expose *themselves*, as well as the other provinces, of being again enthralled by the Spaniards. The Walloons could not entirely divest themselves of the scruples, which these remonstrances were calculated to excite; nor were they free from those apprehensions of the Spanish tyranny, by which the other provinces were so much disquieted. They had not forgot the scenes of treachery and violence, of which they had been so often witnesses; and found it difficult to rely on the promises of those, whose insincerity they had so frequently experienced. On the other hand, their bigotry, joined with the inveterate jealousy which the nobility entertained of the prince of Orange, formed an insurmountable obstacle against any agreement with the Flemings. *That* hatred with which they had been long actuated against the Spaniards, began to yield to a more implacable aversion against the protestants; and in this they were confirmed by

the address of the bishop of Arras, and the other agents of the prince of Parma; whose proposals of accommodation they were now inclined to embrace, provided it could be done consistently with those solemn engagements, under which they had lately come to the other provinces. To these engagements, according to the sense in which they themselves understood them, they adhered with inflexible fidelity; and persisted to the last in requiring that all foreign troops should be immediately dismissed; that the pacification of Ghent should be fully executed; and that Philip should recognise their right to form alliances either within or without the Netherlands, in case of any infraction on his part of the articles of this pacification.

Of their several demands, there was none which the prince of Parma found it so difficult to digest, as that of sending away the foreign troops. *Their* place, he knew, could not be supplied by the undisciplined forces of the country; and he dreaded that he should be obliged to abandon the plan which he had formed, for subduing the maritime provinces. The king, to whom he applied for precise instructions, was no less averse from this concession. But Philip, considering the recovery of the Walloons (the most warlike of all the inhabitants of the Netherlands) as a matter of the last importance; especially in the present juncture, when his exchequer was drained by the expense which he had incurred in the conquest of Portugal; and hoping, that by the indulgent measures which he had resolved to espouse in his treatment of the

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The Spanish
and Italian
troops sent
out of the
Netherlands.

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May 17th.

Walloons, he should be able ere long to obtain their consent to whatever he should require of them, he sent orders to Farnese to hasten the conclusion of the treaty; and it was accordingly concluded in the following terms: That all foreign troops in the service of the king, should leave the Netherlands in six weeks, and never return thither without the consent of the Walloon provinces: that an army of national troops should be levied, to the payment of which the king might apply the subsidies to be granted by the States: that all persons in public offices should take an oath to maintain the catholic religion: that all the privileges of the provinces should remain inviolate: and that the government should be preserved in the same form in which it had been left by the late emperor when he resigned his dominions*.

This treaty was signed, on the part of the provinces, only by the deputies of French Flanders, Artois, and Hainault. The other provinces were not called, as Luxemburgh had never concurred in any of the late transactions; and the greatest part of Limburgh and Namur had already submitted to the king's authority.

The union of
Utrecht.

The prince of Orange, no stranger to the secret motives of the leading men among the Walloons, having foreseen that this agreement would certainly take place; had, in order to provide a counterpoise against it, set on foot a new treaty of alliance among the provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht,

* Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

Guelderland, Friesland, Brabant, and Flanders. B O O K
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1579.
This alliance was called the Union of Utrecht, from the place where it was brought to a conclusion. It may justly be considered as the first foundation of the republic of the United Provinces. It is still regarded as containing the fundamental laws of the constitution, and proves its author, by the wisdom, moderation, and extensive views which it discovers. It contains neither any avowal, nor any express renunciation of their allegiance to Philip; but the provinces tacitly assume to themselves the sovereign authority, and lodge it partly in the general assembly of the States, and partly in the States of the several provinces. The principal articles of this confederacy are those which follow: "That the several provinces contracting, unite themselves together in one political body, renouncing for ever the power of separating from each other; but reserving each to itself all the rights which it possessed before."

"That the said provinces shall assist each other to repel the attacks of any foreign power; and, in particular, to repel whatever violence may be offered to any of the contracting parties, in the name of the king of Spain, under the pretext of establishing the catholic religion, or on account of any transaction in the Netherlands, since the year 1558; leaving it always to the generality of the union to determine in what proportion each province shall be obliged to furnish its supplies, either of money, or of troops."

"That in Holland and Zealand, no religion

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but that which is already established shall be openly professed; and that the other provinces shall be at liberty to allow either of the protestant religion, or the catholic, or both, as they themselves shall judge expedient: that restitution shall be made of the effects which belong to the convents and churches, in all the provinces except those of Holland and Zealand; and in these, that pensions shall be appointed to the popish ecclesiastics, to be paid them wheresoever they reside."

"That all frontier, and other towns, which the general and provincial States shall think proper to fortify, shall be fortified at the joint expense of the generality, and of the particular province in which they lie; but if the General States shall on any occasion think proper to build new forts, without the consent of the particular province in which they lie, the generality shall furnish the whole expense."

"That all fortified towns shall be obliged to receive such garrisons as the generality shall appoint, on condition that the troops shall, besides their oath of allegiance to the General States, take a particular oath to the province and town in which they are stationed."

"That the General States shall not conclude any peace or truce, nor undertake any war, nor impose any taxes, without the consent of the majority of all the provinces and towns of the union; and that on the other hand, no town or province shall enter into any alliance with any foreign prince or power, without consent of the generality."

“That in case any prince or state shall incline to accede to this alliance, he may be admitted, with the consent of all the members of the confederacy.”

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“That all the male inhabitants of the provinces, from the age of eighteen to that of sixty, shall in a month after the publication of the present treaty, inscribe their names in a register to be laid before the General States at their first assembly, to assist them in judging what forces each province is able to furnish.”

“That in order to procure the money necessary for the support of the forces, all the taxes shall be farmed out publicly, to those who shall make the highest offer; and lastly, that the said taxes shall be heightened or lowered according as the General States shall judge the exigencies of the confederacy to require.”

This confederacy was not immediately attended with those advantages which it was designed and calculated to produce. It behoved the religious parties to experience, for some time longer, the mischievous effects of their intemperate zeal and bigotry, before they could live at peace. In several places, the people were still agitated by the most violent animosity against one another. In Bois-le-duc, the protestants and papists took arms, and coming to blows, had several hundreds of their number killed. Soon after this, the protestants, being seized with a sudden panic, abandoned the town to their enemies, who immediately submitted to the Spaniards.

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Violence of
the protest-
ants.

In Antwerp, where the protestant party was the most powerful, the people insulted the popish ecclesiastics, when employed in one of the solemn processions of their religion; and in spite of Matthias and the prince of Orange, who interposed their authority to protect them, they obliged them to leave the city.

Count Eg-
mont's at-
tempt on
Brussels.

These violences, which the reformers, impelled by their religious zeal, exercised in Antwerp and other places, served only more easily to reconcile the catholics to the Spanish government; and contributed not a little to make several of the nobility forsake the party of the States. Among these was count Egmont, son of the great, unfortunate count Egmont. This young nobleman had hitherto distinguished himself by his zeal against the Spaniards; but resolving now to make his peace with them, he attempted, with a regiment of Walloons, to render himself master of Brussels, in order to deliver it to Farnese; and he succeeded so far in his design, as to get possession of one of the gates, and introduce his troops into the city. The citizens ran instantly to arms; and, being joined by some regular forces in the service of the States, they quickly recovered the gate by a singular stratagem. Having driven violently towards it, some waggons loaded with hay and straw, they set fire to these combustible materials, and the wind blowing the flame and smoke towards count Egmont's soldiers, they were soon obliged to betake themselves to flight. The whole inhabitants had, in the mean time, got under arms, and Egmont, with the rest

of his men, was shut up in the market place, hemmed in on every side, and without any prospect of deliverance. There they remained during that day and the night following; neither of the two parties being inclined to begin hostilities. The citizens meanwhile indulged their resentment, by reproaching the count with his treachery, in forsaking those who had taken arms to revenge his father's death; calling out to him, that only eleven years before, on the same day of the year, and in the very place where he then stood, his father had died a martyr for that cause, which *he* now wanted so basely to betray. This bitter remembrance drew tears from the young man's eyes. The people were moved with that compassion for the son, which they owed to the memory of the father, and consented to suffer him and his troops to leave the town⁹.

During the course of these transactions, conferences for reconciling the Netherlands to Philip were held in the city of Cologne, at the request and under the mediation of the emperor, the pope, and the electors of Treves and Cologne. The pope sent thither Castagna, archbishop of Rossano, who afterwards attained the papal dignity, and assumed the name of Urban VII. The chief of the emperor's embassy was count Schwartzzenburgh. Philip named the duke de Terra Nuova for his ambassador, and the duke d'Arfchot was at the head of the deputies from the States. From this nomination of persons of so great eminence and distinction, superficial

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Conferences
for peace at
Cologne.

⁹ Grotius, p. 64. Meteren, book ix. p. 250.

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observers were apt to imagine, that the negociation committed to them could not fail to be brought to the desired conclusion. But this was not the judgment of persons of greater penetration. They considered, not only that the prince of Orange, and the other popular leaders, by whom the States were governed, had already gone too far to expect forgiveness from the unrelenting temper of the king; but that the opinions of the reformers were more widely diffused, and their zeal, if possible, more ardent than ever. And as there was no reason to believe that they would ever be persuaded to abandon their religion, so there was little ground to hope that Philip's bigotry would suffer him to agree to any terms of peace, whilst they adhered to it. It was in reality this cause chiefly, by which the present negociation, as well as all preceding ones, was frustrated. Philip acted on this occasion with his usual duplicity, and gave private instructions to his ambassador, of a very different import from those which had been communicated to the emperor^{1°}. At first, he seemed willing to ratify the pacification of Ghent; and by one of the articles of that treaty, religion was to remain on its present footing, till a general assembly of the States should alter it. But in the course of the conferences it appeared, that the re-establishment of popery was a condition, without which he would agree to no accommodation. Neither would he consent to the convoking of the assembly of the States, nor to the ratifying of

^{1°} Strada, lib. v.

the election of Matthias; and he still insisted peremptorily, that all cities, forts, and military stores, should be immediately delivered into the hands of the prince of Parma. In a word, the terms offered on this occasion were, in every material article, the same with those which had been formerly rejected by the provinces of Holland and Zealand, when they stood alone, and unsupported by the other provinces; and therefore it is difficult to suppose that Philip could, from the beginning, have intended any thing by the present negociation, but to gratify the pope and emperor, at whose desire it was begun.

Before the dissolution of this congress, however, he humbled himself so far as to make private offers to the prince of Orange. These were the payment of his debts, the restitution of his estates, a compensation for the losses which he had sustained during the war, and the liberty of his son the count of Buren, upon whom, if the prince himself should incline to retire into Germany, the king promised to bestow the government of Holland and Utrecht. These offers were made in Philip's name by count Schwartzzenburgh, who pledged his faith for the strict performance of them. William could not but be flattered with the testimony which was thus given, by an enemy so great and powerful, of the dread that was entertained of his abilities. But being superior to the allurements of interest, he preferred the glory of saving from slavery a people who confided in his integrity, to all the advantages which he or his family could

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Philip attempts to gain over the prince of Orange.

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have derived from the favor or forgiveness of the king. "He would listen to no proposal," he said, "that related to himself only. He was conscious, that in all his conduct, he had been animated by a disinterested affection towards the public good; and no consideration would induce him to enter into any agreement, from which the States and people were excluded: but if *their* just claims were satisfied, he would not reject any terms for himself, which his conscience and honor would suffer him to accept¹¹."

Dissolution
of the con-
gress.

Soon after this, the congress was dissolved; and no other effect was produced by it, except that the duke d'Arfchot, and some other deputies of the States, embraced the opportunity, with which it furnished them, of reconciling themselves to the king.

The negociation for peace did not entirely interrupt the operations of the war. By the assistance of the catholic inhabitants, the prince of Parma acquired possession of Mechlin; and some time afterwards of Villebroek. These losses were compensated to the States, by some acquisitions which their forces made under the count of Renneberg; who, besides reducing the province of Friesland, made himself master of Deventer and Groningen. In the southern provinces, the Flemings and Walloons were engaged in perpetual hostilities against one another, but no exploit was performed by either party, sufficiently interesting and important to deserve to be recorded.

¹¹ Reidanus, p. 29. Grotius, p. 66.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

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DURING the course of the preceding transactions in the Netherlands, Philip was assiduously employed in preparing to assert his claim to the kingdom of Portugal, an object fitted to inflame a more moderate ambition than that of Philip, and worthy of all the attention and expense which he bestowed in order to acquire it. Under a succession of kings, who placed their glory in promoting commerce among their subjects, and in making discoveries in the remotest regions of the globe, the Portuguese had attained a degree of consideration among the European nations, from which the narrow limits of the kingdom, and the neighbourhood of the Spanish monarchy, seemed for ever to exclude them. Besides establishing settlements in Africa, and the adjacent islands, they had doubled the Cape of Good Hope, which no

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European mariners had ever attempted, and had penetrated boldly into almost every corner of the great eastern ocean, discovering lands till then unknown, and founding cities, with a view to the advancement of their trade. And not satisfied with their acquisitions in the east, they had turned their arms towards America, and planted in Brasil, that valuable colony, of which they still retain possession.

Don Sebastian.

John the third, the last of those great kings under whose government the Portuguese performed such mighty achievements, died several years before the present period leaving his throne to Sebastian, his grandson, who was then only three years old. This young prince gave early indications of many splendid accomplishments, which excited in the minds of the Portuguese the most sanguine hopes of a prosperous and happy reign; but unfortunately for himself, as well as for his people, he was animated with the most chimerical ambition, which led him not to imitate the example of his illustrious ancestors, by studying to promote the true happiness of his subjects, but prompted him to extend his dominions, in order to propagate the Romish faith.

His romantic ambition.

This passion was cherished in him by Don Alexis de Menezes, his governor, and Lewis de Camarra, a jesuit, his tutor or instructor; the former of whom was perpetually celebrating the praises of his predecessors, on account of their victories over the Moors in Africa and the Indies; while the latter impressed his young mind with a

persuasion, that it was the first duty of a Christian king, and the most acceptable service which he could perform to the Deity, to extend the knowledge of the true religion. By these means, his ambition was inflamed to a degree of madness; and, in order to accomplish that design which appeared so meritorious and honorable, he once resolved to sail with a fleet and army to India; nor could his courtiers persuade him to relinquish that romantic project, till they proposed that, in place of it, he should undertake an expedition against the Mahometans in Africa. From this enterprise likewise his wisest counsellors labored with much solicitude to divert him; but their exhortations proved ineffectual. Sebastian adhered to his purpose with inflexible obstinacy, and exerted himself with great activity, in making preparations for carrying it into execution.

In the midst of these preparations an opportunity presented itself, which he considered as a declaration of Heaven in favor of his design. On the death of Abdalla, king of Morocco, his son, Muley Mahomet, had seized upon the crown, in contradiction to an established law of succession, that the kingdom shall devolve to the brother of the deceased king. A civil war ensued, and Mahomet, after having lost several pitched battles, was compelled to leave his uncle, Muley-Moluc, a prince of great abilities and virtues, in possession of the throne. After attempting in vain to engage Philip to espouse his cause, Mahomet applied to Sebastian, and offered, if he would reinstate

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Sebastian re-
solves to in-
vade Mo-
rocco.

him in his dominions, to put certain towns into his hands, and to become tributary to the crown of Portugal.

Sebastian listened to these offers with the utmost pleasure, and readily engaged to pass over himself to Africa with a fleet and army.

To enable him to fulfil this engagement, he solicited assistance in troops from his uncle the king of Spain, from some Italian powers, and (which shows how anxious he was to insure success) from the prince of Orange.

In answer to the application which he made to Philip, that monarch proposed an interview with him, in the town of Guadaloupe in Castile. Sebastian agreed to this proposal; and the Spanish historians relate, that, in the interview which was held soon afterwards, Philip endeavoured to dissuade him from his intended enterprise; but that, having found him inflexible, he promised, before they parted, to assist him with fifty galleys and five thousand men. They add, that not long after, Philip, dreading that the great number of Turks in the service of Muley-Moluc, might reduce Morocco under the dominion of the Sultan, made an offer of his friendship to that prince, who, being likewise under apprehensions of danger from the Turks, gladly accepted of it, and entered into the proposed alliance. The same historians inform us, that about this time Philip obtained, through the intercession of the Venetians, a truce of three years from the Sultan; and that he was prompted to humble himself so far, as thus to treat
with

with the inveterate enemies of Christianity, (which he had never vouchsafed to do before) by the anxiety which he entertained with regard to the transactions in the Netherlands ¹.

The prince of Orange was not less anxious concerning the issue of these transactions, yet his conduct was extremely different from that of Philip; whether it proceeded from his native magnanimity, joined with a desire of giving proof, in the sight of all Europe, of the strength of the confederated provinces, or from the hopes of securing Sebastian's friendship to the confederacy in some future period; by whichever of these motives William was influenced on this occasion, he gave the kindest reception to Da Costa, the Portuguese ambassador, and afterwards sent three thousand Germans to the assistance of Sebastian ².

These troops, with ten thousand Portuguese, and some Italians and Spaniards that were sent him by Philip, notwithstanding his late treaty with Muley-Moluc, made up an army of fifteen thousand men. With this army, and a great number of pioneers, Sebastian set sail from Portugal, in the beginning of summer 1578, and landed them all safe at Arzile and Tangiers, where he was joined by Mahomet, the exiled king, with a body of Moorish troops. His army.

He arrives in
Morocco.

Muley-Moluc, having received early intelligence of his design, had endeavoured to divert

Muley-
Moluc.

¹ Ferreras, vol. x. p. 306. 312. ² Thuanus.

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him from it, by offering him certain territories adjacent to those sea-coast towns in Africa which belonged to the crown of Portugal. This heroic prince had been the more sollicitous to prevent Sebastian's invasion, because he labored under an inveterate disease, which he believed would soon prove mortal, and he was desirous to leave his dominions in peace to his brother, whom he considered as his rightful heir. But when he found Sebastian deaf to his proposal, he had exerted all his native vigor in preparing for his defence, and had drawn together an army consisting of more than sixty thousand horse and foot.

With this army he advanced towards the enemy, and when he had arrived within a few miles of their camp, as he doubted the fidelity of a part of his troops who had formerly been attached to the interest of his nephew, he published a proclamation, giving liberty to all, who should incline, to pass over to the Portuguese. But few of them embraced this opportunity which was offered them. His magnanimity, and other virtues, had overcome their attachment to Mahomet, and determined them faithfully to support their present sovereign.

Imprudence
of Sebastian.

Sebastian was earnestly entreated by his most experienced officers, and by Mahomet, who was greatly discouraged at seeing so small a desertion from his uncle's army, to keep within his intrenchments, near the sea-coast, and not to expose his troops to the risk of a battle; but that obstinate, imprudent prince rejected with disdain this

wholesome counsel, because he thought that it favored of timidity, and not only led out his army from the camp which he had fortified, but marched into the centre of the country to meet the enemy.

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Moluc's distemper, in the mean time, had made the most rapid progress; yet the strength of his mind was unabated. If he had not dreaded the quick approach of death, he would have been satisfied with cutting off Sebastian's communication with his ships, and as the Portuguese were badly furnished with provisions, have brought the war to a conclusion without fighting; but he dreaded the effect which his death might produce upon his troops, and therefore resolved to bring on, as soon as possible, a general engagement. Sebastian's rashness rendered it easy for him to execute this resolution. Without regard to the great superiority of Moluc's forces, that infatuated prince ventured to advance into an open country, where the whole Moorish army, horse as well as foot, could be employed. Moluc improved, with great dexterity, the advantage which was thus afforded him. Having drawn up his army in the form of a half-moon, he went in his litter through all the ranks, exhorting his troops to remember, that their religion and liberty were at stake; and assuring them, that whatever pretext Sebastian had offered to justify his present unprovoked invasion, his real design was, to reduce the Moors to slavery, and to extirpate their religion. Then, after he had given all the instructions which he thought necessary to ensure success,

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Alcazar.

finding his strength almost quite spent, he committed the command of the army to his brother, and retired to a little distance from the field.

The battle was begun with a furious discharge of the artillery; but the two armies came soon to close fight, and the Portuguese infantry repulsed the Moors in different places with great slaughter. In the mean time the Moorish cavalry, amounting to thirty thousand, having wheeled round from both wings, had inclosed the enemy on every quarter; immediately after which, they attacked them on the flanks, and in the rear, while they were pursuing the advantage which they had gained over the Moorish infantry. By the Portuguese horse, a body of the Moors were repulsed, and driven towards the place to which Moluc had retired. Fired with indignation at the fight, he threw himself out of his litter, and having got on horseback, by the assistance of his attendants, he rallied his flying troops, and was about to lead them back to the field of battle. But by this exertion the small remains of his strength were entirely exhausted. His officers seeing him unable to support himself on his horse; carried him to his litter, where he fainted, and only recovered to desire that those about him would keep his death secret, till the battle should be decided; immediately after which, putting his finger on his mouth, as a further injunction of secrecy, he expired.

Death of
Muley-
Moluc.

His character.

A more striking display of strength of mind occurs not in the annals of history. Moluc was

besides endued with every amiable and respectable accomplishment, being no less conspicuous for justice and generosity, and (which are rare endowments in a native of Africa) integrity and candor, than for prudence, vigor, magnanimity, and fortitude. By his bravery and conduct he delivered his kingdom from the oppression of a tyrannical usurper; and if he had lived, he would have advanced it to a degree of prosperity and glory to which it has never attained.

His troops remained under a persuasion, that he was still a witness of their behaviour. Great numbers of them fell. The Portuguese, the Spaniards, and Germans, fought with the most undaunted intrepidity; but the horse being driven upon the foot, broke their ranks, and threw them into confusion. The Moorish cavalry then pressed forward in thousands on every side, and made dreadful havoc among them, till almost all of them were either slain or taken prisoners.

Sebastian himself, who still survived the fatal catastrophe, had, in the arrangement of his troops, and in the beginning of the engagement, acted the part of an expert commander; and he gave afterwards many conspicuous proofs of the most heroic valor, flying from rank to rank, encouraging and exhorting his troops; exposing himself to every danger; and often mingling sword in hand with the thickest of the enemy. Having had three horses killed under him, and his standard-bearer slain, his soldiers, in the confusion of battle, mistook another standard for his, which

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they flocked round, and left their king almost alone. The Moors called out to him, that if he would surrender, they would spare his life; "But you cannot," he replied, "preserve my honor." Then accompanied only by the count of Vimioso, Christopher Tavora, and Nunno de Mascaregnas, he threw himself into the midst of the enemy, and fought desperately, till Vimioso and Tavora fell by his side, and he himself, breathless and exhausted, and unable any longer to wield his sword, was seized, and disarmed by the surrounding Moors.

Death of
Sebastian.

These men quarrelled with one another concerning their royal prisoner, and from words they had recourse to arms; when a Moorish officer coming up, put an end to the dispute, by discharging a furious stroke of his sabre on the head of the king³.

In this manner perished the brave, but rash Sebastian; whose fate affords a striking instance of the pernicious tendency of courage and ambition, when they are not tempered with prudence and moderation. About eight thousand of his troops were killed, and all the rest, except a few who escaped to Arzile and Tangiers, were reduced to slavery. Of the nobility, the greatest

³ This account of Sebastian's death rests entirely on the testimony of Don Nunno de Mascaregnas, who was an eye-witness; nor did de Thou think there was any reason for calling it in question; though some other authors insinuate, that Sebastian laid violent hands upon himself.

part were slain; and several of the most illustrious families in Portugal became extinct *.

Don Henry, grand uncle of Sebastian, a cardinal and a priest, succeeded to the throne; but being of a weak and sickly constitution, and far advanced in years, there was little probability, either that he would live long, or that he would leave any issue behind him: and his short reign served only to give the several pretenders to his kingdom an opportunity of preparing to assert their claims to the succession.

The candidates were seven in number: the dutchess of Braganza, the king of Spain, the duke of Savoy, Don Antonio prior of Crato, the duke of Parma, Catherine of Medicis, and the fovereign pontiff.

Candidates
for the suc-
cession.

The four first were grand-children of Emanuel the Great, father of Henry. The dutchess of Braganza was daughter of prince Edward, Emanuel's second son; Philip was son of the empress Isabella, his eldest daughter; the duke of Savoy, of Beatrix his younger daughter; and Don Antonio was a natural son of Lewis, who was a younger son of Emanuel, and brother to the present king. The duke of Parma was great grandson of Emanuel, by a daughter of the above-mentioned prince Edward. The queen-mother of France founded her claim on her supposed

* Mahomet, the exiled king, was drowned in attempting to make his escape; and Hamet, Muley-Moluc's brother, succeeded to the throne of Fez and Morocco.

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descent from Alphonso III. who died about three hundred years before the present period; and the pope pretended that Portugal was feudatory to the see of Rome, and belonged to him, since the male-heirs in the direct line were extinct. Gregory had conceived a violent desire to make his natural son a king, and he had once flattered himself with the hopes of making him king of Ireland, through the assistance of Philip. But as it is inconceivable how he could ever expect to persuade Philip to quit *his* claim, so nothing but folly or dotage could have determined him to prosecute his own, in opposition to so powerful an antagonist.

The pretensions of Catherine of Medicis, and her hopes of success, if she ever entertained any, were not less chimerical than those of the pope. It can hardly be believed, that this political princess could, in her present competition, have any other end in view, but to obstruct the ambitious designs of Philip, and to furnish the court of France with a pretence for opposing him.

From the dukes of Savoy and Parma, Philip knew that he should not meet with opposition; since, besides that his claim was better founded than theirs, these princes were in close alliance with him, and depended much upon his support and protection. Could Don Antonio have proved his mother's marriage, his right to the throne would have been unquestionable. He attempted to prove it, but in vain. Still, however, he persisted in his purpose, and with some address and

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great activity, he gained over a considerable party among the people. Most of the nobility, on the other hand, and the king himself, who knew the vanity of Antonio's pretensions to legitimacy, were inclined to support the claim of the dutchess of Braganza⁵; whose right, they thought, was clearly preferable to that of Philip, not only because she was descended from Emanuel by a male, and Philip by a female; but because an ancient and fundamental law required, that the crown should not be inherited by a stranger.

Philip's title

Philip's agents at the court of Lisbon allowed, that if the dutchess of Braganza's father had been alive, his title would have been indisputable; but they maintained, that since he had died without attaining possession of the throne, nothing but the degree of consanguinity to Emanuel ought to be regarded; and that as the dutchess and he were equal in that respect, the preference was due to a male before a female. And they farther insisted, that the law which excludes strangers from inheriting the crown, was not applicable to *him*, since Portugal had formerly belonged to the kings of Castile.

Besides these considerations, which had very little weight, except with those who were for other reasons inclined to espouse Philip's interest, the duke de Ossuna, his ambassador, endeavoured to impress the scrupulous and timid mind of Henry with a persuasion, that, in opposition to so

⁵ The duke of Braganza himself was sprung, though not in a direct line, from the royal blood.

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powerful a competitor as the king of Spain, it would be impossible for the duke of Braganza to maintain possession of the throne; and that the fruits of all the glorious discoveries and conquests which had been made by his father and brother would be lost, and the kingdom itself involved in the calamities of war.

Don Henry
discusses the
claims of the
competitors.

Henry's desire to prevent these unhappy consequences, determined him to proceed with great deliberation in examining the pleas of the contending parties. He consulted civilians in different parts of Europe, and called a convention of the States of the kingdom, to give him their opinion with respect to the measures proper to be pursued. The members of the convention differed widely in their sentiments from each other, and while some of them advised him, without delay, to nominate for his successor whichever of the competitors he thought fit, others exhorted him deliberately to examine the several claims that had been offered. In compliance with this last advice the candidates were cited to appear; and they all sent commissioners, who pleaded the cause of the princes whom they represented, before Henry, as they would have pleaded any ordinary point of right before a civil judge.

Henry's deliberations.

This extraordinary trial, in which so great attention seemed to be paid to justice, was suited to the feeble and irresolute character, as well as to the habits of the king, who had spent his life in listening to the idle disputes of theologians. But his conduct was severely censured by all men of

prudence and understanding. They considered that the fate of kingdoms can almost never be decided by the forms or principles of law; and they regarded this farcical trial, not only as useless for the purpose which was intended, but as calculated to divide the kingdom into factions, which must sooner or later produce a civil war.

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He ought in the beginning, it was said, to have declared himself in favor of the dutchess of Braganza, whose right, according to the most common and obvious law of succession, was unquestionable; and who, besides, was much more acceptable to the nation, than any other of the candidates. He ought, after this, to have caused her right to be recognised by the convention of the States, who would cheerfully have consented to acknowledge it; he ought to have required an oath of allegiance to her, in the event of his own demise, from the army, and all persons in public offices; and then, instead of losing his valuable time in consulting and deliberating, he ought to have employed it, in putting the kingdom into a posture of defence against the king of Spain.

His imprudence.

But Henry was incapable of forming any resolution that required so much courage, vigor, and activity. He was no less attached to the dutchess of Braganza, and no less averse from Philip, than his nobility and people; yet he still continued to hesitate between them with as much deliberation as if he had expected to live for many years.

In order to extricate himself from this perplexity, Henry began to think seriously of a proposal,

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which had been made to him by some of his counsellors, to marry; and accordingly, notwithstanding his great age, his infirmities, and his having borne so long the character of a priest, he sent an ambassador to solicit a dispensation from the pope. There was little probability of his living to fulfil his intention, and much less of his leaving any issue behind him; yet Philip, being greatly alarmed at his design, sent Ferdinand de Castello, a Dominican friar, to dissuade him from it, by reminding him of the offence which his marriage would give to all true catholics, and the triumph it would afford to the Lutherans, and other sectaries of the age: and when Henry refused to admit Castello to an audience, a circumstance that furnished Philip with a stronger proof of Henry's alienation from him, than any which he had hitherto received, he employed all his interest at Rome, to prevent the pope from granting the dispensation.

Philip's manifesto.

In the mean time he spared no pains to conciliate the favor of the principal nobility; and having spread his emissaries over the kingdom, he published a manifesto, in vindication of his title, calling upon the people to turn their eyes towards *him*, as the only person who would have a right to the throne after the decease of the present king. This manifesto, while it incensed Henry more than ever against him, served in no degree the purpose for which it was designed. The Portuguese entertained the thoughts of falling under the dominion of the Castilians with an

hereditary and violent aversion; and there was nothing in the character of Philip by which their prejudice could be overcome.

If Henry had availed himself of this disposition of his subjects, and acknowledged the dutchess of Braganza for his successor, almost the whole kingdom would have concurred to support her claim; and so great a force might have been prepared, as, with the assistance of foreign powers, would have either determined Philip to abandon his design, or have prevented him from carrying it into execution. But as the duke and dutchess of Braganza were deterred from exerting themselves, by their dread of Philip, and the weak irresolute conduct of the king; so Henry still flattered himself with the vain conceit, that Philip, as well as the other competitors, would submit to his decision.

Towards his nephew, Henry acted with much less hesitation and reserve, than towards the other candidates. Having obtained a bull from the pope, empowering him to judge of Antonio's claim to legitimacy, he examined the witnesses whom Antonio produced to prove his mother's marriage; and, having extorted from two of them a confession of their having been suborned, while the other two contradicted each other in delivering their evidence, Henry, on this foundation, joined with the circumstance of the prior's being mentioned by his father in his latter will as his natural son, passed sentence, declaring him to be illegitimate.

Don Antonio
declared illegitimate.

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Antonio had influence afterwards to persuade the pope to recal his bull, on the pretence of the king's having exceeded his powers. By this treatment Henry was highly exasperated both against the pope and Don Antonio; and he indulged his resentment against the latter, by banishing him first from the court, and afterwards from the kingdom. In obedience to this sentence, Antonio retired for some time into Castile; but he soon returned, and found, that his uncle's conduct towards him had not produced that effect upon the people which Henry had expected. Their attachment to the prior remained as strong as ever; and, as no pains were taken to form a party in the interest of the dutchess of Braganza, great numbers of the people were entirely devoted to him, and regarded him as their only resource against the tyranny of Spain.

Philip's military preparations.

From this disposition of the people, together with the activity which Antonio displayed in augmenting the number of his partisans, Philip perceived that he must not satisfy himself with arguments, manifestos, and private applications to individuals, but must resolve to support his claim by force of arms. Agreeably to this resolution, he issued orders for levying troops in Spain, Italy, and Germany; and gave instructions to the marquis de Santa Croce to hold the fleet in readiness for action. He was aware how much reason he had to expect opposition from several of the European powers; and, in order to prevent them from being alarmed, he caused a report to be

propagated, that, having entered lately into an alliance with the new king of Morocco, his present military preparations were intended for an expedition which he had agreed to undertake, in conjunction with that monarch, against Algiers. This pretext served the purpose which he designed; and neither the king of France, nor the queen of England, nor any Italian or German prince, seemed to attend to his operations.

In the mean time Henry's health declined daily, and all about him perceived that his death was fast approaching. He appeared now more desirous than ever to have his successor fixed; and having for this purpose summoned the States to meet at Almerin, he seems to have resolved to declare himself either in favor of the king of Spain, or the dutchess of Braganza, according as he should find the one or the other of these competitors most acceptable to the States. But the members of this assembly could not agree. Most of the nobility and ecclesiastics had, by different means, been gained over to the interest of Philip, while the deputies of the cities were animated with the most irreconcilable aversion to his person and government.

In the midst of their deliberations and disputes the king died, leaving the nomination of his successor to five persons, to whom he committed the regency of the kingdom.

Death of
Henry, Jan.
31st, 1588.

The first act of the administration of the regents was to send ambassadors to Philip, to dissuade him from having recourse to arms, till, according to

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the will of the late king, they should deliver their judgment concerning his right to the succession. But to this request, Philip, whose preparations were now complete, gave the following reply: "That his right was clear and indisputable; that he would not submit it either to the regents, or to the States, and that he did not desire to have any judgment whatever passed in confirmation of it."

By this answer the regents were thrown into great perplexity. A majority of them stood well affected towards Philip; but they were prevented from declaring in his favor, by their dread of the indignation of the people, and were obliged to issue orders for equipping the fleet, and strengthening the fortifications and garrisons of the frontier towns. But the great exertion which had been made lately by Sebastian, and the exhausted state to which the kingdom had been reduced, by the numberless expeditions to India and America, from which no fruit had been yet derived, sufficient to compensate either for the expense which they had cost, or the loss of men which they had occasioned, rendered it impossible for the regents, if they had been ever so much inclined, to secure the kingdom against so great a force as the Spanish monarch had prepared.

Philip's fleet
and army.

His army, including four thousand pioneers, amounted to thirty-five thousand men, and his fleet consisted of thirty men of war, seventeen frigates, and seventy gallies and ships of burden loaded with provisions and military stores. It was not likely that so great a fleet and army would

would find employment in subduing a kingdom so ill prepared for defence, and so much weakened by intestine divisions, as Portugal at the present period. But, besides that Philip was from natural temper, generally cautious to excess in his military enterprises, it should seem that, in the present case, he regarded the importance of the prize more than the difficulty of attaining it; unless it be supposed, that he still had reason to apprehend that the French and English would interpose.

He gave the command of the fleet to the marquis of Santa Croce, who was reckoned the ablest naval officer in Spain. But he hesitated for some time with regard to the person whom he should place at the head of his land forces. His hesitation, however, did not proceed from any doubt which he entertained with regard to the merit and abilities of his generals. For the duke of Alva was still alive; whom Philip knew to be possessed of every qualification requisite to secure the success of his intended enterprise.

Alva, upon his return from the Netherlands, had been admitted by Philip to the same degree of favor and confidence which he had formerly enjoyed. But his son, Don Garcia de Toledo, having debauched one of the maids of honor, under a promise of marriage, Philip had put him under arrest, and given orders that he should not be released till he should consent to fulfil his engagement: notwithstanding which, his father had assisted him in making his escape; and, in order effectually to disappoint the king's intention, had

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Commanded
by Santa
Croce,

and the duke
of Alva.

B O O K concluded a marriage between him and his cousin,
 XVI. a daughter of the marquis of Villena.

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Philip, highly provoked with this contempt of his authority, had banished the duke from court, and confined him to the castle of Uzeda. Alva bore this indignity with extreme impatience, and persuaded the pope, and some other foreign princes, to employ their intercession in his behalf; but all his applications for forgiveness had hitherto been ineffectual, and he had remained almost two years in confinement. This severity, exercised, for so small an offence, towards an old friend and servant, in the decline of life, was by some ascribed to Philip's imperious temper, and his implacable resentment; whilst others said, that he had been long disgusted with Alva's arrogance; and that the duke's conduct in the affair of his son, was only a pretence which Philip made use of, to justify himself for dismissing from his presence a man whose temper and manners were become intolerable.

To whichever of these motives Philip's treatment of Alva could be ascribed, it was expected, that neither his pride, nor his natural suspicion and distrust, would have suffered him to commit the charge of an enterprise of so great importance as the present, to one towards whom he had shown himself so inexorable; and it excited great surprise, when he sent two of his secretaries to the duke, to inquire whether his health would permit him to undertake the command of the army which he had prepared for the conquest of Portugal. To this inquiry, Alva, without hesitation, replied,

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that he was ready to devote the little health and strength that were left him to the service of the king, and immediately afterwards he set out for Barajas to receive his instructions. He desired liberty to pay his respects to Philip at Madrid. But so ungracious was this prince even towards such of his ministers as he esteemed the most, and so incapable of entirely forgiving any offence or injury, that he refused to grant him admittance into his presence; and, having transmitted his instructions to him at Barajas, he ordered him to join the army as soon as possible. Those who remembered the barbarous cruelty which Alva had exercised in the Netherlands, were not sorry for the mortification which he suffered on the present occasion; but they could not withhold the tribute of applause which was due to him, on account of that inflexible fidelity so becoming in a subject towards his sovereign, which determined him, in the extremity of old age, to expose himself to all the hazards and hardships of war, in order to advance the interest of a prince by whom he had been treated so ungratefully.

From Barajas, Alva went, as soon as he had received his instructions, to join the troops, which were assembled at Badajoz; and soon afterwards he began his march towards Elvas and Olivença. These, and all the other towns which lie north from the Tagus, as far as Setubal, on the western coast, though extremely averse to the Spanish government, yet being utterly unprepared for

March of the
Spanish
troops.
June.

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Progress of
the Spanish
arms.

resistance, opened their gates, and proclaimed Philip for their sovereign.

The marquis de Santa Croce, who had set sail with the fleet from Port St. Mary, near Cadiz, found the same facility in reducing Faro, Lagos, and other towns on the coast of Algarva and Antejo; and he came in sight of Setubal, in a few days after the arrival of the land forces at that place.

Hitherto almost no blood had been shed, and neither the fleet nor army had met with any opposition to retard their progress. The duke of Alva intended next to march without delay to the capital, but it was necessary, he thought to proceed now with greater circumspection than before, as Don Antonio had drawn together a considerable body of forces, had been admitted into Lisbon, where he was proclaimed king by the people, and had strengthened several of the towns and forts by which the Spanish army must pass in their approach to that city.

Three ways of reaching Lisbon were proposed in a council of war that was held on this occasion. One of these was to cross the Tagus, some miles above the city, at the towns of Almerin and Santaren; another, to send round the fleet to Almada, and to put the troops on board at that place, which lies almost directly opposite to Lisbon; and the third, to carry the army round by sea from Setubal to Cascaes. The two first of these ways were thought preferable to the last, by most of the officers, because they were safer; yet the last was

embraced by the duke of Alva. He acknowledged the justness of what his officers advanced in support of their opinion, but he observed, that, as the fleet was at hand, the army could be immediately put on board; that the passage to Cascaes was not long, and that, as the enemy were ill prepared for their defence, his success would be greatly facilitated by the celerity of his approach.

Alva was not disappointed in his expectation of the effect which his sudden arrival was calculated to produce upon the Portuguese. They were drawn up along the shore, as if they had intended to dispute his landing; but no sooner had the ships begun to fire upon them, than they retired, and suffered him to land, and put his men in order, without giving him the smallest molestation. They might still have obstructed his approach to Cascaes, as his road thither lay over a hill, defended with a battery of cannon, and full of rugged rocks and brambles, of which Don Diego de Menezes, commander in chief of the Portuguese under Don Antonio, had taken possession with between three and four thousand men. Alva ordered the Spaniards to attack them, without being deterred, either by the strength of the ground, or the number of the enemy. An old experienced officer, of the name of Bariettos, an intimate friend of Alva's, asked him in a whisper, Whether his attempting, with so little precaution, to dislodge an enemy so strongly situated, did not resemble the action of an ardent young warrior, rather than that of an experienced general? Alva smiled, and replied,

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That a good general ought on some occasions to employ the prudence and circumspection of old age, and in others, the ardor and confidence of youth. The event showed that his conduct, though apparently rash, was well adapted to the present circumstances. The Spaniards, inspired with their general's confidence, advanced boldly, and the Portuguese (almost all of whom were raw and undisciplined) retreated, without waiting for their approach.

Alva laid siege immediately afterwards to the town and castle of Cascaes, and by the briskness of his operations he soon compelled the garrison to surrender. But on this occasion he sullied that renown which his wisdom and vigor would have procured him, by the cruelty which he exercised towards such of the Portuguese as had thrown themselves upon his mercy. In violation of his promise to Don Antonio de Castro, lord of Cascaes, who had joined him upon his first arrival in the kingdom, he gave up the town to be plundered by the Spaniards, and having sent all the soldiers in the garrison to the gallies, he put to death, without any form of trial, Don Diego de Meneses, a nobleman of an illustrious family, and one who, on account of his personal merit, was universally respected and beloved. To this barbarity Alva was prompted by private resentment against Meneses^e; although, it may be presumed, that he would not have ventured to indulge it on the present occasion,

^e Thuanus, l. lxx. c. x.

if he had not known that his conduct was conformable to the sentiments of the king. It was calculated to inspire the Portuguese with terror, but it served likewise more than ever to alienate their affections; and considering how much superior the Spanish fleet and army were to any force which had been prepared to oppose them, it could not be colored with the tyrant's ordinary plea of necessity,

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From the town of Cascaes, Alva led his army against the forts of St. John and Belen, both which he soon reduced to the necessity of surrendering; and being seconded in his operations by the fleet, the example of these places was quickly followed by Almada, and almost all the other fortified places on both sides of the river.

During these transactions Don Antonio, after having, from a consciousness of the weakness of his party, essayed in vain to obtain advantageous terms from Philip, had pitched his camp, with all the forces which he could collect, on the east side of the river of Alcantara, on the road to Lisbon.

Don Antonio.

Alva amused him for several days with the hopes of an accommodation, in order to afford time for the operation of a spirit of despondency that prevailed in Antonio's army. Meanwhile he omitted not to procure the most accurate information concerning the situation and strength of his camp; and, on the 25th of August, he resolved to attack it. Before he could approach the intrenchments, it was necessary that he should make himself master of the bridge of Alcantara,

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or lead his army to a considerable distance up the river, the banks of which were so steep and rugged, as rendered it impossible to transport either horse or foot in sight of the enemy. Having drawn up his main army in order of battle, directly opposite to the Portuguese camp, he sent the horse under his son Ferdinand de Toledo, and two thousand select infantry, under Sancho d'Avila, to cross the river several miles higher, where the banks were practicable, whilst he ordered Colonna, with the Italians, to make an assault upon the bridge.

Colonna's troops were twice repulsed, but in the third onset, being supported by a body of Germans, which the duke sent to their assistance, they drove the Portuguese before them, and secured possession of the bridge.

Defeat of
the Portu-
guese under
Antonio.

Soon afterwards Toledo and d'Avila appeared. The Portuguese, astonished at the sight of them, and dreading that their communication with the city might be intercepted, threw down their arms after a short resistance, and betook themselves to flight. The Spaniards pursued, and slew between two and three thousand before they could reach the town.

Don Antonio, who displayed on this occasion neither fortitude nor conduct, had fled with his troops to Lisbon. There he knew that he could not long remain in safety, as, besides the insufficiency of the fortifications, the magistrates, and many of the inhabitants, were disaffected to his interest; and therefore, immediately after releasing

all the prisoners in the city (a poor expedient to recruit his ruined army) he set out, attended by the count de Vimioso, and the bishop of la Guarda, two of his most zealous friends and partisans, with a small number of troops, for the town of Santaren.

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The magistrates of Lisbon did not hesitate a moment in resolving to submit to the conqueror, and the town was, immediately after the battle, delivered into his hands. The Portuguese fleet at the same time struck their colors to the marquis de Santa Croce, and received such a number of his Castilians on board as gave him the entire command.

It was now become Philip's interest to provide for the security of Lisbon and its suburbs, as much as for that of any of his towns in Spain; and Alva so far fulfilled his engagement with the magistrates, as to prevent any formidable number of his troops from entering the town; but he gave up the suburbs (which were at that time no less considerable than the town itself) to be ransacked and plundered, without making any distinction between the friends and enemies of the king. He suffered them likewise to pillage the houses of such of the inhabitants within the town as had discovered any attachment to Don Antonio, and he allowed parties to go out and plunder all the country and villages in the neighbourhood. A Spanish historian says, that the soldiers committed these enormities without the duke's permission,

Cruel treatment of the Portuguese.

⁷ Thuanus, l. lxx. c. x.

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yet no punishment was ever inflicted on them, and no restitution was ever made to the many thousand innocent persons, who were involved in the same common ruin with the guilty.

After a conduct so barbarous and impolitic, there was little reason to expect that the people of Lisbon would be able soon to overcome their aversion to the Spanish government. From their dread of Alva's tyranny they took the oath of allegiance which was prescribed to them; and, from the same motive, they witnessed those public rejoicings which he appointed to be celebrated on account of his success; but being unable to conceal the anguish of their minds, the acclamations which they uttered were feeble and languid, and intermixed with sighs and groans.

The duke of Alva's joy, soon after his entrance into Lisbon, was interrupted by intelligence which he received from Spain, that Philip had fallen sick and that his physicians were extremely apprehensive of the issue of his distemper. Alva knew that the king's death, at this crisis, would probably render all his labors and success in Portugal abortive, and therefore he suspended for a while the prosecution of the war.

New prepara-
tions of
Don Antonio.

In this interval Don Antonio exerted himself with great activity, and employed every expedient which he or his partisans could devise to raise another army, flattering himself with the hope of being able to maintain his ground, till the French, or some other foreign power should be persuaded to espouse his cause. In the town of Santaren he

had lately been received by the people as their only rightful sovereign, and every mark of affection and respect had been shown him; yet so great a change had his defeat and flight produced, that they refused to admit him within the town, till he engaged that he should not remain in it beyond a limited time; and, immediately after his departure, they sent ambassadors to the duke of Alva, with an offer of submission.

From Santaren Antonio directed his course northwards, and in the province which lies between the Minho and Douro, he prevailed upon eight or nine thousand of the inhabitants to take up arms. With these tumultuary troops he procured admittance, partly by force and partly by persuasion, first into Aveiro, and afterwards into the city of Oporto; but in both these places he exercised a degree of severity towards those whom he suspected to be his enemies, that was extremely ill calculated to increase the number of his friends.

He remained at Oporto till he was informed that the duke of Alva, being delivered from his anxiety with regard to the king's health, had sent a part of his forces against him, under Sancho D'Avila, who was advancing towards the banks of the Douro with great rapidity. D'Avila had under his command only five or six thousand horse and foot, and Antonio's army consisted of about nine thousand; but from past experience, the latter was deeply sensible of the difference between his undisciplined forces and those of d'Avila, and he was well acquainted with the character of that general;

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who, in the Netherlands, and other places, had given the most conspicuous proofs of military skill and intrepidity. His safety he knew depended on his preventing the Spaniards from crossing the Douro, which, for many miles above Oporto, was so deep and rapid, that without boats they could not attempt to pass it. He exerted himself therefore with diligence in removing the boats and barks from the south side of the river, and planted his troops at different places on the north side, to watch the motions of the enemy.

Progress of
the Spaniards
under d'Avila.

In the mean time d'Avila advanced, and took possession of Villanova, a little town which stands opposite to Oporto. From that place he sent a party of his troops in search of boats; who returned without success: but d'Avila being resolved to omit nothing in his power to accomplish his design, sent them back with orders to pursue their march a great way further up the river, which they did accordingly, and collected about twenty boats, from places at so great a distance from Oporto, that Antonio had judged it unnecessary to remove them. Still, however, most of the Spanish officers thought it impracticable to effectuate their passage with so small a number; and it was impossible to bring them down the river, by reason of certain armed vessels which Antonio kept ready to intercept them. To remedy this inconvenience, d'Avila ordered a part of his troops to march up to the place where the boats lay, and there he transported them, without opposition, to the other side. These troops had time to intrench

themselves, before the enemy received intelligence of their landing; and, under the shelter of their intrenchments, the rest of the forces were immediately carried over in the same way.

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This unexpected success in the beginning of his enterprize, gave d'Avila the highest assurance of victory, and demonstrated how little reason he had to dread the efforts of an enemy, who, on so critical an occasion, had shown themselves so deficient both in courage and vigilance. Their conduct afterwards was such as their negligence and cowardice, in permitting the Spaniards to land in small bodies, one after another, gave reason to expect. D'Avila drove them before him, till, with very little bloodshed, they were entirely routed and dispersed. This active general lost no time in sending a party of horse in pursuit of Don Antonio, who had fled, accompanied by a small number of his partisans, to Viana, a town on the sea-coast near the northern frontier of the kingdom. Upon the approach of the Spaniards to that place, he attempted to make his escape by sea, but was driven back by a violent storm, which overtook him soon after he had embarked. He then dismissed his attendants, and, disguising himself in the dress of a common sailor, eluded the search of his pursuers. Philip had recourse to his favorite weapon, a proscription, and offered a reward of eighty thousand ducats to any person who should deliver him into his hands. Notwithstanding this, so great was the aversion of the Portuguese towards the Castilian government, or such their

Defeat of
Don Antonio.

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attachment to Antonio, that no person was tempted by the proffered reward, either to seize him, or to give information of the place of his retreat. Antonio remained in the country between the Minho and Douro from November till May, living sometimes in the houses of the nobility, and sometimes in monasteries and convents, till he found an opportunity of going by sea to France.

Entire sub-
jection of
Portugal;

After the dispersion of the prior's army, all the towns between the Minho and Douro opened their gates, and submitted to the conqueror. The regents appointed by the late king, had some time before declared themselves for Philip; and the duke of Braganza, who seemed to have despaired from the beginning of being able to assert his wife's title to the throne against so potent an antagonist, had taken the same oath of fidelity and allegiance that was required from others.

and of the
colonies.

The colonies in America, Africa, and the Indies, which belonged to the crown of Portugal, quickly followed the example of the mother-country; nor did Philip find employment for his arms in any part of the Portuguese dominions but the Azores, where Antonio's agents had persuaded the people to proclaim him king. Some troops which were sent against them under an officer of the name of Valdes, were defeated by the governor of Angra. In the following year Antonio obtained from the court of France, a fleet of sixty ships, with about six thousand troops, which he landed on one of the isles called St. Michael; but the marquis of Santa Croce coming upon him with

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a fleet and army much superior to his, obtained a decisive victory over the French both by sea and land, and afterwards reduced all the inhabitants to a state of entire subjection and obedience^s.

The success of Philip's arms, and the great accession of dominion which he had thereby acquired, occasioned much anxiety to the neighbouring powers; and excited in the Dutch and Flemings the most alarming apprehensions. They had with infinite difficulty withstood his efforts, while he was employed in the pursuit of that plan of conquest which he had now carried into execution; and they seemed, at this time, to have much greater reason than ever to dread that they should soon be obliged to submit to whatever terms of peace he should be pleased to prescribe. Yet, as will appear in the sequel, Philip's acquisition of the Portuguese dominions in India served rather to expose him to the assaults of his revolted subjects, than to furnish him with the means of subduing them, and contributed more than any other event to that wealth and greatness which they afterwards attained^p.

^s Antonio escaped, and once more returned to France, and the marquis de Santa Croce treated all his French prisoners as pirates, because war had not been declared between France and Spain.

^p Thuani hist. sui temp. ann. 1579-80. Cabrera, l. xiii. Ferreras, part xv. &c.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
KING OF SPAIN.

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State of af-
fairs in the
Netherlands.

WHILE Philip's arms were employed in subduing the Portuguese, the prince of Parma had little room for the exertion of that activity and enterprize by which he was so eminently distinguished. Having, according to his late agreement with the southern provinces, dismissed his Spanish and Italian forces, he had thereby weakened his army so much, as to render it unable to keep the field. The States of these provinces had labored in vain to fulfil their part of the agreement. Their finances were exhausted, all their levies were carried on slowly, and their cavalry were so few in number, that they had been obliged to consent that Farnese should retain some of the foreign horse for his body-guard.

It was fortunate for him, that at this juncture the confederates were in a similar state of weakness.

After

After the departure of their auxiliaries, only a small number of troops remained; and, after the revolt of so many of the nobility, and the death of the count de Bossut, which happened about this time, there was scarcely a single officer, a native of the Netherlands, whom they could intrust with the chief command. Matthias, a young man of no experience, bore the name, but was incapable of discharging the duties of governor. The whole weight of the administration lay upon the prince of Orange, who was involved in an endless maze of the most intricate political negotiations; and without his continual presence, activity, and vigilance, the weak frame of the confederacy would quickly have fallen to pieces. William was therefore obliged to leave the direction of military affairs to the count of Renneberg, La Noue, and Norris; and although these men were not deficient either in spirit and intrepidity, or in prudence and good conduct, yet they neither had forces sufficient to undertake any important enterprise, nor means to support such as were under their command¹.

The greatest part of Brabant and Flanders had acceded to the union of Utrecht; but the strength of the confederacy was not proportioned to its extent. The union of the several members was not sufficiently compact, the administration was not properly ascertained, and there was no common centre of power and authority established. The

¹ Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i.

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troops were scattered in small bodies throughout the provinces; no adequate provision was made for their pay; they lived at free quarters on the inhabitants; and, as luxury is the constant attendant of licentiousness, the country was miserably oppressed and plundered, and the people reduced to an incapacity of furnishing the necessary contributions and supplies. In this situation many persons lamented that they had not embraced the opportunity lately afforded them, of making their peace with the king; and they began to accuse the prince of Orange who had advised them to reject the conditions that had been offered, of having preferred his private interest to that of the provinces. A spirit of discontent prevailed every where, except in Holland and Zealand, and it was generally believed, that they must soon either make their peace with the king of Spain, or elect some other sovereign, able to deliver them from the calamities with which they were overwhelmed.

The causes of
their distress.

The prince of Orange was at this time in Ghent, employed in quieting the disturbances above mentioned. At the desire of the States he published a vindication of his conduct, together with his sentiments concerning the causes of that distress in which the provinces were involved, and the means of their deliverance. As what he said on this occasion, and some weeks afterwards, in the assembly of the States at Antwerp, contains an interesting view of the situation of the Netherlands at the present period, it will not be improper to lay before the reader an abstract of the principal particulars.

He began with complaining of the injustice of those by whom he had been accused of having contributed to render ineffectual the late negociation for peace at Cologn. " For no person in the Netherlands , he said , had greater reason than himself to wish for peace , since without it he could never hope to obtain either the liberty of his son , whom he had not seen for many years , or the recovery of the many rich inheritances which he had lost , or the power of passing the remainder of his life , which now began to decline , free from labor and anxiety. But while , for these reasons , joined with compassion for the miseries of the people , no person could more ardently desire to have an end put to the war , he could not help regarding war , with all its calamities , as infinitely preferable to the proffered peace ; by one article of which many hundred thousands of the inhabitants would have been driven into exile ; and by another , all who remained , exposed to the mercy of the Spaniards , without any security either for their liberty or their lives , but the promises of those by whom the most solemn oaths had been often violated. These were not his sentiments only of the peace that had been offered , but the sentiments likewise of the States , and of all the sincere friends of their country ; nor could that detraction and calumny in which many persons had of late indulged themselves , be ascribed to any other cause , but the secret machinations of those , who , from selfish views , were desirous of reducing the Netherlands under the Spanish yoke.

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“ There was much ground, he acknowledged, for complaining of the irregularities of which the troops had been guilty in some of the provinces; but nothing could be more unjust than to throw the blame on those who were intrusted with the reins of government. The governors of states ought to be judged of sometimes by the orders which they issued, and not by the success with which their measures were accompanied; for what could it avail to interpose their authority, when they wanted power to enforce obedience? The disregard shown by many, to the orders of the States and council, was the principal source of the evils complained of. In all the provinces, except Holland and Zealand, there was scarcely a single town that would admit the garrisons appointed for its defence. To this was to be ascribed that facility with which the enemy had made themselves masters of Allost, and other places; and it was owing to the same cause, that the troops were so much scattered throughout the provinces; the consequence of which was, that the inhabitants of the country and of the open towns, suffering equally from the forces of the States that lived at free quarters upon them, and from the incursions of the enemy, were totally disabled from contributing their share of the public expenses. Thus there was no fund sufficient for the regular payment of the troops; without which, it was in vain to expect either that they could be kept under proper discipline, or employed successfully in any important enterprise.

“ To remedy the abuses complained of, the most effectual method was to place numerous garrisons in the frontier towns. For if this were done, the great number of small garrisons would become unnecessary; and the interior parts of the provinces being thereby delivered both from the oppressions of their friends and the devastations of the enemy, the people would be more able to furnish their proportion of the supplies, the troops would be paid more regularly, and discipline more easily maintained.

“ The States ought not however to stop there, but to exert themselves strenuously in drawing together such an army of regular forces, as might face the enemy in the field, or at least disturb and interrupt their operations. It was their want of such an army that had occasioned the loss of Maestricht; and, if care were not taken to supply that want, there was ground to apprehend, that the confederacy would soon be stript of all the towns in the inland provinces. But in order to carry this, or any other expedient into execution, it was necessary that, instead of suffering each town or province to dispose of its troops and contributions as it thought fit, a senate or council should be established, with authority to determine every thing relative to the application of the public funds and the conduct of the war.

“ He was far from intending that this council should be invested with the power either of imposing taxes or of enacting laws. He meant only that it should be empowered to levy such taxes as were

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imposed, and to execute such laws as were enacted, by the general States of the union. That it should not be subject to be controuled by particular towns or provinces; nor obliged, in applying the public money, distributing garrisons, and regulating the motions of the troops, to have recourse on every emergency to the States; but should have such a degree of discretionary power conferred upon it, as would enable it to seize the opportunities of action when they offered, and to conduct the operations of the war with secrecy and dispatch."

William exhorts the confederates to renounce their allegiance.

Besides these and some other points of less importance, William ventured, both in the writing which he published, and afterwards in the assembly of the States, to explain his sentiments concerning another subject, which he had long revolved, and concerning which he had sounded the inclinations of many of the deputies. Having, before the present period, despaired that peace could ever be restored between the king and the confederated provinces, he exhorted the deputies to consider, whether they were not now in a situation which required that, renouncing their allegiance to Philip, they should transfer it to some other prince, who was able and willing to defend them.

His reasons.

In the eyes of the greater part of Europe, this proposal appeared in the highest degree audacious. Philip had, ever since his accession, been considered as the most powerful prince of the age; he had lately received an immense increase of power by the acquisition of Portugal, and men could not

doubt that the revolted provinces must soon yield to his superior arms, and bitterly repent of the offence which they had given him.

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Reasons however were not wanting to show, that the measure proposed was the best which the people of the Netherlands could embrace in their present circumstances. If they could have entertained the prospect of obtaining peace on tolerable terms, it might be difficult perhaps entirely to vindicate their conduct. The evils which accompany a change of government, are generally so great, and the obligation to maintain the present, so strong and powerful, that nothing but the most urgent necessity can ever justify a people for shaking off their allegiance to their legal prince. But, from the issue of the late negotiations at Cologne, it was manifest, not only that Philip was unalterably fixed in his purpose to govern the Netherlands with despotic authority, in contradiction to their fundamental rights and laws; but that the utter extirpation of the protestants, who were now become the most considerable part of the people, was a condition, without which he was determined never to be reconciled. Desolation therefore, and slavery, must have been the certain consequences of peace, and no greater evils could be apprehended from a continuance of the war. "Even allowing (said the prince of Orange, in the assembly of the States) that the king should be persuaded, by any mediating power, to grant us such conditions as our consciences would suffer us to accept, yet what security can we obtain for his fulfilling them?

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He has, before this time, been set at liberty by the pope from his most sacred obligations. It is an established maxim of Philip and his counsellors, that with heretics, such as we are, no promises or oaths are binding. Although he were of himself inclined to fulfil his engagement, yet the Roman pontiff and the Spanish inquisitors would reclaim, and soon persuade him to alter his intention. It has been said by some, continued William, that he is a prince of a compassionate disposition, and that we may safely rely upon his mercy. Of the truth of this, we can best judge from what we have seen and known. Do the deeds that have been perpetrated by his command, in India, in Italy, or in Granada, authorize us to form this favorable judgment of his character? Has not every corner of the Netherlands been overflowed with the blood of thousands of our countrymen, barbarously butchered by his command? Are not all the neighbouring kingdoms filled with his subjects, who have been driven from their native land, either to enrich the countries that have afforded them protection, with our trade and manufactures, or to drag out a miserable life in poverty and exile? We know how grievously our late conduct has offended him, and from what we have seen on former occasions, we may judge of the measure of his resentment. He may humble himself so far as to sooth us with the hopes of a more mild administration; but we should remember the discovery which we made lately, when, by the letters that were intercepted, it appeared, that, instead of

the generous purposes that were pretended, nothing was meant but to employ some of the provinces as instruments of vengeance against the rest."

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Opposition of
the catholics.

Influenced by these considerations, which showed that Philip had entirely lost the confidence as well as the affections of his Flemish subjects, a great majority of the deputies were inclined to renounce his authority. Some of the catholic members, however, prompted partly by political principles, and partly by concern for the safety of their religion, had the courage to remonstrate. They expatiated on the greatness of Philip's power, and the danger to which the States would expose themselves, by adding so great an affront to their former provocations. And to their representations on this head they subjoined, that they could not adopt the strong measure that was proposed, consistently with their oath of allegiance; since the king was unquestionably their rightful sovereign, they had all solemnly recognised his right; and the provinces were his inheritance, which he had derived from a long uninterrupted line of illustrious ancestors².

But this reasoning had no weight with the prince of Orange, St. Aldegonde, and the other leaders of the protestants. They considered the breach between Philip and the confederated provinces, as irreparable; and knew, that long before the present period, he was animated against them with the most implacable resentment. "It

² Bentivoglio, part ii. l. i.

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was too late, they said, to talk of keeping measures with the king; and no part remained to be espoused, but to provide against the effects of his displeasure. Nor was there the smallest reason for those scruples by which the catholic members were disturbed, either with regard to the lawfulness, or the expediency of renouncing their allegiance. Kings were invested with authority, not for their own sakes, but for the interest of the people whom they were appointed to govern. If the rights of princes were to be investigated, they would be found, in most of the kingdoms in Europe, to have been derived from the will of their subjects, who, grown impatient under the injuries of former princes, had taken from *them*, and given to their successors, what they had an undoubted right to bestow. A prince was indeed superior to each individual in a State; but neither his interest, nor his pleasure was to be put in the balance with the security and happiness of the whole. On the contrary, he might be judged, and even punished for his abuse of power, by the supreme council of the nation. If this truth were doubted of in other places, it could not be controverted in the Netherlands; where, till lately, both the name of king, and the measure of obedience which kings commonly require, were utterly unknown. In the Netherlands the engagements between the prince and the people were strictly mutual; and in engagements of this sort, it was a clear and universal maxim, that the infidelity of either of the two contracting parties,

absolves the other from the most sacred obligation³.

The protestant members, in comparison with whom the catholics were few in number, being thus confirmed in their purpose of abjuring the dominion of Philip, the assembly proceeded next to consider, whether they should substitute another sovereign in his place, or establish a republican government, upon the plan of that confederacy which was already formed. The latter of these measures would have been embraced by all the deputies; by the protestants, from the conformity between the principles of a commonwealth, and those of their religion; and by the catholics; from their persuasion that such a government would neither be so highly affronting to the king, nor so effectually preclude the hopes of a future reconciliation. But the present feeble state of the United Provinces obliged them to sacrifice their inclination to their preservation and security. From the representation which the prince of Orange made of the disorders that prevailed, together with the view which he exhibited of their strength and resources, they were convinced; that however strenuously they might exert themselves, they would be able to wage only a tedious defensive war; by which their strength would be gradually wasted, till they were at last compelled to accept of such terms of peace as the king should be pleased to prescribe. To have recourse therefore to the assistance

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Deliberations about
electing an
other sovereign.

³ Meteren, lib. x. and Grotius, p. 70.

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Motives for
choosing the
duke of An-
jou.

of some foreign prince, seemed not only expedient but necessary; and to engage the prince of whom they should make choice to espouse their cause with greater zeal and sincerity than they had hitherto experienced in their allies, they resolved to confer upon him the sovereignty of the provinces, with all the prerogatives which had been enjoyed by the princes of the house of Burgundy.

Nothing now remained but to fix upon the person to whom the offer of this high dignity should be made. The prince of Orange, having beforehand sounded the inclinations of the emperor and other German princes, had found them utterly averse from taking any concern in the affairs of the Netherlands. The queen of England, and the duke of Anjou, brother to the king of France, were the only princes at that time in Europe, between whom the States thought there was ground to hesitate; and they were determined to concur in giving the preference to Anjou, by the prince of Orange; who, besides representing to them the necessity of electing a sovereign who would reside in the country, informed them that their making choice of the duke, would be highly acceptable to the queen. "For she had writ to him on the subject, and given him assurances of granting the States her assistance, in case the sovereignty were conferred on one with whom she had so much reason to expect to live on amicable terms*."

* Meteren, lib. x.

From this it should seem, that William had offered to employ his influence in favor of Elizabeth; and it may be presumed, that unless he had found her averse to his proposal, neither he nor the other protestant leaders would have been inclined to give the preference to Anjou. Very different motives indeed were assigned for the prince's conduct, by his enemies. His principality of Orange, they observed, lay in the centre of France. He had lately married Charlotte de Bourbon, of the blood royal of that kingdom^s. For many years he had maintained an intimate correspondence with the leaders of the Hugonots; and he flattered himself with the hopes of enjoying the entire direction of the duke of Anjou, a weak prince, who would probably be more attentive to his pleasures, than to the affairs of government. These interested considerations, it is likely, were not entirely without their influence; but the other circumstance above mentioned seems to afford a still more satisfactory account, since there was in reality no room for hesitation between Elizabeth and Anjou; and Elizabeth, as will appear in the sequel, would certainly have rejected the sovereignty, in case an offer of it had been made to her. This political princess expected to derive advantage from that animosity which the election of Anjou was likely to produce between the courts of France and Spain. And the prince of Orange knew, that as it would be easier to reconcile the

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^s Daughter of the duke de Montpensier.

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catholics in the United Provinces to the election of a prince of the same religion with themselves, than to that of a protestant; so, without making such a choice, there was little probability that he should ever prevail on the Walloons to accede to the confederacy. Whatever were William's motives, a great majority of the deputies entered readily into his opinion, and they would have proceeded instantly to the election, if it had not been deemed a matter of too much consequence to be decided without consulting their constituents.

La Noue
taken pri-
soner.

In the mean time the operations of the war were not wholly discontinued, although neither of the two contending parties was in a condition at this period to make any great or vigorous exertion. By means of a stratagem conducted by count Egmont, Farnese acquired possession of Courtray in Flanders, as he did by the like means of some other places. On the other hand, count Egmont and his brother were taken prisoners by La Noue in the town of Ninove: and not long afterwards La Noue himself lost his liberty. This gallant officer having been attacked unexpectedly by the marquis de Roubais, commander in chief of the Walloon forces, was overpowered by numbers, and obliged, through the disadvantage of his ground, to surrender himself a prisoner of war. The States were sensibly affected by the loss of a person of such uncommon abilities, and they offered to give in exchange for him count Egmont and the baron de Selles, who had been taken prisoner at Bouchain. But the prince of Parma refused to

consent to this exchange, and said, that he would never agree to give one lion for two sheep. La Noue was conducted to the castle of Limburgh, where he remained long; and, during his confinement, employed himself in writing those military and political discourses which were afterwards published, and much admired by his contemporaries. Count Egmont's relations, and those of de Selles, solicited Philip with great importunity to consent to the exchange proposed. But this prince, who never hearkened to the voice of gratitude or compassion where his interest interfered, declined complying with their request; and, rather than yield to the enemy so great an advantage as the recovery of La Noue, he chose to leave his friends to languish in prison for several years.

These two noblemen bore this indignity with extreme impatience. De Selles, conscious of having exerted himself with the most fervent zeal in detaching the Walloons from the revolted provinces, fell a sacrifice to the indignation and chagrin which the king's ingratitude and his own unfortunate situation were calculated to inspire. The same causes produced a different, but no less melancholy effect, on count Egmont, whom they deprived of the use of his understanding. Through the tender assiduous care of his sister, whom the States permitted to attend him, he recovered from this distress. But Philip still declined consenting to the exchange, till the year 1585, when La Noue engaged in the strictest manner never to bear arms against him in the Netherlands; and

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Defection of
count Ren-
neberg.

the king of Navarre, the duke of Lorrain, and others, became sureties for his fulfilling this engagement. It is difficult to determine whether Philip's conduct afforded on this occasion a more striking proof of pusillanimity or ingratitude, while no stronger testimony could have been given of the extraordinary merit of La Noue, and the dread which his enemies entertained of his abilities⁶.

About the time when La Noue was taken prisoner, the confederacy sustained another loss by the defection of count Renneberg. This young nobleman having been appointed governor of Friesland by the States, had subdued the cities of Deventer and Groningen, besides several other places of considerable consequence; and his zeal and services were the more highly valued, as all his relations adhered to the Spanish interest, and he himself was of the catholic persuasion. But these circumstances which gave him so much merit in the eyes of his countrymen, were the means by which he was enticed to abandon the cause which he had hitherto so illustriously supported. The prince of Parma readily perceived the advantage which they afforded for gaining him over from the confederates; and, with this view, he employed the count's sister and her husband, the baron de Monceaux, to offer him the following terms of accommodation: That he should be confirmed in the government of Friesland, and have that of

⁶ Bentivoglio, part. ii. lib. i. Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 39. and Meteren.

Overysfel annexed to it; that twenty thousand crowns should be immediately paid him, besides an annual pension of twenty thousand florins; that a town, of which he was feudal superior, should be erected into a marquisate; and that he should have two regiments of troops to be distributed throughout his governments, in whatever stations he should think fit. Besides these enticements, another object was held forth to him, more tempting perhaps than any of the rest; he was flattered with the hopes of obtaining in marriage the countess of Megen, of whom he was greatly enamoured, and who possessed one of the richest fortunes in the Netherlands. His religious principles conspired with these allurements, and made him lend an open ear to his sister's repeated representations of the danger to which the catholic faith was exposed, and of the designs formed by the prince of Orange for its destruction. He hesitated however for some time, and trembled at the thoughts of the infamy in which he was about to be involved; but at last he consented to accept of the terms proposed, resolving to conceal his having done so, till he should take proper measures for delivering the towns and forts into the hands of the Spaniards.

His design could not however entirely escape the penetrating eye of the prince of Orange. Various circumstances concurred to alarm William's apprehensions, which made him resolve, without delay, to prevent, if possible, the fatal effects of his intended treachery. He instantly went into Friesland, under the pretence of quelling some

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disturbances in that country, and ordered some officers to draw their troops together, and lead them against Lewarden, Harlingen, and Staveren. These orders were executed with secrecy and dispatch, and all the three places were wrested out of the hands of those to whom count Renneberg had committed them.

The count, who resided at this time in Groningen, was thunderstruck when he received intelligence of this disaster, which at once showed him that his perfidy was detected, and put it in a great measure out of his power to fulfil his engagements to the prince of Parma. Still, however, he was either not prepared, or he had not courage, to throw off the mask. He complained loudly of the affront that had been offered him, and of the ingratitude with which his services had been repaid. Among the officers who witnessed his confusion on this occasion, there were two to whom, as he knew their fidelity to the States to be inviolable, he had not communicated his designs. These men, thinking it still practicable to preserve him in his duty, exhorted him to go immediately to the prince of Orange, in order to clear himself from the suspicions which were entertained against him. "This is the only expedient in your power, said one of them, if you are conscious of innocence; nor can I doubt that you are, when I consider, that by persisting to act the part which your duty and honor require, you must promote your interest more effectually, than by violating these sacred obligations, and involving your name in perpetual infamy." Renneberg listened attentively

to this discourse, changed color frequently, and at last burst into tears. He repeated his complaints of the treatment which he had met with, but he would not explain his intentions, nor comply with his friends' advice. The two officers then left him; and, after acquainting the chief magistrate of what had passed, they withdrew privately from the city.

By a popular and insinuating behaviour, accompanied with strong asseverations of the falsehood of the reports which had been propagated, Renneberg laid asleep the suspicions both of the magistrates and the people, till the plot which he had formed was ripe for execution. Having brought in secretly a body of troops, which he concealed in the palace, and put arms into the hands of his domestics; with these, and the catholic inhabitants devoted to the Spanish interest, he overpowered the garrison; and having thus made himself master of the town, he proclaimed himself governor, in the name of Philip, and then mounted the fortifications with the troops which he had introduced.

But he did not long enjoy any of the advantages which he expected to derive from his revolt, and some of them he never attained. The money promised him was never paid, and the countess of Megen was given in marriage to another. His health being impaired by the fatigues which he had undergone in his military enterprises, the remembrance of his treachery filled his mind with anguish and remorse, which preyed upon his sickly

Renneberg's
remorse and
death.

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tions of it.

frame, and carried him off in the prime of his age, lamented even by those whom he has betrayed, who felt for his misfortunes, on account of his many amiable accomplishments⁷.

The losses which the confederacy suffered from La Noue's imprisonment, and the infidelity of Renneberg, served only to confirm them in their resolution of conferring the sovereignty on some foreign prince; and the reasons above mentioned, joined to the influence of the prince of Orange, determined the States of the several provinces and towns to give the preference to the duke of Anjou. The election was made accordingly in due form by the General States, and a solemn embassy sent to give intimation of it to the duke, who readily accepted the offer, and consented to all the conditions annexed to it. They were contained in a treaty signed by him and the ambassadors of the States at Plessi-les-Tours, on the 29th of September; and the principal articles were those which follow: "That the States of the United Provinces having elected Francis de Valois, duke of Alençon and Anjou, for their sovereign, did thereby confer upon him all the titles and prerogatives which their former princes had enjoyed. That in case the duke should die without issue, the States might elect another sovereign, and that the Netherlands should in no event be annexed to the crown of France. That in case the duke should die leaving several sons behind him, the States should have power to determine which of them, should succeed him in the sovereignty, and that if the prince

⁷ Grotius and Meteren.

whom they should make choice of were under age, they might assume the government into their own hands till he should arrive at the age of twenty. That the duke should maintain inviolate, all the rights and privileges of the people; that he should summon the general assembly of the States to meet at least once a year; and that, if he should fail to issue letters of convocation, they should themselves have power, agreeably to ancient form and custom, to meet together as often as they should judge expedient. That the duke should fix his residence in the Low Countries; but if his affairs should, on any occasion, call him thence, he should nominate for governor some nobleman a native of the Netherlands; with the consent and approbation of the States. That all his counsellors should be natives of the provinces, except two or three of the French nation, who might be admitted into the council, provided the States should give their consent. That he should make no innovation in religion, but afford his protection equally to the protestants and catholics. That Holland and Zealand should, both in respect of government and religion, remain in their present state, being obliged, however, to contribute their proportion of the supplies requisite for the support of the confederacy. That the duke should spare no pains to engage his brother the king of France to assist him in carrying on the war; that he should accede to all the treaties that subsist between the States and foreign powers, and should not himself form any new alliance without their

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consent. That all foreign soldiers should be dismissed on the first requisition of the States: And lastly, That if the duke should fail in performing any of the foregoing conditions, his right to the sovereignty should cease, and the provinces be no longer bound to yield obedience to his authority."

As this treaty was negociated in France, Philip complained to Henry of his breach of friendship in permitting it; and Henry affected to be much offended with his brother's conduct, but in reality he did not feel that displeasure which he pretended. On the contrary he secretly rejoiced in the prospect of being delivered from a brother, whose levity and caprice had given him much inquietude, and it is said, that he assured the States privately, that he would send them either troops or money, as soon as the troubles of his kingdom were composed.

Philip's pro-
scription of
the prince of
Orange.

But whatever reason Philip had to be offended with the French monarch, he was much more highly incensed against the prince of Orange, whom he considered as the contriver, as well as the chief promoter of the revolution that had taken place. Having oftener than once attempted, by negociation and artifice, to free himself from an enemy, who had furnished employment to his ablest generals and best disciplined forces for so many years, he had recourse, on this occasion, to the ignoble expedient of exciting some wretch or desperado to make an attempt upon his life. For this purpose he published an edict of proscription against him, in which he accused him of having

excited and fomented that spirit of discord, which had proved the source of so much misery to the Netherlands; interdicted all the subjects of the crown of Spain from holding communication with him, and from supplying him with bread, or drink, or fire, and offered to any person, who should deliver him dead or alive, or take away his life, the sum of twenty-five thousand crowns, besides making him and his associates noble, if they were not already noble, and granting them a full pardon of all crimes, however enormous, of which they had been guilty.

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This practice of commanding assassination, almost unheard of since the days of the Roman triumvirate, was suitable to the dark, revengeful, and ungenerous nature of Philip. The prince of Orange could have retaliated the injury; but he scorned so ignoble a revenge, and chose rather to rest his defence on an appeal to the world for his integrity.

His vindication or Apology, addressed to the assembly of the States, and of which he sent copies to the several courts in Europe, is one of the most precious monuments of history. It contains an interesting relation of many particulars, which throw light, not only on William's own character and that of Philip, but likewise on the characters of several of the other principal actors in the Netherlands. The author has, in some parts of it, indulged himself in the language of keen resentment, and ventured to assert boldly several facts; of which the cotemporary historians have spoken

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with reserve. Some allowance perhaps must be made for that just indignation with which he was inflamed; but when it is considered, that no person had better access to information; that no prince possessed a higher character for sincerity and truth, having never, in a single instance, been convicted by his numerous enemies of insincerity and falsehood; that the relation of the facts which he asserts was published at the time when they are said to have happened, and when it was easy for the persons accused, if accused unjustly, to have confuted him; that their interest and honor called loudly for a confutation; and yet, that no such confutation, nor any vindication of their characters, which had been arraigned as odious at the bar of the universe, was ever attempted. When all these circumstances are duly considered, there does not appear any sufficient reason for calling in question the facts contained in this Apology, although some of them are of such a nature as to require the strongest evidence to justify the reader for yielding his assent^{*}.

Adopted by
the States.

The conduct of the confederated States on this occasion was such as William had reason to expect. After employing several days in examining his Apology, they voted him an affectionate address, in which they attested the falsehood of those imputations on which Philip had founded his proscription. They declared, that as the prince had been regularly elected into the several offices which he held, so he had never accepted of any office but in

^{*} An abstract of this Apology is subjoined to the conclusion of this work.

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Solemn re-
nunciation
of their alle-
giance to
Philip.

consequence of their most earnest entreaties. They prayed him still to exercise the authority with which they had invested him, expressed their gratitude for his many eminent services to the commonwealth, and promised to yield a ready and cheerful obedience to his commands. They concluded with expressing their anxiety for his life, and made him an offer of maintaining a company of horseguards, of which they entreated him to accept, being persuaded that on his preservation their own security depended.

In a few days afterwards they gave him another proof of that zeal and sincerity with which they had espoused his cause. Their election of the duke of Anjou was a virtual renunciation of their allegiance to their former sovereign; yet all public acts ran as before in the name of Philip and that of the States; the oath administered to persons entering upon public offices had not been altered, and the people in some of those cities in the confederacy, which had consented to Anjou's election, were extremely averse to alter it, from that attachment which men often discover to exterior forms, even after the institutions on which they were originally founded have been abolished; but the States, sensible at last of the incongruity between these forms and the steps which they had lately taken, and apprehensive of danger from leaving it in any respect ambiguous to whom the people owed their allegiance, agreed now to remove all ground of ambiguity by a solemn abjuration of Philip as their sovereign.

An act of abjuration was accordingly passed,

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with great unanimity, in an assembly held on purpose at the Hague, consisting of deputies from Brabant, Guelderland, Zutphen, Flanders, Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Overysfel, and Friesland. In this act, after enumerating the principal grievances which had prompted them to form their present resolution, they declared it to be a right inherent in every free people, to withdraw their allegiance from a prince who obstinately refuses to fulfil the duty which he owes them; and much more from one who violates the fundamental laws, and acts the part of a tyrant and oppressor. They pronounced Philip to have forfeited for ever all authority in the Netherlands. They forbade all judges and others to use his name, arms, or seal, and they required the magistrates of towns, and all other persons in public offices, to bind themselves by an oath to oppose him and his adherents to the utmost of their power.

These resolutions were carried into immediate execution. All Philip's seals were broken, all commissions and letters patent in his name were cancelled, and the new oath was administered to every person who possessed any civil or military employment. It was not without difficulty that the magistrates in some towns were persuaded to take this oath. Some remaining scruples of conscience, arising from a regard to their former oaths, gave uneasiness to several; and others doubted of the expediency of so strong a measure at the present crisis, on account of the ships and merchandise belonging to the people of the Netherlands, which were in the ports of Spain. But no pains were

spared to remove these objections, and at last almost the whole inhabitants of the above mentioned provinces entered into the views of the States, and took the oath that was prescribed them⁹.

About this time Matthias left the Netherlands, after having resided there between three and four years, without having acquired either reputation to himself, or any advantage to the people whom he had been called to govern. He had employed all his influence to persuade the States to make choice of him for their sovereign, but the motives above explained having determined them to give the preference to the duke of Anjou, it should seem that the prince of Orange had been able to satisfy Matthias as to the necessity of that measure, since he remained in the country for a considerable time afterwards, and accepted of an annual pension of fifty thousand guilders from the States¹⁰.

During the course of these civil and political transactions, the troops were not wholly unemployed. In Friesland, the king's forces were com-

⁹ Upon a representation of the prince of Orange, the States formed at this time several useful regulations relative to the administration of justice, to the finances, and the troops. That council of state likewise was established, of the necessity of which William had labored to convince them, which was instituted partly to remedy the inconveniencies arising from the slowness, with which the deliberations of the States were unavoidably conducted, and partly to serve as a check upon the future sovereign. Grotii An. l. iii. Meteren, &c.

¹⁰ Matthias had afterwards a better fortune. His brother resigned to him the kingdom of Hungary in 1608, and that of Bohemia in 1611, and the year following he obtained the Imperial crown. Strada, lib. vii. Meteren, p. 317.

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manded by Schinch and Verdugo, between whom and colonel Norris and count Hohenlohe several sharp rencounters passed, with various success; but the only important event which happened at this time in the northern provinces, was the acquisition of Breda, into which the Spaniards were treacherously admitted in the night by some of the garrison, whom the agents of the prince of Parma had found means to corrupt¹¹.

The prince himself was, in the mean time, intent on the reduction of Cambray. But not having a sufficient number of troops to carry on the siege with vigor, he was obliged to convert it into a blockade. D'Inchi, the governor, had recourse for relief to the duke of Anjou, and was warmly seconded in his application by the States and the prince of Orange. Anjou perceiving how deeply his honor was concerned to gratify this first desire of his new subjects, published at the court of France his intention of attempting to raise the siege. This was no sooner known, than a great number of the nobility flocked, from all parts of the kingdom, to his standard. With their assistance, he collected in a few days an army of near twelve thousand foot and four thousand horse, and marched directly towards Cambray. The prince of Parma, too prudent to contend with an army, which, besides being greatly superior to his own in number, was conducted by a brave and warlike nobility, quitted his intrenchments and retired. In this manner was Cambray delivered, after it had been blockaded for several months, during which

¹¹ Meteren, p. 313.

the inhabitants had been reduced to great distress. Anjou having brought along with him an ample supply of provisions, it was immediately introduced; and soon after, he made a magnificent entry into the city, amidst the applauses of the people, who saluted him, the Protector of their Liberty. He then laid siege to Chateau-Cambresis, and quickly compelled the garrison to surrender¹².

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This success which attended Anjou's first enterprise afforded inexpressible pleasure to the confederated provinces, and served to heighten their expectations of his future government. He was earnestly entreated by the States to improve the present opportunity, and to advance with his army towards Flanders. But it was not in his power, he told them, to comply with their request. All his troops but a few were volunteers, who had engaged in his service only for a short time, and for the single purpose of the relief of Cambray. He could not prevail upon them to remain with him much longer; and he had not yet provided money for their pay. But he hoped to return soon with a powerful army; and he would in the mean time employ his utmost influence to interest his brother and the queen of England in their cause.

There were not wanting powerful motives to induce the French king to grant Anjou that assistance for which he now applied; since, besides being delivered from the fickle, restless spirit of a brother, who had greatly increased the troubles of his reign, he would have thereby avenged himself

Anjou solicits aid from his brother.

¹² Meteren, p. 315. Bentivoglio, part. ii. lib. ii.

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of Philip, who had secretly undertaken the protection of the catholic league, which, as will be afterwards related, had been lately formed by the duke of Guise, on pretence of providing for the security of the catholic religion, but in reality to control the sovereign's authority. But Henry was not in a condition at this time to make an open breach with Philip. By his indolence and voluptuousness, added to the numberless calamities in which his kingdom was involved, his finances were exceedingly reduced; and the king of Navarre on the one hand, and the duke of Guise on the other, furnished more than sufficient employment to all the policy and power which he possessed. Promises therefore of future aid were all that Anjou could obtain from him, and this disappointment determined the duke to set out immediately for England, where it should seem he had better ground to hope for assistance than in his native country.

Elizabeth had for some time past appeared to lend a favorable ear to a proposal of marriage which he had made to her; and his expectations were at present raised to the greatest height. On his arrival in England, she gave him the most gracious reception. Soon afterwards, she ordered her ministers to prepare the marriage contract; and, in the presence of many witnesses, after a long discourse with him apart, she took a ring from her own finger, and put it upon his; which both the spectators and the duke interpreted as a declaration of her consent. It is impossible to believe with some historians, that Elizabeth

meant only to amuse Anjou, and thereby to advance some political design. It is inconceivable how any design whatever could be promoted by carrying her dissimulation to so great a length. This wise princess, notwithstanding the many extraordinary accomplishments which adorned her character, was not exempt from the weaknesses that are peculiarly incident to her sex. Flattered by the court which Anjou had long assiduously paid her, she appears to have entertained the most partial sentiments of affection towards him, and seriously to have intended to listen to his proposal. But at last her prudence, her ambition, and that love of independence which she had cherished through her whole life, prevailed over the temporary passion into which she had been betrayed. She made an apology to Anjou, for her change of resolution, and gave him the strongest assurances of assistance and support in his new dominions. The marriage was no more mentioned, and the duke, after a stay of three months in England, set sail for the Low Countries; escorted by a fleet, on board which there was a great number of nobility and gentry, whom the queen had desired to attend him, as a proof to his new subjects, that although the intended marriage had not taken place, yet she was deeply interested in his prosperity.

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OF THE REIGN OF
PHILIP THE SECOND,
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Anjou's arrival in the
Netherlands.

AFTER a passage of three days, the duke of Anjou landed on the 10th of February, at Flushing. From Flushing he went to Middleburgh, and was conducted from thence by a fleet of fifty ships of war to Antwerp. The banks of the Scheld, the entrance into the town, and the streets which led to the palace, were lined by the citizens, to the number of twenty thousand in arms; and no expense was saved, which a wealthy commercial city could afford, to express their attachment and respect. After having taken the usual oath to maintain their rights and privileges, he received from the States the oath of allegiance; and then entered upon the sovereignty, while all around him wore a face of happiness and joy.

In Antwerp, the public exercise of the catholic religion had for some time past been prohibited.

But

But now, in order to gratify the new sovereign, it was permitted in one of the churches; and all catholics were allowed to worship there, according to the rites of their religion, upon condition that they should abjure the king of Spain, and swear allegiance to the duke. Only a few accepted of this indulgence, while the greater part chose rather to forego the privilege held forth to them, than so solemnly to renounce their former sovereign. On this occasion the States, as well as the duke, were not a little alarmed; and thought it necessary without delay to provide against the danger that might arise from persons who gave so clear a discovery of their disaffection to the present establishment. They first published *one* edict, imposing a fine of 200 guilders on those who should decline taking the oaths; and soon afterwards another, by which the recusants were banished from the Netherlands¹.

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In the midst of these transactions, that joy which Anjou's arrival had diffused throughout the provinces was interrupted, by an attempt which was made, not many days after his inauguration, upon the life of the prince of Orange. The design was first conceived in Spain, by a man of the name of Isonca; and it was suggested by him to Gaspar Anastro, a Spanish banker in Antwerp, of ruined circumstances, as an expedient for retrieving his affairs. To induce Anastro to undertake the execution of the bloody purpose, Isonca sent him a sign-manual of the king, in

Attempt to
assassinate
the prince of
Orange.

¹ Meteren, p. 325.

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which Philip engaged to pay him eighty thousand ducats as soon as the assassination should be perpetrated. Anaſtro had not courage himſelf to execute ſo bold and deſperate an enterpriſe, and therefore he communicated Iſonca's propoſal to John Jauregui, a menial ſervant in his family, a young Biſcayan, of a thoughtful, melancholy diſpoſition, whom he knew to be both truſty and audacious. With this young man Anaſtro found there was little need for perſuaſion. "I am ready," ſaid he, "to perform inſtantly what the king ſo earneſtly deſires. I deſpiſe equally the proffered reward, and the danger to which I ſhall be expoſed; for I know that I ſhall die. I only aſk that you will aſſiſt me with your prayers to God, and employ your intereſt with the king, to provide for my father in his old age". Jauregui was the better qualified to ſucceed in his deſign, as he ſpoke the German language fluently, and was in no danger of being known to be a Spaniard. He was confirmed in his purpoſe by a prieſt of the name of Timmerman; from whom he received abſolution of his ſins, and the ſtrongeſt aſſurances, that by putting to death ſo great a heretic as the prince of Orange, he would inſallibly ſecure the favor of God and everlaſting happineſs.

Under a full conviction of the truth of what the prieſt had declared, this deluded wretch ſet out for the caſtle, and having taken his ſtation near the door of the apartment in which the prince had dined, he watched the opportunity of his coming out; when ſtepping up to him, he diſcharged

a pistol at his head, loaded with a single ball. The ball entered a little beneath his right ear, and passing under his palate and upper teeth, came out on the other side. William was deprived for a moment of his senses; which he no sooner recovered, than he desired his attendants to save the life of the assassin. But the guards, transported with sudden rage, had dispatched him. The appearance of the prince's wound, from the effusion of blood, was extremely formidable, and as he was deprived of his speech by the same cause, the spectators believed him to be at the point of death. The news of this disaster spread quickly over the town, and excited in all ranks of men, inexpressible anguish and despair. The citizens poured in crowds from every quarter to learn the particulars of that calamity which had befallen them; and, as if each individual had lost his own proper parent, as well as the common parent of the state, there was nothing to be heard but the voice of sorrow and lamentation.

In the midst of this distress, a rumor was propagated, that the French were the authors of the murder, and that it had been perpetrated in order to deliver the duke of Anjou from the restraints which had been imposed on his authority. This report gained easy credit from the people. Their grief was now converted into fury, and they flew to the palace with an intention to execute a speedy vengeance.

In the mean time it was known at the castle, that the assassin was a Spaniard, from papers found

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in his pocket, by Maurice, the prince's son². Of this discovery, notice was immediately carried to the prince, who had now recovered his speech; and he was informed, at the same time, of the danger to which Anjou and his countrymen were exposed. This intelligence affected William in the most sensible manner; and notwithstanding his present critical situation, he wrote, with his own hand, a billet in exculpation of the French. By this, joined with the pains which were taken by St. Aldegonde, the people were undeceived and pacified. The assassin's body having being exposed to public view, it was soon discovered that he had been a domestic of Anaistro. Anaistro himself had fled, but his secretary, whom he had left behind, to wait the issue of Jauregui's attempt, and Timmerman, the priest, were seized, and having confessed their guilt, they were condemned to suffer death. At the desire of the prince of Orange, who never neglected an opportunity of inculcating humanity upon his countrymen, no tortures were inflicted on them. They were first strangled and then quartered, and their heads and limbs fixed over the gates of the city³.

William's recovery was dubious for some time, on account of the difficulty which the physicians found in stopping the effusion of blood; but after

² Maurice was at this time only fifteen years of age, but was then remarkable for his attention and sagacity.

³ They remained there till the city fell into the hands of the prince of Parma, when they were taken down by the popish ecclesiastics, and buried with every mark of veneration which their superstition could devise.

all their applications had failed, they made a number of persons succeed one another in pressing the mouth of the wound with their thumbs, without intermission, for the space of several days and nights; and this expedient proved at length successful*.

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Anastro having gone from Antwerp to Tournay, where the prince of Parma then resided, affirmed confidently that William had died of his wound. Farnese too rashly believed him, and wrote letters to the citizens of Antwerp, and other places, exhorting them to return now to their duty, since that person was removed by whom they had been led astray. These letters would not have been calculated, in the present disposition of the people, to promote the prince of Parma's design, even if the information on which he proceeded had been true: but as they did not arrive till after the people were delivered from their apprehensions with regard to William's life, they served only to excite their ridicule and indignation'.

Meanwhile the operations of the war were not discontinued by either of the contending parties. The States acquired possession of the town of Allost, and the prince of Parma made himself master of Steenwick and Lierres. He was soon after enabled to act with greater vigor than

Return of
the Spanish
troops.

* While his life was in danger, a public supplication was offered up to heaven for his recovery; and when it was accomplished, a solemn thanksgiving was celebrated.

' Bentivoglio, p. 263. Meteren, p. 326. Thuanus, lib. lxxv.

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the weakness of his army had hitherto permitted him to exert. Having consented, with great reluctance, to the dismissal of the Italian and Spanish troops, he had employed all his address to convince the Walloons that it was in vain for them to expect, with their own forces alone, to bring the war to a conclusion. He found it extremely difficult to overcome their diffidence, and was obliged to observe the utmost caution, in order to avoid awakening those suspicions which they had long indulged against the Spaniards. At length however he accomplished his design through the marquis de Roubais, who, as was mentioned above, had acted a principal part in promoting the reconciliation of the southern provinces. With this nobleman, Farnese had formed an intimate connexion, and had labored assiduously to make him sensible how necessary it was that the troops should be permitted to return. The marquis, flattered with the familiarity to which he was admitted, and prompted by the view of advancing his credit with the king, yielded at last to the prince's solicitations, and then employed his influence with the States so effectually, that they not only consented to the return of the forces, but even petitioned the king for it in the most earnest terms⁶.

Nothing could be more acceptable to Philip than this application, and orders were immediately sent to Italy for the march of four regiments of veterans, consisting of near ten thousand men; who, together with several thousand Burgundians

⁶ Bentivoglio, p. 258.

and Germans, arrived in the Netherlands towards the end of the summer 1582. After the arrival of this reinforcement, the prince of Parma's army amounted to sixty thousand foot and four thousand horse; but finding it necessary to leave more than the half of that number in garrisons, he could keep only about thirty thousand in the field; and a part of these was employed in Friesland under Verdugo, while the rest were under his own immediate command in the southern provinces. With these last he took Chateau Cambresis, Ninove, Gaesbec, and several other places; he attacked the army of the States, which he compelled to retire under the cannon of Ghent; and then he laid siege to Brussels. But the severity of the season, and the difficulty of finding provisions in a country which had been so long the seat of war, obliged him to desist from his attempt, and to put his troops into winter-quarters⁷.

The United States, on the other hand, discovered great alacrity and zeal in supporting their new established government. They raised their yearly revenue from two millions four hundred thousand, to four millions of guilders, with which they maintained, besides their native troops, a considerable number of British, French, and German forces. But so great a proportion of these forces was necessary for defending the forts and towns, that no army could be assembled sufficient to contend with the enemy in the field, nor even to raise the siege of any of those places which the

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State of the
confederacy.

⁷ Meteren, p. 334.

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Anjou soli-
cits assistance
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prince of Parma attempted to subdue. Thus the number of towns belonging to the confederates was daily diminished, while their acquisitions were few and inconsiderable. And, as the enemy was now much more formidable than before, they were filled with the most disquieting apprehensions when they looked forward to the opening of a new campaign. Anjou, who participated with them in the anxiety which so critical a situation was fitted to excite, did every thing in his power to procure from France the succours which he had given them reason to expect. After many delays, the duke the Montpensier and marshal Biron arrived in the Netherlands in the end of November, with between seven and eight thousand men, partly Swiss and partly French. With this reinforcement, under so able a general as Biron, Anjou perceived that he might retard the progress of the prince of Parma's arms, but that he could not hope either to expel him from his new conquests, or to bring the war to a conclusion: he therefore renewed his solicitations at the court of France, and endeavoured to engage his brother more heartily to espouse his cause.

Henry's de-
liberations.

Henry's counsellors were much divided in their opinions with regard to the measures proper to be pursued on this occasion. By some of them, the present opportunity was represented as the happiest that could offer for uniting the Netherlands to the crown of France. But, as these men did not intend to advance the interest of Anjou, they did not employ any argument addressed to Henry's friendship or generosity; and instead of exhorting

him to afford his brother aid sufficient to establish himself securely in his new sovereignty, they advised him only to give him such assistance as might enable him to stop the progress of the Spanish arms. To this counsel they subjoined, that Henry ought to maintain a fleet in the Channel, and an army on the frontier of Luxemburgh, in order to prevent the prince of Parma from receiving supplies from Spain or Italy. And in this posture, they said, he ought to wait, without exposing his troops to the hazards of war, till the contending parties should exhaust their strength, when it would be easy for him to drive the Spaniards out of the Netherlands, and his brother and the States, in order to obtain his protection, would gladly accept of whatever terms he should think fit to impose. But such a plan, which the great abilities of Farnese would have disconcerted, was too refined, and required too much labor, patience, attention and expense, to be relished by a prince so indolent and voluptuous as Henry, who was so improvident of the future, and whose affairs were so exceedingly involved.

He listened with less reluctance to a proposal made him by some others of his counsellors, who being well acquainted with his character, perceived that his hesitation proceeded in a great measure from the shame of deserting his brother, and that in reality he wished for a pretence to reject his application. These men, secret enemies to the duke, and partisans of Philip, whose money it was believed they had accepted, were afraid to declare openly against a measure in which the heir-

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Henry refuses
to grant his
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apparent of the crown, supported by the queen-mother, was so deeply interested. They affected to approve highly of the granting Anjou's request, provided the king could comply with it consistently with the interest of his kingdom. But both the interest and honor of France, they thought, required that the States should previously agree, that, in the event of the duke's death without issue, the king and his heirs should succeed him in the sovereignty of the Netherlands. They knew that the States would not consent to this condition. It was, however, proposed to them, and having met with that reception from them which there was reason to expect, notice was soon afterwards sent to Anjou by the queen-mother, and his other friends, of the unsuccessful issue of their endeavours to serve him^s.

Anjou's attempt on Antwerp and other places.

This disappointment, which rendered it impossible for him to fulfil the expectations of his new subjects, was calculated to give him the most sensible concern. A candid and grateful prince would have thought himself bound more strongly than ever to exert himself in their behalf; and, by a careful attention to their interests, joined to a faithful discharge of his other obligations, to atone for his failure in that engagement which he was unable to perform. Widely different were the sentiments which arose in the mind of the faithless, ungenerous Anjou. Apprehensive that the Flemings, disgusted on account of their disappointment in those hopes of assistance with which they had been deluded, might withdraw their alle-

^s Thuanus, lib. xxvii. c. 9. Meteren, lib. xi.

giance from him, and reconcile themselves to their former sovereign; he resolved to prevent them from executing this design, in case they should conceive it, and in violation of all the oaths which he had sworn so lately, he formed a plan of depriving them of their liberty, by making himself master of all the towns into which his troops had already found, or could by force or stratagem find admission.

This strange design, it is said, was first suggested to him by his partisans in France, in order to induce Henry to grant him the assistance which he solicited; and it was strongly recommended by Fervaques, and other French nobility who had accompanied him to the Netherlands. These men were all real or pretended friends to Anjou, and affected to be deeply concerned for his honor, with which they persuaded him, that such a limited authority as he possessed was utterly incompatible. Had they been his most inveterate enemies, they could not have advised him to a measure more likely to prove fatal to his interest. Yet this weak prince, without communicating his intention to Biron or Montpensier, who would have refused their consent, readily embraced the counsel that was given him, and immediately proceeded to deliberate with his advisers concerning the means of carrying it into execution⁹.

It was agreed, that the French troops, in all the towns where they were quartered, should, under the pretence of a mutiny, take up arms, and expel the garrisons; and in this manner he

⁹ Thuanus, l. xxvii. c. 10. Meteren, p. 336.

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got possession of Dunkirk, Dixmude, Dendremonde, and several other places; but his principal object was the city of Antwerp. It would have been in vain, he believed, to attempt making himself master of so strong a place by open force, with so small a number of his troops as were within the city; and therefore, in conjunction with his counsellors, he exerted all his ingenuity in contriving how force and artifice might be united. On this occasion, fortune seemed to favor his design. Towards the middle of January, after the frost had continued for some time, the States signified their intention to have his troops employed in an expedition against some of the enemy's towns in Friesland, which, on account of their wet situation, were accessible only in the time of frost. Anjou pretended to enter with great alacrity into this design. He immediately gave orders to have his troops conducted to the villages in the neighbourhood of Antwerp, where he held them ready to march upon the shortest notice; and, under various pretences, he brought to his court at Antwerp almost all the French noblesse, who had been dispersed throughout the Netherlands.

Being thus prepared, his plan was to seize upon the gate of Cronenburgh, which lay next to the palace, with his body-guards, and to introduce his army silently in the night; but, on the day immediately preceding, an obscure report of his intention was circulated among the citizens, and a general alarm excited. The prince of Orange and the magistrates thought it proper to inform the duke of this report, and proposed to hang up

lights in the city, and to stretch chains accross the streets and gates, in order to quiet the apprehensions of the people. Anjou could not, without confirming the suspicions entertained against him, refuse his consent to this proposal; but as he possessed a considerable share of his mother's duplicity and artifice, he assumed with so much seeming sincerity, the appearance of indignation against the authors of the report, accompanied with such strong professions of attachment to the Netherlands in general, and the city of Antwerp in particular, that not only the magistrates, but even the prince of Orange were almost persuaded of his innocence. The streets however were barricaded, the whole town was illuminated, and many of the citizens were under arms.

These circumstances having made it necessary for Anjou to change his plan, he went early next morning to the prince of Orange's apartment in the castle, and after informing him that he had ordered his troops to be drawn out for a general review before their departure for Friesland, he desired the prince to witness it. Whether William had still any suspicion of his design is uncertain; but he refused to accompany him, alledging the badness of the day, and the state of his wound, as an excuse for his refusal; and he advised the duke to put off the review till some future day, when the people would be entirely delivered from those apprehensions with which they were at present disquieted. Anjou pretended that he would comply with his advice, and left him; but soon afterwards he sent him

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notice, that, finding the day grown better, he still resolved to hold the review, as he had at first directed. He then gave orders to remove the barricades in the street which leads to the gate of Ripdorp, and set out, attended with a retinue in arms, amounting to between two and three hundred men.

He had no sooner passed the gate and the draw-bridge, than his attendants fell sword in hand upon the guards, and having butchered some of them, obliged the rest to take shelter in the guard-house. The orders which he had sent to the camp had been punctually executed. The whole army was in motion, and seventeen companies of foot, six hundred lances, and four troops of horse were at hand, and ready to enter the city. They rushed in impetuously; and, having set fire to some houses near the gate, as a signal for the rest of the troops to hasten forward, they spread themselves over the town, crying out, "May the mass flourish! the city is taken."

The citizens had been in some measure freed from their apprehensions, by Anjou's protestations on the evening before; but they had not been put entirely off their guard. They flew instantly to arms, and quickly formed a close compacted body, of sufficient strength to make head against the enemy. Their number was soon augmented by others, who flocked to their assistance from every quarter of the city. None declined exposing themselves to danger, or trusted to others for their defence. They remembered the devastations which had been committed some

years before by the mutinous Spaniards, and were persuaded, that they could not now avoid a repetition of the disasters which they then suffered, by any other means, but by exerting their utmost vigor, and showing, each man for himself, a contempt of danger. Animated therefore by the dread of that ruin with which their fortunes, their friends, their wives and children, were about to be overwhelmed; and fired with indignation against their ungrateful, perfidious enemy, they advanced with a degree of fury which the French troops were unable to withstand. Many of the French had entered the houses for the sake of plunder. These men were quickly surrounded by the citizens, and put to the sword; the rest were driven back towards the gate. There they expected, either to be supported by their friends from the camp, or to make their escape out of the city: but, having neglected to secure the portcullis, the soldiers, who had shut themselves up in the guard-house, had sallied out and let it down. By this circumstance, the French were thrown into despair, and the resolution and spirit of the citizens augmented. The situation of the former was now truly deplorable: disappointed of that assistance from without, on which they had depended, and crowded together into a narrow space; while the citizens; who pursued, poured their shot upon them without a moment's intermission; they fell in heaps above one another, till the gate was choked with the dead and wounded.

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The citizens made next 'a desperate attack on a body of French troops who had mounted the rampart, and either put them to the sword, or tumbled them headlong from the wall. Of this scene, Anjou himself, and the Swiss troops, who had attempted in vain to burst open the gate, were spectators. At first he thought it was the citizens that were thrown down, and believed it must have been by accident that the portcullis had been shut. He could not suppose that the inhabitants, unaccustomed to the use of arms, could, in the space of an hour, have discomfited so great a number of disciplined forces; but he was soon undeceived in his conjecture. The citizens, still inflamed with indignation, on account of his unprovoked, atrocious attempt, pointed their cannon towards the place where he stood, and killed a considerable number of the Swiss.

The prince of Orange, who lodged in the castle, at the opposite end of the city, remained ignorant for some time of what had passed, and when intelligence of it was brought him, he at first believed it to be some accidental scuffle between the inhabitants and soldiers; but at last receiving more certain information of the truth, he set out with a part of the garrison for the scene of action. In his way thither he met Fervaques advancing towards him with a body of French troops, which had been left behind in the palace. At the first onset, Fervaques himself was taken prisoner, and his troops, disheartened by the loss of their commander, and still more by the consciousness

consciousness of their treachery, were easily overcome. William then proceeded to the gate of Ripdorp, where he arrived in time to prevent the citizens from wreaking an useless, though merited, vengeance upon the prisoners.

Nothing could be more, affecting, says an historian ¹⁰, whose information was derived from eye-witnesses, than the spectacle at the gate: the dead bodies piled one above another to a considerable height, and the wounded mingled with the dead, weltering in blood, uttering the most doleful lamentations, and struggling to disengage themselves from each other, or from the bodies of their slaughtered friends. At the prince's intercession the lives of all the prisoners were spared, and many of the wounded recovered, through the attention and tenderness of those to whose care they were committed.

The number of the French found dead in different parts of the city, amounted to fifteen hundred, among whom were upwards of three hundred persons of distinction. And the prisoners, including those who surrendered to the prince of Orange, were computed at two thousand. So great was the loss which Anjou sustained from this ill-concerted enterprise; while only one hundred of the inhabitants were killed, and the same number wounded. It would be impossible, notwithstanding the desperate bravery of the citizens, to account for this extreme disparity betwixt the loss on the one side, and that on the other, were it not for a circumstance which one of the historians ¹¹ has mentioned, that the French, either from

¹⁰ Van Meteren.

¹¹ Reidan.

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negligence, or their general's confidence of success, had brought very little ammunition with them, and stood, during the greatest part of the combat, exposed to the enemy's fire, without having any other weapon to defend them but their swords.

It is easier to imagine than describe the confusion with which Anjou must have been overwhelmed, when he reflected on the egregious folly into which he had been betrayed. He passed the night in a neighbouring fort called Berchem, where there was neither furniture nor provisions. From that place he wrote a letter to the senate of Antwerp, in which, after boasting absurdly of the proofs which he had given of his attachment to the Netherlands, he subjoined, That although the misfortune which had happened, had arisen from the unworthy treatment which he had met with, yet he was deeply penetrated with sorrow and repentance on account of it; that he still retained all his wonted affection towards them, and had sent them this letter partly to inquire what were their intentions with respect to him, and partly to desire that they would send him his papers, furniture, and servants; hoping that these last, who were entirely innocent of what had been done, should not suffer any harm¹².

To this letter the senate made no return, but referred it to the consideration of the prince of Orange and the States; and in the mean time Anjou being utterly destitute of every thing necessary for the support of his troops, left Berchem and directed his march towards Dendremonde. He

¹² Meteren, p. 339.

intended to have gone thither by the shortest road, but the citizens of Antwerp having sent a number of armed vessels to oppose his passage over the Scheld, he was obliged to turn back, and to fetch a compass round by Duffel, Mechlin, Rimenant, and Vilvorden. In this march, besides suffering the greatest hardships in his own person, he lost a considerable number of his troops by an inundation of the river Nethe. From Duffel he wrote letters to the governors of Brussels, and other places, in which he threw the whole blame of what had happened on the inhabitants of Antwerp, and represented the affair as a tumult, in which his troops, when upon their way to the camp, had interfered, but which had arisen in consequence of the ill usage which he himself had received. This disingenuous conduct served to exasperate the people of Antwerp more than ever against him, and they published a vindication of their conduct, setting forth, "That they had in all respects demeaned themselves towards him as became good and faithful subjects. They had given him even more than their proportion of the supplies, and had raised the sum of seventy thousand guilders; which, instead of applying it to pay the arrears due to the army, he had distributed among his French and Swiss troops to encourage them in their late atrocious attempt. Nothing could be more palpably unjust than to impute that attempt to the citizens of Antwerp, since, on the same day, the French troops had offered the same violence in other places. By the kind providence of Heaven,

B O O K the plan concerted to enslave them, had been
XVIII. frustrated, in such towns as were of the greatest
1583. importance; and it was their earnest prayer, that the duke might become sensible of the iniquity of his conduct, and resolve for the future to govern the provinces conformably to those fundamental laws of the constitution, which, at his accession, he had solemnly sworn to observe."

The news of what had happened, having been quickly diffused throughout the provinces, excited universal astonishment and indignation. The prince of Parma, desirous to improve the opportunity which was presented to him, attempted to reconcile the people to their ancient government. But his endeavours were not more successful now than formerly. The confederates were deaf to his proposals, and even refused to appoint ambassadors to treat with him concerning peace.

**Deliberations
of the States.**

The States in the mean time were deliberating concerning the letter which Anjou had written to the senate of Antwerp. Had they listened to that just resentment with which they were inflamed, they would not have hesitated to declare that he had forfeited the sovereignty. But they considered how extremely critical their situation was become, while Anjou was master of several of their fortified towns, and the prince of Parma hovered round them with an army, against which they were unable to contend. In this perplexity they entreated the prince of Orange, who had hitherto remained silent, to assist them with his counsel. No person felt more sensibly for the distress into which Anjou's temerity had plunged the confe-

deracy; and no person had a juster ground of provocation. It was by his means chiefly that Anjou had obtained the sovereignty: and yet it could not be doubted, that in sending Fervaques with troops to the castle, as above related, the intention was to deprive him either of his life or his liberty. Notwithstanding this, William had at first interposed to prevent the citizens from using any violence against the prisoners; and he now gave the following conciliatory advice to the States in writing, as he generally did in matters which he deemed of high importance.

“It was not, he said, without reluctance, that he had resolved to deliver his opinion on the difficult question which was now before them, as it had of late been the practice of many persons to blame him for every misfortune that had befallen the confederacy. Even if he had been invested with absolute authority, their censure would have been unjust, since the issues of things belong to God only, and no man can answer for the success of the best concerted enterprise. Considering his age, and the injustice with which he had been treated, it would be prudent perhaps not to expose himself again to the obloquy of his detractors. But his concern for the prosperity of the Netherlands would not suffer him to maintain that silence, which a regard to his personal ease and security required; especially as they had assured him that they would take in good part, and interpret favorably, whatever counsel he should offer.

“Nothing was farther from his intention than

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to attempt to justify that atrocious violence which had been lately perpetrated: on the contrary, he thought the conduct of the duke had been such as proved beyond a possibility of doubt, that he had forfeited his title to the sovereignty. Notwithstanding this, no person, he believed, who suffered himself to consider attentively the course of events since their first connexion with the duke, would deny that this connexion had been attended with advantages. By his troops, not only the siege of Cambray, but that of Lochem too, had been raised, and the whole province of Guelderland thereby saved from the depredations of the enemy. In consequence of his election, peace had been established between the catholics and protestants in France, and the latter left at liberty to enter into the service of the States. Not to mention what they ought perhaps to prize more than any thing else, that, by electing the duke for their sovereign, not only the authority, but the name and arms of Spain, had been abolished in the Netherlands, and a foundation laid, upon which their liberty might be firmly established, provided they should exert themselves with their wonted zeal and vigor. When these things were considered, there would not appear much ground for the censures passed on those by whom the duke's election had been promoted. But whether they had judged wisely or unwisely, the States must now resolve either to make peace with the king of Spain, or trust for the future to their own strength, or enter into terms of accommodation with the duke.

“ With regard to the first of these, he observed,

that besides that all the same reasons still subsisted against returning under the Spanish yoke, which had formerly determined them to shake it off; it must appear preposterous to think of reconciling themselves as subjects to a prince, whose name and ensigns were obliterated, and whose authority they had so solemnly renounced. There was truth in what some persons (friends of Spain more than their native country) had suggested, that it was more desirable for the people of the Low Countries to be subject to a distant, than to a neighbouring prince, as it must be more difficult for the former, than for the latter to encroach upon their liberty. But this maxim could not, in the present divided state of the Netherlands, be urged in favor of the dominion of the king of Spain; who, besides possessing a powerful army ready to overwhelm them, was absolute master of several of the provinces; and was therefore, in reality, much nearer to the confederacy than any other prince.

“ Prompted by this and other considerations, they had bestowed the sovereignty on the duke of Anjou; and *he*, it could not be denied, had forfeited his title to it. This was acknowledged even by the duke himself, who was now sensible of his folly. But notwithstanding his repentance, there was much ground to doubt of the expediency of entering into a second agreement with one by whom the first had been so grossly violated. There was ground to dread that the same evil counsellors, by whom the duke had been once deluded, might

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again deceive him ; and there was reason to suspect, that confidence could not be soon restored between the French troops and the people of the Netherlands.

“ On the other hand, he thought it his duty to call their attention to the consequences which must attend their refusing to be pacified. The duke would deliver all the fortified towns which he possessed, into the hands of the Spaniards. Both he and his brother, the king of France, would from friends be converted into the most bitter enemies ; from whom all that mischief might be expected, that can be contrived and executed by those who are stimulated by ambition, and inflamed with animosity and resentment. An immediate stop would be put by the French king to their commerce with his subjects ; and while he would shut his harbours against their ships, he would open a passage through his dominions for the troops of the king of Spain. Even the queen of England, though highly dissatisfied with the duke's conduct, yet were she to be informed that the States had obstinately refused to be reconciled, would be exceedingly offended. And if they should lose her favor, as well as that of France, to what other friend could they have recourse, either able or willing to support them ? They must for the future trust for their preservation entirely to themselves. They must, without delay, make a numerous augmentation of their forces ; and yet he knew not where these forces could be raised, since the devastation of the war had been so great in every province of the confederacy, that scarcely a

sufficient number of the people remained, to carry on their trade and manufactures. In order to maintain such an army as was necessary, much larger sums of money were requisite, than had hitherto been collected. What these were, would appear from the scheme which he now delivered to them, containing a particular description of all the ordinary and extraordinary expenses of the war. From the difficulty which they had experienced in procuring money for paying the garrisons alone, they might judge whether they were possessed of funds adequate to the expense both of these and of an army in the field; without which, it was impossible that they could for any considerable time resist the enemy.

“ He was far from censuring those who advised them to trust to the Almighty for protection. The counsel of these persons was pious and well intended; but he thought, that to engage in any difficult enterprise without the means of carrying it into execution, was more properly to tempt the Divine Providence than to trust in it; and that those only could be said to exercise a proper trust in God, who, after embracing the most favorable opportunities of action, had recourse to Heaven by prayer, to crown their undertakings with success. It behoved them therefore still attentively to consider their strength and their resources; and if, without foreign assistance, they should find them sufficient for the purposes which they had in view, they would, in his opinion, judge wisely in resolving to retain the sovereignty in their own hands.

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“ There was a time when the people of the Netherlands might have established themselves in this happy state of freedom and independence ; when in spite of the king of Spain , they might have expelled his brother John of Austria from the provinces. But our present situation , continued William , is widely different from what it was at the time of which I speak. A powerful Spanish army , seconded by those who were then our friends , is at our gates. The strength of the confederacy is impaired. Even with the assistance of the French troops , we have been unable to stop the progress of the enemy. If nevertheless you shall , upon inquiry , find that you are able , by making greater exertions , to do more alone , than when you were assisted by others , banish for ever all thoughts of an accommodation with the duke , and resolve henceforth , alone and unassisted , to oppose both him and the Spaniards. Proceed instantly to the execution of your design. But I dread that before you can make the preparations necessary for entering upon action , before you can collect either the troops or the money requisite , and even before you can appoint a general to command your forces , many of your towns will be taken ; and many of them despairing of relief , will enter into terms of accommodation with the Spaniards. For these reasons you will judge , perhaps , that in your present circumstances the wisest resolution which you can form , is to enter into a treaty of reconciliation with the duke. And if this shall be the result of your deliberations , I have only one other counsel to suggest , which is , to give particular

attention in your new agreement to prevent the fortified towns from being exposed on any future occasion to that danger from which the city of Antwerp has so narrowly escaped; and for this purpose to require, that no officer or soldier shall be admitted into garrisons without taking an oath of allegiance and fidelity to the States¹³.

This reasoning of the prince of Orange produced the desired effect upon a great majority of the deputies, and a negociation was immediately begun, and soon afterwards a treaty of peace and reconciliation was concluded on the following conditions: That all the French prisoners in Antwerp should be set at liberty, the duke's papers and other effects restored, and ninety thousand guilders given him for discharging the arrears due to his troops. That he should deliver up all the towns which he had seized, retire to Dunkirk with four hundred foot and three hundred horse, and remain there till every point of difference should be entirely settled; that he should renew the oath which he took at his inauguration, to govern the provinces according to the fundamental laws, and that all his troops should take an oath of allegiance to the States, binding themselves to serve them faithfully against their enemies, and never to be concerned in any attempt to the prejudice of their authority.

Reconcile-
ment of the
States with
Anjou.
March 8th.

As in promoting this agreement the prince of Orange appears to have acted under a conviction, that there was no other expedient by which the confederacy could be saved from ruin; so, in

Attempt on
the life of the
prince of
Orange.

¹³ Van Meteren and Thuanus.

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being able to persuade the States to adopt it, he gave the most convincing proof of his unlimited influence over that assembly. The people in general, especially in Flanders and Brabant, were extremely averse from all accommodation. Their hereditary antipathy against the French had, on this occasion, risen to the greatest height. Many of the deputies too were animated with the same aversion and resentment; nor can it be doubted, that if they had not been prevented by that deference which they had been long accustomed to entertain for William's opinion, they would have proceeded against Anjou to the utmost extremities, and have resolved never more to acknowledge his authority. The Spaniards were not ignorant by whom the States had been prevented from forming this resolution; and they were now convinced, that, till the prince of Orange were removed, no event, however promising, would induce the confederates to return to their allegiance. They had recourse therefore to the dishonorable means of private assassination; and to attempt it, different persons were instigated about this time by Philip or his ministers; one of them by Philip himself, according to the declaration of the criminal; but more probably, by his ministers at Madrid; another by his ambassador at the court of France; and a third by the marquis de Roubais and the prince of Parma. The conspiracy of the two former was detected, and they suffered death; and the last, a French officer, whom Roubais had taken prisoner, and who had pretended to agree to the proposal, in order to procure his liberty,

gave information to William's friends of the arguments which had been employed to persuade him, and showed by his conduct afterwards in the service of the States, the sincerity of his abhorrence of that unhallowed deed which he had been solicited to perform¹⁴.

Discontents
of the people.

The danger to which the prince was so often exposed from the inveterate resentment of the Spaniards, ought to have endeared his person and counsels to his countrymen, and they produced this effect in a high degree upon all those who were able to comprehend the wisdom and moderation with which he had conducted their affairs. But great numbers having formed their judgment of Anjou's election to the sovereignty, from the late unhappy consequences with which it had been accompanied, could not refrain from ascribing some sinister intention to those who had been active in promoting it. They were incapable of discerning the strength of the motives by which William had been prompted to advise the States to renew their agreement, and they even fostered suspicions of his having attached himself to the duke, with a view to some private advantage. This spirit of discontent was not confined to the vulgar, but likewise infected several of the deputies of the States, who became fullen and refractory; and by their contentious opposition to almost every measure that was proposed, disturbed and retarded the deliberations of that assembly. A great majority however of the members agreed to employ the French and Swiss troops under marshal

¹⁴ Meteren, p. 348.

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Biron, whom the duke had appointed to command them. Biron having not only had no concern in the attempt upon Antwerp, but having been considered by Anjou as one by whom it would have been opposed, was the most unexceptionable person to whom the command could have been committed, and he had been long distinguished for his military skill and experience. At first his arms were attended with success. He compelled the fort of Wouda to surrender, and with inferior forces he repulsed the prince of Parma, who had attacked his lines near the town of Rosendal. But it was impossible for him with so small an army to stop the progress of the Spaniards in other places, or to face them in the open field. Farnese therefore pushed his conquest with great rapidity, and made himself master of Endove, Diest, and Westerlo, while he practised every art of negotiation and intrigue against Bruges, Ghent, and other places.

During the course of these transactions the duke of Anjou fell into a lingering illness at Dunkirk, which was generally supposed to be the effect of those hardships which he suffered in his retreat from Antwerp. Whether he believed himself insecure in his present situation, while the prince of Parma was so briskly carrying on his conquests in the neighbourhood, or found that his health required a change of air, and a relaxation from the fatigues of business, or whether he had conceived hopes at this time of obtaining, by a personal interview with his brother, more powerful assistance

than he had hitherto received, does not appear with sufficient evidence. But whatever was the motive which determined him, he left Dunkirk, and set out for France.

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The prince of Parma was no sooner informed of his departure, than he quitted Herentals, and led his troops to Dunkirk. The States, aware of the importance of that place, ordered marshal Biron to march with all his forces to its relief. But such was the resentment which the Ghentese and other Flemings had conceived against the French, that no consideration could prevail upon them to suffer Biron to pass through their territories. They had resolved, they said, never to accede to the late agreement with the duke, whom they could not trust, and they would not be indebted to his troops for their defence. The consequence to be expected followed. The garrison of Dunkirk, which consisted wholly of French, gave up the town in a few days to the prince of Parma. He then laid siege to Nieuport, and took it with so much facility, as gave ground for a suspicion of treachery on the part of the garrison. He intended next to have invested Ostend, but having learnt that the prince of Orange had taken particular pains to provide for its security, he relinquished his design; and having turned his arms against Dixmude and Meningen, he subdued these and several other places with a degree of celerity with which the people of the Netherlands had never been accustomed to see any military enterprises carried on. But his success served only to

Progress of
the prince of
Parma's
arms.

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dazzle and confound the confederates, instead of opening their eyes to the fatal consequences of that discord which had exposed so great a number of their associates an easy prey to the Spaniards. Except augmenting the garrisons of two or three towns, in the preservation of which some of the deputies were personally interested, no vigorous resolution of any consequence was formed by the States, although they held their sessions daily, and were daily alarmed with fresh accounts of some new loss which the confederacy had sustained.

Injurious
suspicions
against the
prince of
Orange.

About this time an incident fell out at Antwerp which strongly marks the spirit by which the Flemings were actuated on this occasion. The prince of Orange having given orders for building an additional rampart for the greater security of the castle, some secret partisans of Spain took occasion from thence to insinuate, that he intended to deliver that fortress to the French, and was now preparing it for their reception. The people too easily believed this injurious suggestion; and having taken up arms, they ran tumultuously to the castle, with a resolution to expel the garrison. William immediately presented himself before them. The sight of a person whom they had been so long accustomed to revere, joined to the evidence which they received on the spot, of the utter falshood of that report which they had so rashly credited, appeased the fury of the greater number, and quelled the tumult. But there were some among them more audacious and malignant than the rest, who called him by the contumelious
names

names of deserter and traitor of his country. This treatment, so unmerited from a people whom he had saved from ruin, affected him in the most sensible manner. He admonished the magistrates to take cognizance of the licentiousness which they had witnessed; but finding, that, on account of the great number of the guilty, they were afraid to exercise their authority, he left Antwerp, and retired into Zealand, after having delivered directions to the magistrates in writing, for the government and defence of the city, and nominated the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, chief magistrate, or governor, for the ensuing year¹⁵.

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He retires
to Zealand,
July 23.

William did not intend by changing the place of his residence, to withdraw his attention from the southern provinces. He interested himself as much as ever in their affairs, and meant only to provide for his own security, and to remove the assembly of the States (which was summoned to

¹⁵ Of the affection of the maritime provinces towards the prince of Orange, and of the trust and confidence which they reposed in him, he received about this time a conspicuous proof, by a resolution into which all the cities entered, except two, of creating him earl of Holland and Zealand, with all the powers and privileges which belonged to that ancient dignity. How far the prince himself contributed to their forming this resolution, does not appear from the cotemporary historians. It did not contradict the treaty between the United States and the duke of Anjou; as, by that treaty, the maritime provinces had only bound themselves to contribute their share of the public expenses. Yet it was matter of some obloquy against the prince, of whom it was said, that he had not been inattentive to his private interest.

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meet at Middleburgh) to a situation in which the deputies would not be so much influenced by the emissaries of Spain, nor so much disturbed in their deliberations by the tumultuous disposition of the people. He still employed all his interest to reconcile the cities of Brabant and Flanders to the continuance of the French troops in the Netherlands. And his endeavours proved effectual with Brussels, and some other towns which lay nearest to the enemy; but Ghent, and most of the other cities, remained as inflexible as ever, and resolved never to admit the French within their territories, or to be indebted to them for protection. The States therefore found it necessary to give orders for the departure of these troops, at a time when every friend of his country, who suffered himself to reflect on the critical situation of the confederacy, thought that the provinces ought rather to have made concessions to Anjou and the French king, in order to induce the latter to augment their number. Biron put them on board transports at Biervliet, and thence conducted them by sea to France.

August 27.

The Spaniards were now at liberty to pursue their conquests almost without opposition. Farnese immediately formed the blockade of Ipres. Allost was sold to him by an English and Walloon garrison for the payment of their arrears. The country of Waes, and the town of Rupplemonde on the Scheld, were subdued, and Zutphen too was taken by surprise; the consequence of which was, that the Veluwe, an extensive territory

between the Iffel and the Rhine, was laid open to the incursions of the enemy.

In the mean time the secret partisans of Spain were daily increafing in Bruges, Ghent, and other places. Many perfons had declared themselves againft Anjou with fo much violence, that they dreaded his return. Many were intimidated by the rapidity of the prince of Parma's conquests. Some having been intrufted with the public money, were afraid of being called to account for their management of it by the prince of Orange and the States, and all of them were allured to their firft allegiance by the moderation with which Farnefe treated fuch as had already fubmitted to him, and the ftrict fidelity with which he adhered to his engagements.

Among the perfons, who, prompted by thefe motives, were defirous of again reducing their country under the Spanifh government, the prince of Orange had the mortification to find his brother-in-law, count Heremberg. This nobleman, weak, inconstant, and governed by his wife, who was the prince's fifter, but had for fome time been at variance with her brother, had formed the defign of delivering the province of Guelderland, of which he had been appointed governor, into the hands of the Spaniards. His plot having been detected before it was ripe for execution, he was feized and imprifoned by an order of the States. But having been afterwards fet at liberty upon his parole, he gave irrefragable proof of his guilt by flying over to the enemy.

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Treachery
of the prince
of Chimai.

The prince of Chimai's intrigues in Flanders were more successful. This nobleman, eldest son of the duke d'Arſchot, had been educated in the catholic faith, but some time before the present period, he had openly professed the reformed religion, and attached himself with much apparent zeal to the party of the prince of Orange and the States. Conscious that both his religion and patriotism were mere grimace, he had labored with consummate artifice to remove any suspicions that might be entertained of his sincerity. He was perpetually surrounded with the protestant ministers, with whom he lived on the most familiar terms; and he published an apology for his conduct, in which, with the highest encomiums on the protestant faith, he mingled the bitterest invectives against Philip, bestowing on him every reproachful epithet which the most implacable hatred could suggest. By these means he had insinuated himself into the favor of great numbers of the protestants, and particularly those of Bruges, who conferred upon him the government of their town. The prince of Orange, having received information of a secret correspondence which he held with the catholics, had at first attempted to dissuade the people of Bruges from electing him their governor, and he now gave secret instructions to the magistrates, to employ colonel Boyd, a Scotch officer, who commanded one of the regiments in garrison, to deprive Chimai of his authority. Boyd affected to enter heartily into the plan proposed, but he betrayed

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the magistrates, and gave immediate information of their design to Chimai; who, through an artful misrepresentation of their conduct, was enabled to expel them from the city. He then put others into their place, who were devoted to his interest, and still pretended all his wonted zeal for the reformed religion, till, having obliged many of the principal citizens to withdraw, he made himself master of the town, and then delivered it to the prince of Parma, upon condition that the prince should confer upon him the government of the province. To the obtaining of this request, which was granted by Farnese, and confirmed by Philip, Chimai thought himself the better entitled, as he had contributed in the same perfidious manner to the reduction of Ipres, which, after a blockade of nine months, had lately been obliged to surrender. Not long after this he threw off the mask of religion, and both he and one of the protestant ministers, who had been a principal instrument of his deceit, publicly abjured Calvinism, and declared themselves converts to the popish faith ¹⁶.

An attempt of the same nature with that of Chimai on Bruges was made by Imbise, and other agents of Farnese, to put Ghent and Dendremonde into his possession. In order to second their endeavours, he had pitched his camp between Ghent and Bruges; but the plan which had been formed for the surprise of Dendremonde was discovered, and Imbise, the principal contriver, who was chief

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May.

¹⁶ Meteren, p. 357. Thuanus, lib. lxxix. c. 15.

BOOK XVIII. magistrate of Ghent, a factious and turbulent old man, was condemned and executed.

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Death of
Anjou.

During these transactions, the prince of Orange was employed in establishing a thorough reconciliation between the States and the duke of Anjou, whose return with a numerous army the prince considered as the only remedy for the increasing calamities of the commonwealth. There was more reason now than ever to expect that Anjou would soon be able to fulfil his engagements. Through the Queen mother's intercession, Henry had openly declared his resolution to exert himself with vigor in the support of his brother's interest in the Netherlands. An ambassador had been sent by the States to congratulate with the duke on this desirable event, and to acquaint him of their having consented to certain conditions which he had proposed. His joy on this occasion was extreme, and he now indulged the most flattering expectations; but he did not long survive these events, which gave him so much pleasure. Having never enjoyed perfect health since the hardships which he underwent in his retreat from

Beginning of
June.

Antwerp, he was seized about this time with an illness, which might have been easily accounted for, from the unsound state of his constitution; but which, agreeably to the practice of the age, was attributed to poison¹⁷. Whatever was the cause, he died in great pain, at Chateau-Thierry, on the 10th of June, 1584, at the age of thirty.

¹⁷ It was supposed to have been given him by his physician, bribed by the court of Spain.

Such was the conclusion of the restless life of this prince, whose weaknesses and vices were equally pernicious to himself, to the Netherlands, and to France. Improvident of the future, and unable to judge for himself, he was a slave to the selfish purposes of others, as well as to his own humor and caprice. He seems likewise to have been incapable of discerning the merit or demerit of those who approached him, or the soundness or folly of the counsels which they offered. He was not void of friendship or attachment, and he was active and ambitious; but he was entirely destitute of that patience, steadiness, and resolution, which are necessary in carrying on any important enterprise; and his conduct towards the United Provinces above related, too clearly justifies what was said of him by his sister Margaret, that if fraud and infidelity were to be banished from the earth, there was in him a stock sufficient from which it might be soon replenished¹⁸.

Yet his death, at the present crisis, was a real calamity to the people of the United Provinces; but the memory of it was soon effaced by a much greater calamity, which in a few weeks afterwards befel them, in the death of the prince of Orange; against whom one of those atrocious attempts, to which Philip's proscription gave birth, proved at last successful. It was planned and afterwards executed in Delft, by Balthazar Gerard, a native of Villefans in Burgundy. This man, in order to facilitate his admission into the prince's presence,

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His character.

Assassination
of the prince
of Orange.

¹⁸ Bentivoglio, 275. D'Avila, l. vi. &c.

BOOK XVIII. 1584. had called himself the son of a French protestant, of the name of Guion, who had suffered for the sake of his religion. By this fictitious account of his extraction, joined to an artful affectation of zeal for the reformed religion and the service of the States, he became known to the prince; and William was so far deceived by this impostor, that he put him into the train of an ambassador to the court of France. This mark of confidence did not divert him from his ungenerous design; on the contrary, he had no sooner returned from France than he resolved to carry it into execution; and he would have done so, as he afterwards declared, on his first arrival, when he was admitted with letters into the prince's apartment, if he had not neglected to furnish himself with arms. But in a few days after, having returned to the palace, on the pretence of applying for a passport, he placed himself at the door of that apartment, in which the prince was at dinner with his wife Louisa de Coligni, and his sister the countess of Schwartzburgh, and waited there, with a cloak cast round him, till they were retiring into another room. The princess, observing him look confused and pale, was greatly alarmed, and inquired what he wanted. He comes for a passport, answered the prince; when the assassin, stepping forward, shot him in the body with a pistol loaded with three balls. William had time only to say, "God have mercy on me, and this afflicted people: I am grievously wounded." Immediately after which he fell down, and in a few moments after-

wards expired ¹⁹; the princess, overwhelmed with anguish, looking on; whose peculiar fate it was to see her second husband murdered, as her illustrious father, and her first husband, the amiable Teligni, had been, in the massacre of Paris, some years before.

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The murderer, in the mean time had made his escape out of the palace by a back-door, and had almost reached the ramparts. He was preparing to throw himself into the ditch, which was full of water, in the hopes of being able to swim over, when he was overtaken by two of the prince's guards.

Upon his first examination he declared, that, six years before the present period, he had formed the design of putting the prince to death; that he had then been deterred from his purpose by his friends; that he had again resumed it, when the king published his edict of proscription; that having been in the service of Du Pré, secretary to count Mansfeldt, he had procured from him some blank subscriptions of the count's, which, in order to gain credit, he had delivered to the prince; that he had communicated his design to four jesuits in Treves and Tournay, who assured him, that if he should die in the execution of it, he would be deemed a martyr by the church.

To these circumstances, after the torture was applied, he subjoined, that the reward promised in the proscription had been his principal motive; that he had made known his purpose to the prince

¹⁹ In the fifty-second year of his age.

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of Parma, and had been advised by him to converse with his secretary, Christopher Affonville; that Affonville had desired him to reflect on the difficulties which he must encounter; but had assured him, that he could not perform a more acceptable service either to the king or the prince of Parma; that he might depend, with perfect security, upon receiving the money promised in the king's edict of proscription; but exhorted him repeatedly to deny, in case of his being seized, that the prince of Parma had approved of his design; although the prince, he said, had in reality approved of it, and had consented to his using the blank subscriptions.

When he was informed of the sentence pronounced against him, in which it was ordained, that his right hand should be burnt off, and the flesh of his body torn from the bones with burning pincers, he was at first thrown into the most dreadful consternation, and lamented bitterly that he had suffered the thirst of wealth to betray him into an action, which had plunged him into such intolerable misery; but he soon recovered his natural fortitude, and said, that, far from repenting of what he had done, he was conscious of having merited the favor of God, and was sure of being admitted into a state of eternal happiness. And in this temper of mind he remained, both in the interval before his execution, and the time of it, during which he exhibited a degree of composure and tranquillity that filled the spectators with astonishment.

The highest encomiums were bestowed on this deluded wretch by the popish ecclesiastics in the

southern provinces; and in many cities they would have lighted up bonfires, and celebrated public rejoicings, if the consent of the people could have been obtained; but even the prince of Parma's troops refused to join in these rejoicings, and openly declared their condemnation of an act, which they found repugnant to the dictates of their hearts, whatever might be said in justification of it, on the principles of crooked politics, or the popish faith.

The reader will not need being told of the grief and consternation, which this melancholy event diffused throughout the confederated provinces. Each person mourned as for his parent, his guardian, and friend, and felt for the loss which the State had sustained, as men are wont to feel for their private and domestic calamities. Being now deprived of the person whose wisdom had, for many years, been their principal support, they considered themselves as destitute and forlorn, and were overwhelmed with the most gloomy apprehensions of their future fate²⁰.

Never was any person better fitted than the prince of Orange for the difficult situation in which he was placed, or better qualified for the arduous task of delivering an injured people from the yoke of their oppressor. Even his bitterest enemies allow him to have been possessed of vigilance, application, penetration, and sagacity, joined with a peculiar dexterity in governing the inclinations of men, and in conciliating and preserving their

Character of
the prince.

²⁰ Meteren, p. 363. Bentivoglio, lib. xii. Thuanus in hoc anno.

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affections. To these accomplishments both the history of his life, and the testimony of the best informed historians, authorize us to add the virtues of fortitude and magnanimity, of justice and equity, of patience, equanimity, and moderation, which were never perhaps found united in one person in so eminent a degree ²¹. Amidst all the variety of fortune which he experienced, he was never either elated or depressed; but whether the events in which he was interested were prosperous or adverse, he preserved on all occasions the same composure and serenity of soul.

By a respectable popish historian ²², he is accused of avarice and rapacity, yet that author has not been able to produce a single fact to justify his charge. It appears not from any historian, that he was ever guilty of employing his power for the purpose of advancing his private interest to the prejudice either of individuals or the public. He always declined taking any concern in administering the finances. He did not even exact payment of the revenue which the States had appointed him; and at his death he left his private affairs so much encumbered, that the States found it necessary to make provision for the support of his widow and children ²³.

The same historian had loaded him with the imputation of fraud and hypocrisy, of which however no proof was ever given but general invective,

²¹ Thuani Historia.

²² Bentivoglio.

²³ Wickfort, lib. ii.

nor a single instance of deceit produced by his most inveterate enemies. Before his rupture with Philip, he testified on all occasions his disapprobation of the measures that were pursued; and after it, he acted uniformly the part of an open foe. He had no religion, say some catholic writers, but what his interest and ambition dictated. Yet he was decent and irreproachable in his conduct, as well as punctual in discharging the functions of that religion which he professed; nor do these authors pretend to offer any other evidence to justify their surmise, but that he gave up the catholic religion, in which he had been educated at the court of the emperor, and returned to that with which his mind had been tinctured in his earliest infancy. His religion was not indeed of the same spirit either with that of those whom he forsook, or of many of those whose cause he adopted. It suffered him not to regard either speculative opinions or external right, as sufficient ground for harassing and butchering those from whom he differed in opinion. But in an age of cruel, gloomy superstition, with which almost all the companions of his youth were deeply infected, his religion, conformably to the example and precepts of its author, was mild, moderate, and humane. Nor was it to one sect of Christians only that his moderation and humanity extended. As he did what he could, while he adhered to the catholic faith, to put a stop to the persecution of the protestants; so after he had embraced the reformed religion, he exerted his most strenuous endeavours

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to protect the catholics from violence, and to procure liberty for them to exercise their religion as far as was consistent with the public peace. To infer from this conduct, that he had no religion of his own, is going a great deal farther than to assert the lawfulness of persecution; it is equivalent to maintaining, that no Christian can be sincere who can live at peace with those who differ from him in his religious persuasion.

It is not to the purpose which the popish historians intended to serve by their portraits of William's character, to say of him that he was ambitious: in itself, ambition merits neither praise nor blame, but is culpable or laudable according to the end at which it aspires, and the means which it employs. But if we judge concerning the character of the prince of Orange according to this criterion, it must be impossible for persons so opposite in their principles, as the catholic and protestant historians, to agree.

If, with the former, we place the rights of all sovereigns on the same foundation, without distinguishing between an absolute prince and the sovereign of a free people, and believe that every prince is, by an indefeasible and divine right, entitled to exercise a despotic power over the religion and liberty of his subjects; if we believe, that with the permission of the pope, a king may violate his most solemn oaths, and that the obligations of his subjects to obedience remain in force, even after every condition upon which they entered into them has been violated; if with such principles as these, we judge of the character of the prince of Orange,

it will be difficult not to consider him as guilty both of perjury and rebellion; and, in this case, the most favorable verdict that can be passed upon his conduct, is to say, that it proceeded from a criminal ambition.

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But if, on the other hand, we regard the pontiff's pretensions to the power of setting men at liberty from their oaths as absurd and impious; if we regard the rights of subjects as no less sacred than those of kings; if we distinguish between a prince invested with unlimited authority, and one whose power is circumscribed by the fundamental laws of the State; between a prince whose right to his dominions is indefeasible, and one who obtained his sovereignty only upon certain terms, which he swore to fulfil, while his subjects engaged to yield their obedience on condition of his fulfilling them; in this case, our judgment of William's character will be extremely different from what it was on the former supposition. We will not be satisfied with barely asserting his innocence of those crimes of which his enemies have accused him, but we will confer upon him the glorious appellations which his countrymen bestowed, of the father of his country, and the guardian of its liberty and laws, who generously sacrificed his interest, ease, and safety to the public good, and who, first by counsel and persuasion, and afterwards by force of arms, did more to rescue his fellow-citizens from oppression, than was ever done in such untoward circumstances by any patriot in the world before ²⁴.

²⁴ William left issue, four sons and eight daughters. By

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his first wife, Anne of Egmont, Countess of Buren, he had Philip William, who was detained for thirty years a prisoner in Spain; and Mary de Nassau, who was married to count Hohenlohe.

By his second wife, Anne, daughter of Maurice, elector of Saxony, he had prince Maurice, so much celebrated in the history of the Netherlands, and a daughter, named Emilia, who married Emanuel, son of Don Antonio, prior of Crato.

By his third wife, Charlotte de Bourbon, daughter of the duke de Montpensier, he had six daughters, viz:

1. Louisa Juliana, who was married to Frederic IV. Elector Palatine.

2. Elizabeth, whom he gave in marriage to Henry de la Tour, duke of Bouillon; and who, besides other children, bore her husband the celebrated Viscount de Turenne.

3. Catharine, who married Lewis, Count de Hanau.

4. Charlotte Brabantina, married to Claude, duke de la Tremouille, to whom she bore the celebrated countess of Derby, who distinguished herself during the civil wars in England; and from whom are descended the present noble families of Derby and Athol.

5. Charlotte Flandrina de Nassau, who embraced the Catholic religion and died abbess of St. Croix in Poitiers.

6. Emilia de Nassau, who was married to the duke of Lansberg.


By his fourth and last wife, Louisa de Coligny, daughter of the great admiral de Chatillon, William had one son, Henry-Frederic, who succeeded his brother Maurice in the principality, of Orange, and in his authority in the united provinces.

Besides this numerous offspring, William left a natural son, Justin de Nassau, who was highly respected for his bravery and conduct, was intrusted with several important commands, and is often mentioned in the sequel.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.



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